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ABSTRACT 
 
This study was premised on the knowledge that the positive socio-economic image of a 
democratic government depends largely upon the humanistic effects of its policy, 
implementation and conduct of those that implement (those saddled with the responsibility of 
implementation of the policy) on one side, and the perceptions of its citizenry and immigrants 
regarding the acceptable standards of services offered by the departments on the other side. 
The argument of the study is that what is widely regarded as xenophobia in South Africa is 
way beyond that, as most migrants who bear the brunt of this ugly phenomenon are presumably 
and mostly people of colour (black African immigrants). It is therefore of crucial importance 
that government departments act equitably, justly and fairly to all and sundry, and not only pay 
lip service to transparency and openness. Socio-economic development vis-à-vis good 
governance is an elusive commodity if it does not address the ills of its society such as 
marginalisation and uneven allocation of the common wealth of the nation. 
 
Adherence to these principles will guarantee the provision of excellent services that meet the 
people’s needs and expectations, enhance customer satisfaction, while upholding the 
government’s promise that access to decent public services is no longer a privilege to be 
enjoyed by a few, but the rightful expectation of all citizens inclusive of other nationals residing 
within its borders. What separates non-nationals is the degree to which exclusion is both 
bureaucratically institutionalised and socially legitimatised. In all cases, it is not only the 
material acts of marginalisation that matters; imprisonment, denial of services, or harassment 
(eg. recent 2016/2017 Operation Fiela) but also the nationalist discourse evoked to legitimise 
and explain them. 
 
From the literature review, it is evident that improved public service delivery depends on 
several aspects ranging from policy making and implementation, Human Resource 
Development (HRD), training and re-training, to performance measurement and 
accountability. The need for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the public services 
cannot be over-emphasised throughout the various pieces of legislation. Questionnaires and 
interviews were used to generate, collate data and to gain an understanding from the perspective 
of the black African immigrants. Both quantitative and qualitative approaches as well as 
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methods triangulation was adopted in the analysis of the collated data, which revealed to a 
greater extent that the popularly held perception of black African immigrants in South Africa 
is that they are relatively deprived in terms of quality of service delivery at the Department of 
Home Affairs, as a result of their vulnerability. Hence, the Theory of Relative Deprivation, 
Social Comparison and Afrophobia informs an explanation for the phenomenon and 
underpinned issues regarding why, how and to whom xenophobia manifests.  
 
The key findings are that, firstly, migrants’ experiences with officials were predominantly 
negative. Secondly, the primary basis for differential treatment of migrants was their 
foreignness, regardless of their nationality. The findings are not only beneficial to the 
participants (black African immigrants), political actors saddled with the responsibility of 
policy-making, but also to the South African government and all public-sector institutions 
dealing with migration policy and immigrants in particular. The recommendations of the study 
are not to negate but rather to challenge for alternative ways to achieve the status quo. The 
bottom-up approach in engagement with migration policy formulation and implementation is 
most sacrosanct.  
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1 CHAPTER ONE : INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Across all borders around the world, migration and immigration has been a widely 
acknowledged phenomenon. The post-World War II period has been called the age of 
migration, since an unprecedented number of people worldwide have been on the move. Hence, 
the attentive observer of globalisation is at least intuitively aware of the centrality of the issue 
of migration. As sub-Saharan Africa is not left out in the new millennium, it is currently 
experiencing challenges and opportunities with respect to the emigration of its skilled 
professionals, the diaspora links with the country of origin, and migrants’ remittances. Sub-
Saharan Africa has experienced major changes in migration configurations from within and 
outside the region.  
 
However, well-managed migration can be a win-win situation for migrants, as well as for origin 
and destination countries, communities and families. Migration plays a major role in the 
complex (and unclear) process of change in the international political order as well as in the 
national/local political order we are experiencing now. It impacts states and regions, their 
societies, economies, and policies.  
Historically, trans-national migration in Africa took place in the 18th century during 
European economic crises and eventual European expansion and resulted in the 
colonisation of the continent. In South Africa, European migration gave rise to 
apartheid, and shipment of cheap labour from Asia and other parts of Africa by white 
investors (South African Parliamentary report, 2008 cited in Umezuruike, 2013).  
 
Apart from the issue of migration, service delivery is also a major issue in South Africa. Within 
both government and outside government circles, South Africans seems to be highly 
dissatisfied with the inadequacy of it at all levels. Hence, while this has led South Africans to 
protest on the streets on several occasions, few or none of these kinds of protests have been 
recorded on the side of the black African immigrants. The major problem is that most studies 
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on immigrants and migration in South Africa tend to concentrate more on xenophobia, while 
studies on service delivery tend to focus more on South African citizens receiving poor service 
delivery. However, this study takes into cognisance that effective service delivery is quite as 
important to black African immigrants in South Africa as it is to its citizens. In the context of 
this study, the concern is with service delivery by the Department of Home Affairs, using 
Durban as a case study in the KwaZulu-Natal Province.  
 
1.2 BACKGROUND AND OUTLINE OF RESEARCH 
 
The growing concern over the allegedly increasing number of illegal immigrants entering 
South Africa (Reitzes, 2000, p.62), was the underpinning factor behind a study of this nature. 
This population influx presents the government and other affected stakeholders with enormous 
challenges in formulating and implementing appropriate policy responses. Accompanying this 
influx is an apparent rise in xenophobia, which has become increasingly evident since the April 
1994 national elections. Anti-foreigner sentiment at times expresses itself in violent attacks on 
those who are assumed by South African citizens to be illegal immigrants. No longer able to 
blame an unrepresentative government for their ills, the poor, homeless and unemployed are 
shifting the blame to foreigners (Reitzes, 1994b and 1995c; Charney, 1995; Tomlinson et al., 
1995). Hence Africans are the most likely to be considered ‘illegal’ immigrants or foreigners, 
even before they have crossed the borders (Peberdy, 2001, p.23-24), as South Africans are 
considerably less concerned with ridding the country of fairer skinned migrants (Landau, 2004, 
p.6). That this obsession with policing the borders of perceived opportunities is shared by 
government authorities, immigration officials, the media and the general public indicates the 
extent to which black African migrants are collectively unwelcome. 
 
However, according to Reitzes (2000, p.62), these alleged illegals are also harassed by state 
officials and police, imprisoned without trial, and subject to corrupt practices. Many illegal 
immigrants are compelled to migrate by condition of political turmoil and socio-economic 
deprivation in their home countries and are drawn to South Africa with the expectation of 
acquiring political freedom, stability and economic opportunities resulting from the advent of 
a democratic government (Charney, 1995, p.7). Although it is not new, this phenomenon has 
been on the increase (Elbourne, 2003, p.46). What is novel is its implications for a recently 
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enfranchised black majority in South Africa, who now regard foreigners (previously perceived 
by some as allies in a regional struggle against apartheid) as potential new enemies and a threat 
to their recently granted civil and political rights and the expectations of socio-economic 
entitlements as proposed in the Reconstruction and Development programme. 
 
Enshrined in Chapter 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) was an end 
to any form of racism and the entitlement of all citizens to equal rights, privileges and benefits. 
This would include efficient service delivery from the public services. In 1995, the year before 
the ratification of the Constitution, the government had released a white paper on 
transformation of public services, introducing a new framework for the implementation of 
policies in a new era for improvement of the general wellbeing of South Africans. Another 
major step was taken in 1997 to introduce a white paper on public service delivery, popularly 
known as the Batho Pele principles, the principles of which were consultation with the 
customers, service standards, access, courtesy, information, openness, transparency, redress, 
and value for money, all of which were meant to satisfy the customers.  
 
The current South African government responses to immigration are diverse and inconsistent, 
as politicians struggle to come to terms with a growing and apparently intractable problem 
which, by their own admission, has taken them by surprise. The majority of state departments 
affected by the issue are adopting a position of “keep them out and send them home” (Reitzes, 
2000, p.63). A more moderate policy towards immigrants, especially those from neighbouring 
states, which might have been expected as a result of the post-apartheid ideological shift, has 
not materialised. Consequently, there has been evidence of service delivery protests by South 
Africans occasioned by poor, inefficient and ineffective service delivery. Although no, or 
hardly any, protests have been organised by the immigrants, this does not mean that all is well 
with the plight of those immigrants (whose legal status as regards to residency is the sole 
responsibility of the Department of Home Affairs), nor is it something to celebrate. According 
to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2012), the body is worried 
about South Africa’s long track-record of violence as a means of protest, the targeting of 
foreigners in particular and the documentation tension over migration policy. While refugees 
and asylum seekers account for only a small proportion of the global movement of people, they 
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frequently travel alongside migrants. Many of these movements are irregular, in the sense that 
they often take place without the requisite documentation (UNHCR, 2012). 
 
According to the South African Migration Project (SAMP, 2005, p.1), the South African 
Department of Home Affairs is responsible for the implementation and management of the 
migration policy and legislation, as well as the registration of births, marriages and deaths and 
the issuing of identity documents and passports. However, it is often criticised in the media and 
in private conversation for being administratively inefficient, cumbersome and unwieldly. 
South Africans and foreign customers reportedly and regularly complain about the poor quality 
of services delivered by the department. Examples of such service delivery needs by 
immigrants from this department are; study permits, work permits, business permits, temporary 
residence permits, permanent residence permits as well as asylum seekers, refugee status and 
registration of birth. Hence, undocumented evidence and media reporting underpins the widely 
held belief that the department is not easily accessible, is unresponsive to the needs of its 
customers, and is riddled with corruption to the extent that systems in place to provide efficient 
and quality services are poorly managed. 
 
The Oxford dictionary (2008) defines xenophobia as an intense or irrational dislike or fear of 
people from other countries. A clear example of this is the 2008 xenophobic attack in South 
Africa. The Department of Home Affairs and the Immigration office are South African 
government recognised institutions that deal with immigrants. However, it can be argued that 
a new term Afro-phobia has emerged in current scholarly debate to refer to the violence that is 
being directed towards foreign nationals from other parts of Africa.  The scholarship posits that 
the dislike of foreigners in South Africa is beyond that of all foreigners in question and the 
term Afro-phobia is specific to African immigrants to complement what is generally regarded 
as xenophobia in the South African context (Isike and Isike, 2012; Matsinhe,2011; Neocosmos, 
2008). In this context Afro-phobia connotes the dislike and fear of African immigrants. On this 
basis, Afro-phobia appears to exist as a result of the prevailing legacy of the apartheid era 
where black South Africans were regarded as an unwanted species. For example, it is alleged 
that although South Africa has recorded a significant rise in immigration from both Africa and 
Europe, white immigrants seem to have experienced fewer problems as compared to black 
African immigrants (Kellett, 2002). This includes white immigrants from Europe and those 
5 
 
who were born in another African country but exclude black immigrants born in Europe who 
have moved to South Africa. Consequently, another outcome of the legacy of apartheid is the 
continuing conception of white economic power. South Africans were for so long indoctrinated 
with the idea of white superiority, that even today many find it difficult to see European 
immigrants as a major problem, unlike black African immigrants (Kellett, 2002). According to 
Statistics South Africa (2012), the result of 2011 data obtained from the Department of Home 
Affairs shows that 116,184 was the total number of immigrants documented on the status of 
both temporary and permanent permits in South Africa. In Kellett’s discourse, the wider 
implication of all economic immigrants seems to be lost in the hangover of apartheid, 
notwithstanding the sheer number of black immigrants compared to white ones, which justifies 
the concern of the local community. 
 
There are currently indications that immigrants and South Africans alike continue to complain 
about service delivery from the Department of Home Affairs. While most recent studies have 
concentrated on the violent or xenophobic attacks on people of colour, few, if any, have 
attempted to unearth and address the perceptions and experiences of African foreigners at the 
Department of Home Affairs in this regard. With the attendant nuance of divergence on 
nomenclature of xenophobia and Afro-phobia as enunciated and experienced among black 
African immigrants in South Africa and their perspectives, it was upon this premise that the 
perception and experience of immigrants in Durban at the Department of Home Affairs was 
explored by the researcher. Thus, the following research questions were selected as a guide to 
the study: 
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS: 
 
i. What are the perceptions of black African immigrants regarding their 
experiences of service delivery at the Durban Department of Home Affairs? 
ii. Does being a black African immigrant applicant affect how they are perceived 
at the Durban Department of Home Affairs? 
iii. Does the nature of the behaviours (Afro-phobia) exhibited by staff affect the 
quality of services delivered to black African immigrants at the Durban 
Department of Home Affairs?  
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1.4 STATEMENT OF TENTATIVE HYPOTHESES 
 
i. The lack of good customer service as experienced by black African immigrants 
at the Durban Department of Home Affairs is often linked to the negative 
attitudes of its officials. 
ii. Most often, officials of the Durban Department of Home Affairs are in doubt 
regarding the documents black African immigrants present to them for 
application purposes. 
iii. There is a strong relationship between Afro-phobia and the nature (quality) of 
service delivery to black African immigrants at the Durban Department of 
Home Affairs. 
 
1.5 RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
Research objectives; 
This research study attempts to ascertain the perceptions among black African immigrants that 
black African immigrants are relatively deprived in terms of the quality of service delivery at 
the Durban Department of Home Affairs, in relation to South African nationals as well as white 
immigrants. 
 
1.6 BROADER ISSUES INVESTIGATED 
 
1) The role of the Visa Facilitation Service (VFS) and challenges therein in immigration 
to South Africa. 
 
1.7 PREVIEW OF STRUCTURE OF CHAPTERS 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents the introduction, statement of research problem, research questions, 
research objectives, statement of hypotheses and overview of the thesis. 
 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter presents the literature review relevant to the study. Hence, relevant scholarly 
debates and postulation were critically reviewed to ascertain the point at which this study fits 
in to fill the gaps in knowledge. 
 
However, this chapter also presents the theoretical framework that revolves around the subject 
matter which assisted in providing answers to the research questions highlighted. Three 
theoretical foundations were thematically analysed in relation to the three hypotheses raised to 
synthesise with the empirical study. 
 
CHAPTER 3: DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS 
SERVICE PROVISION 
 
This chapter unpacks the Department of Home Affairs as an entity or department of the South 
African government with the sole responsibility of managing migration in and outside its’ 
territory. Thus, explanation is given regarding the legislative framework that underpins the 
responsibility of the department and the challenges hindering its’ service delivery function. 
More light is shed on the newly introduced immigration regulation, emergence of VFS Global 
and its’ role in visa processing, and also on how applications are processed by VFS Consortium, 
as well as the challenges inherent with the newly introduced VFS. 
 
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
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This chapter focuses on the research methodology, research design, population, sampling 
frame, the research instrument, administration of the research instrument, procedures used for 
processing the collected data and the limitations of the methodology. 
 
CHAPTER 5: PERCEPTION AND EXPERIENCES OF AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS ON 
SERVICE DELIVERY AT THE DURBAN DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS 
 
This chapter captures both quantitative/statistical and qualitative/thematic data presentation 
and analysis in alignment with the research questions and objectives, analysis of demographic 
characteristics of the respondents as well as the test of the hypotheses. Hence, an effort is made 
to present the data in such a way that it will be easily understood at a glance.  
 
CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATION AND SUMMARY CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter provides the summary of the entire the study, conclusions drawn from the findings, 
as well as recommendations and suggestions for further study. 
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2 CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A literature review is a conceptual analysis of the body of knowledge as written by others on 
the subject (Umezuruike, 2013), with the additional aim of positioning the topic being 
researched within this larger body of knowledge. This chapter provides an extensive and 
comprehensive literature review in synthesising and analysing what has already been written 
on the subject matter. However, the organisational scheme of this literature review is built 
around concepts. For example, the review is organised around the conceptual propositions in 
the study title, and some of the key constructs in the research questions as derived from the 
research problem. It unveils various definitions and conceptualisations of service, service 
delivery issues, immigration, migration and xenophobia in the global world and South Africa 
in particular, bearing in mind that there are no universally accepted definitions of the concepts 
by contributors (Umezuruike, 2013).  
 
Instead, the study conceptualises them based on what has already been written on the topic. 
This chapter aims at bridging the gap between what has been written on the topic, which is in 
a way conceptually and methodologically insufficient, and what has not been written, in order 
to clarify the gaps, shortcomings and weaknesses of the existing knowledge (Auriacombe, 
2001, p.22). For this purpose, the literature review is of great importance to any resourceful 
research. Hence, the study critically reviews the scholarship on three related concepts/broad 
areas namely; Governance/Service Delivery, Migration/Immigration, Xenophobia/Afro-
phobia as well as discussion on the theoretical framework that underpins this study. 
 
2.1  GOVERNANCE 
 
There are three conditions that depict good governance and, by implication, effective problem-
solving. Firstly, citizen influence and oversight (the means by which citizens can participate in 
the political process and thereby express their preferences about public policy; how well these 
preferences are aggregated for effective policy-making; and what means exist for holding the 
leadership accountable for their decisions and actions (Hyden 1992 as quoted by Venter 2011, 
p.7). Secondly, responsive and responsible leadership: the attitudes of political leaders towards 
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their call of duty as public trustees. This speaks directly to the openness of public policy-
making or the readiness to share information with citizens and adherence to the rule of law. 
Thirdly and extremely crucial, is social reciprocity or inter-group tolerance: how far groups 
demonstrate tolerance of one another in the pursuit of politics and how far voluntary 
associations are capable of transcending the boundaries of kinship, ethnicity or race. 
 
Ultimately, good governance requires political reform and renewal, and a concerted attack on 
corruption. This can be done only by strengthening the transparency and accountability of 
representative bodies, by free elections in a multiparty system, by encouraging public debates, 
by nurturing press freedom, by developing civil society organisations and by maintaining the 
rule of law and an independent judiciary. Omoworare (2010) states that for a few states, good 
governance is conspicuously absent with visible poverty, dilapidated infrastructure, reckless 
abandonment of the education, health, transport, agriculture, industrial and other sectors with 
a direct bearing on the life of the people. 
 
The image of a government depends upon the conduct of its employees and the perceptions of 
its citizenry regarding the acceptable standards of services offered by the departments. It is 
therefore of crucial importance that government departments act justly and fairly to one and 
all, and not just paying lip service to transparency and openness. Good governance is an elusive 
commodity. Bratton and Rothchild (1992) as quoted by Venter (2011, p.1) state that 
governance is the practice of good government and it remains, essentially a fragile process that 
depends on “the restraint of the ruler” and “the tolerance of the ruled”. The concept of 
governance refers in a generic sense to the task of running a government (Barkan, 1992 as 
quoted by Venter, 2011, p.6). Crisis on the African continent has been identified as one of 
governance (World Bank, 1989 as quoted by Venter, 2011, p.6). According to Hyden (1992 as 
quoted by Venter, 2011, p.6), there are four major shortcomings that are the causes of bad 
governance. Firstly, it is the extensive personalisation of power which then encourages 
customers’ relations on a two person or dyadic basis but discourages the growth of wider forms 
of trust and reciprocity (Callaghy, 1984; Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Joseph, 1987 as quoted 
by Venter, 2011, p.6). Secondly, it is the denial and often widespread abuse of fundamental 
human rights by errant rulers. Human rights abuses cause many citizens to withdraw from 
politics or evade rather than engage political authorities. 
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2.2 SERVICE DELIVERY ISSUES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
According to Crous (2004) as cited by Ngidi (2012), it is the implementation of laws and the 
actual provision of services and products that constitutes governance. The programmes of 
government should thus contribute towards an enhanced quality of life for all. This implies that 
the outcomes of public administration are aimed at service delivery and the improvement of 
the general welfare of the people (Crous, 2004, p.574, as cited by Ngidi, 2012). 
 
From all indication, what this means is that South African public service can be judged based 
on one major criterion which is: its effectiveness in delivering services that meet the basic 
needs of all South African citizens. Consequently, South Africa has been dubbed ‘the service 
delivery protest capital of the world’ (Rodrigues, 2010), and has one of the highest rates of 
public protests in the world (Alexanda, 2012). What this service delivery protest in South 
Africa seems to prove is that something is wrong and needs urgent attention. 
 
It is often argued that the rate of protests has been escalating since 2004 (Alexanda, 2012). The 
rate of protests rose dramatically in the first eight months of 2012 (Davids, 2012) and it was 
reported that there were 540 protests in the province of Gauteng between 1 April and 10 May 
2013 (Patel, 2013). According to Du Preez (2014), in February 2014 alone, there had been 
nearly 3,000 protest actions in the preceding 90 days – more than 30 a day – involving more 
than a million people. Below are a number of reasons given for service delivery protests in 
South Africa: 
 Unequal and segregated distribution of land in both rural and urban areas (Davids, 
2012) 
 The demand for housing (Benjamin, 2011) 
 Poor service delivery (TNS Research, 2011), especially with regard to water (Mouton, 
2013) and sanitation (Robins, 2013) 
 Rampant crime (Benjamin, 2011) 
 Unemployment (Benjamin, 2011) 
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 Police brutality (De lange, 2011) 
 Increases in transport prices (Langa and Magwaza, 2011) 
 Electricity disconnections (Damba, 2011), increases in electricity prices (De wet, 
2012), and the failure to provide electricity to shack settlements (Stone, 2012) 
 Overcrowding in schools (Chauke, 2012) 
 Failure to install traffic calming measures on roads adjacent to shack settlements (De 
wal, 2012) 
 Low wages (Polgreen, 2012) 
 
Martin (2003, p.303), is assertive that providing levels of service that fall short of customer 
expectations carries the risk that customers will take their business elsewhere. Dlamini-Zuma 
(2009, p,6) equally states that poor service delivery will cause customers to move to 
anotherprovince for better services which will lead to the ineffectiveness of the Department of 
Home Affairs in the Eastern Cape. This may lead to closure of the department because there 
are fewer people who visit the department to get services. It is well documented that there is a 
great deal of customer inertia when it comes to changing financial service providers. Mapisa-
Nqakula (2007, p.3) states that customers may well accept service standards that fall short of 
their expectations in one or two areas if they feel that the rest of the service they receive meets 
or   exceeds their requirements. The Department of Home Affairs seem to fall prey to the levels 
of service expected by the customers as evidenced by the long queues and complaints, 
demonstrations and at times corruption (Dlamini-Zuma, 2009, p.6). 
 
Mathis and Jackson (2007, p.16) argue that the most important factor to consider is the level 
(or standard) at which the service is provided. The choice of the level of a particular service is 
influenced by affordability as well as community needs. However, Park (2003, p.123) submits 
that when an organisation makes decisions about the level of service, then they should seriously 
consider the long-term viability of providing a service at that level. 
 
2.2.1 Observations 
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Prior to 1994, according to Crous (2004) as cited in Ngidi (2012), the South African citizenry 
has been reluctant to speak out for fear of being jailed or maltreated and instead, has 
increasingly opted ‘to vote with their feet’ in order to escape repressive political control. This 
can be seen from the decisions/instructions from boardrooms, where foot soldiers (policy 
implementers/workers) decide (asivume konke, kepha singenzi nokukodwa) to agree with all 
decisions imposed upon them and end up not implementing any of its undertakings. Thirdly, 
the prominence and prevalence of an unelected and unaccountable government which 
manifests itself in reluctance to decentralise or delegate authority and a tendency to curb any 
independent political activity outside an institutional network controlled by the ruling party-
state. Fourthly, a situation in which the apparatus or resources of the state primarily become 
the means for elite to acquire wealth, rather than serve as a corrective mechanism to promote 
social justice and sustainable economic development, consequently this has led to widespread 
and even endemic corruption. 
 
Since the advent of democracy in 1994, several policies relating to service delivery have been 
formulated and implemented. One such crucial policy is the Batho Pele White Paper gazetted 
in 1997. Batho Pele, ‘people first’, is an initiative that intends to transform the public service 
at all levels. The democratic South Africa inherited a public service that was not people-
friendly and lacked the skills and attitudes to meet the developmental challenges facing the 
country. In the struggle to transform the public service, there was a need to ensure that citizens 
are served properly, that all employees work to their full capacity and to treat state resources 
with respect (South Africa, White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery, 1997). The 
government regional offices are the real delivery arms of government as they are directly in 
contact with government services beneficiaries and it is where corruption takes place. 
 
2.3 SERVICE DEFINITION 
 
Stanton (1981, p.441) defines service as those separately identifiable, essentially in tangible 
activities which provide want-satisfaction, and that are not necessarily tied to the sale of a 
product or another service. By suggesting that service organisations are those which do not 
have as their principal aim the production of tangible products which buyers will possess 
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permanently, this is close to the idea of Gronoroos (1984, p.589) that “the service is the object 
of marketing i.e. the company is selling the service as the core of its market offering”. 
 
Another similar definition is that of Kotler (2002, p.624) who says “a service is any activity or 
benefit that one party can offer to another that is essentially intangible and does not result in 
the ownership of anything. Its production may or may not be tied to a physical product”. 
What these definitions share is their emphasis, directly or by implication, on the essentially 
intangible nature of a service. Following is a discussion on the distinctive characteristics of a 
service. 
 
2.4 PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
In delivering services, public institutions can either be passive/reactive or strategic/proactive. 
According to Ghobadian et al., (1993, p.55) passive quality emphasises planning and control, 
to minimise customer annoyance, rather than customer satisfaction, hence focus and effort is 
on Herzberg’s hygiene factors. In the context of public institutions hygiene factors would place 
emphasis on aspects such as rationalising functions, structures, legislation and resources, rather 
than also emphasising the use of non-financial measures such as product quality and customer 
satisfaction. However, sole compliance with hygiene factors does not ensure customer 
satisfaction. Alternatively, in strategic or proactive approaches quality is used to differentiate 
the local authority’s service delivery to gain customer satisfaction, rather than mere compliance 
with legislative requirements, which emphasises basic service delivery (Umezuruike, 2013). 
 
Public institutions were battlegrounds in a contest of power between social groups. Public 
service delivery is commonly understood to mean the provision of public goods or social 
(education, health), economic (grants) or infrastructural (water, electricity) services to those 
who need (or demand) them. In South Africa, given apartheid, the provision of services by 
government is linked to the larger task of redistribution, social justice, poverty alleviation and 
economic growth. In this way, the delivery process is strongly associated with development 
and the notion of the developmental state is associated with the capacity to provide social 
justice (Mc Lennan, 2007). This conceptualisation of delivery is a consequence of the specific 
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history and context of South Africa and its apartheid heritage. In Thompson’s discourse, the 
application and maintenance of apartheid led to a questioning of the legitimacy and purpose of 
all state delivery structures and processes. An increasing authoritarianism from the apartheid 
government was reacted to with defiant resistance from anti-apartheid activists and liberation 
movements (Thompson, 1995).  
 
Since the demise of apartheid and eventual inception of democracy and majority rule in South 
Africa in 1994, the three branches of the government of South Africa; parliamentary, executive 
and judiciary have reportedly been found wanting in keeping to their promise of accelerated 
and improved service delivery. This may be due to the wide range of challenges inherent in the 
system, including the inherited problems from apartheid and various new challenges 
(Neocosmos, 2008 cited in Umezuruike, 2013). It is therefore interesting to note that there have 
been analyses from different perspectives to explain the failures and successes of the South 
African government in service delivery. 
 
The former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, identified a major problem in the South 
African socio-political economy when he acknowledged that the state had two parallel            
economies, first world and third world, in other words developed and under-developed. In his 
analysis, the first world economy of South Africa had features of modernity and produced the 
majority of the country’s wealth. It was also highly globalised and well-integrated into the 
world political economy. On the other hand, the third world was not developed, but 
dysfunctional with evidence of an inability to generate growth. Thus, South Africa has laid out 
developmental targets since 1994, setting a target in 2004 for poverty reduction from 1/3 to 1/6 
of households in 2014, unemployment from 30 per cent to 15 per cent, and expansion of 
services of various kinds (Levin, 2007). 
 
Burger’s analysis was centred on the conditions of poverty in South Africa, but he argued that 
effective service delivery is necessary to South African citizens because of the obvious role it 
could play in the possible eradication of poverty. His study further warned against short 
sightedness in policymaking and formulation because such could lead to a possible failure on 
the part of the government, while admitting that it has caused implementation to fail since the 
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end of apartheid. If the new democratic South Africa is to succeed, a high level of planning 
should be undertaken followed careful execution (Burger, 2005). 
 
Karuri-Sebina, Hemson, and Carter examined developmental local government and Batho Pele 
principles, but the common idea was that it is an effort toward alleviating poverty and 
improving service delivery to the general public in the new era of the country. They agreed that 
the South African public service will be judged by service delivery efficiency. In their view the 
essence of good governance is to make life better for the citizens. They also agreed that 
developmental local government can make a vital change in this direction (Karuri-Sebina et 
al., 2010; see also Mubangizi and Gray, 2011 cited in Umezuruike, 2013) on putting the public 
into public service delivery for social welfare. 
 
Mubangizi and Mubangizi examined South Africa’s diverse wealth in terms of human and 
material resources, and the effort of government to use available resources to alleviate poverty. 
Thus, South Africa explored the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), both of which aimed at improving the lives 
of the South African citizens as the nation targeted effective service delivery in various 
ramifications (Mubangizi and Mubangizi, 2005 cited in Umezuruike, 2013). 
 
Mubangizi, while writing on poverty alleviation and service delivery and a possible conceptual 
framework workable for South Africa’s service, argues that the country has made efforts in 
poverty eradication using poverty alleviation strategies. The paper, using three major reports 
on poverty and alleviation in the history of South Africa agrees on the link between poverty 
alleviation and service delivery. The paper further criticises the first Carnegie Commission 
report of 1929-1930 on the poor whites in South Africa for its lack of vision for the entire 
country. Rather than being of benefit to both blacks and whites it further impoverished blacks 
and favoured whites. Nor did the second Carnegie report of 1984 help, as recommendations 
again excluded poverty alleviation on the part of blacks. The paper agreed that the poverty and 
inequality report of 1997 was comprehensive as it identified all the inabilities that increased 
poverty, including those effecting both blacks and whites, such as lack of natural, social, 
institutional and human assets (Mubangizi, 2009). 
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Naidoo and Xollie (2011) cited in Umezuruike (2013) examine the critical situation of service 
delivery in South Africa since the democratic dispensation in the country, pointing out the 
constant crisis the system has continued to experience in service delivery, despite the steady 
efforts of the government in the direction of improvement centred on articulated leadership, 
improved managerial capacity, and workable developmental initiatives. The paper supports the 
argument advanced by the former president that the socio-political economy is divided into 
two parallels, the developed and under-developed (rich and poor), on which hope lies in an 
improved service delivery based on improved leadership, managerial capacity and proper 
developmental initiatives. 
 
Smith and Vawda examine the transformation that has taken place in Cape Town local 
government since the 1996 democratic transition to democracy. The major challenge was the 
inclusion of the majority of the population in the policymaking as the democratic government 
grappled with poverty reduction. The simple aim was to improve quality of service delivery to 
South Africans, especially those in the group deprived of a better life during apartheid days 
(Smith and Vawda, 2003 cited in Umezuruike, 2013). 
 
Regarding the election of the local government of 2006, Booysen’s (2007) study asserts that 
the election was also a referendum as it proved wrong the assumptions that the previous protests 
of poor service delivery were against the ANC-led government. Rather, it was protests purely 
against poor service delivery because the election still saw majority support for the ruling party. 
The study notes that over 900 protests of poor service delivery took place between 2004 and 
2006, while the parliamentary report shows that 881 illegal protests were recorded during the 
same period, but a good point about the system was its ability to recognise the people’s freedom 
to peaceful protests. On the election of 2011, Clark expresses the same view, because the 
service delivery protests in the country did not prevent the ANC being re-elected (Clark, 2011 
cited in Umezuruike, 2013). 
 
Nleya conducted research on the macro-economy of development policies on water delivery, 
extending it to urban policies in South Africa. He remarked that most urban poor South 
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Africans live in informal settlements close to urban areas, but compares it to rural areas of 
which both have experience of poor service delivery, as in water supply, sanitation and housing, 
during the apartheid era. The study concluded that the indelible marks of apartheid are still 
problematic in the service delivery to informal settlements and rural areas, but an improved 
strategy should be put into place to ensure that water supply is free to the poor South Africans, 
including those of the informal settlements who have been denied their privileges of a better 
life under a democratic dispensation (Nleya, 2008 cited in Umezuruike, 2013). 
 
Viljoen (2010) notes that South Africa has a unique environment and topography and is making 
progress in provision of a safe water supply to its citizens. He argues that the World Health 
Organisation’s (WHO) water safety plan was excellent, as the Rand Water, a large water 
company service provider approved of the water safety plan. This is a clear move of South 
Africa to improve service delivery to South Africans as the country tackles poverty in the 
democratic dispensation. He is of the view that clean water is a life necessity and providing it 
to South Africans, both the rich and the poor, is a government’s responsibility (Viljoen, 2010). 
 
McKechnie and Bridgen, cited in Umezuruike (2013) discuss the burden South Africa is 
carrying due to the lack of skills and manpower, especially in the engineering sector, and agree 
on the adverse effects of the situation on service delivery. Their paper highlights confrontations 
such as the historical education legacy which ensured the under-development of blacks and the 
development of the white minority, global demand for skills in the engineering sector and the 
movement of such skills out of South Africa, deficiencies in the present educational system, 
poor performance in sciences, and the fall in traditional artisans and training. In their view, 
there is the need for an improved engineering sector, particularly electrical, in order to achieve 
effective service delivery in the public and private sector (McKechnie and Bridgen, 2008). 
 
Lombard (2008) cited in Umezuruike (2013) investigated the South African government’s 
effort in balancing the injustices of the past, which have led to massive investment in social 
security with little left for social service delivery. Social development, however, is emerging 
as a major contributory factor in the second decade of South African democracy, unlike in the 
first decade in which it did not. His hope is that the state will only be solidly developed if the 
service delivery is made effective (Lombard, 2008). 
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Allais researched the educational reform in South Africa after 1994, noting that the 
government’s first step in education reform was a national qualification framework made up 
of mostly outcomes, but about ten years later the reform was met with too many challenges. 
However, the reforms were intended to address inequality in the socio-political system. His 
paper notes the vital roles a high quality educational system could play in the development of 
a country, particularly in a country with the past of South Africa (Allais, 2007). 
 
AFRIMAP and the Open Society Foundation for South Africa reported a positive change in 
South African service delivery in the education sector as the country pushed for improved 
conditions for its citizens. In the first place, the policy framework of education allows for 
equality of all South Africans in access to learning. The perception is that the Department of 
Education (DoE) is on course to achieve the target of providing basic education to all citizens 
by 2015 as mandated. The literacy rate increased for 15 to 24 olds from 88 per cent to 90 per 
cent from 1990 to 1994, with enrollment rates on the increase, and the pass rate also on the 
increase. The study used the Western Cape and Limpopo Provinces as relatively well and 
poorly funded areas respectively (AFRIMAP and Open Society Foundation for South Africa’s 
2007 report cited in Umezuruike, 2013). 
 
Research on perceptions of service delivery by HIV/AIDS infected persons in South Africa by 
Giya (2010) observed the negative attitudes of politicians towards the eradication of the 
disease. Politicians, it found, including grassroots politicians and councillors, are only willing 
to declare their AIDS/HIV results when they test negative. Their decision is based on the fear 
of rejection and stigma attached to the disease, which they believe could cost them their jobs, 
as the expected reaction of the public could be to distance themselves from such politicians. 
The paper advocates an effective fight against the stigma through prevention, care, treatment 
and attention to the orphans, and all those who are vulnerable. In this argument, a positive 
attitude is required from the politicians in a fight against the HIV pandemic (Giya, 2010). 
 
Alexander’s (2010, p.26) study on protest action embarked by the citizen of South Africa 
argues that there are strong similarities linking the Mbeki-era and the Zuma-era protests which 
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are principally about inadequate service delivery and lack of accountability by local 
councillors. The study indicates that the significant difference is that the new government has 
greater legitimacy. The key difference between the apartheid years and the present is the 
existence of a democratic government retaining widespread legitimacy. In summary, 
Alexander labelled service delivery protests in South Africa the rebellion of the poor. 
 
However, Manala (2010, p.519) disagrees with Alexander’s postulation, and hence opines that 
while it may be tempting to agree with that description, it would rather be viewed as the 
exercising of the people’s rights in the only way open to them for expression of their 
grievances, dissatisfaction and demands since they were not given an opportunity and a 
hearing. According to Manala (2010) the problem of lack of sufficient financial resources 
which prevents municipalities from paying their bulk suppliers and that of corrupt officials who 
abuse state funds are reasons for service delivery to be addressed unequivocally. 
 
Koelble and Lipuma’s (2010, p.583) study on service delivery issues based on detailed cross-
sectional profiles of 18 municipalities across the Eastern and Western Cape indicates that the 
problem of non-delivery is located not so much in demographic shifts or a general lack of 
funding in South Africa, but in the lack of state capacity and the unwillingness of the central 
state to enforce the rules on the law-books on its own operatives in local government. Their 
argument is that the current wave of political protests in South Africa is not purely one of 
reacting against poor service delivery but that the protests are multi‐dimensional and express a 
range of issues from poor service to xenophobia and legitimate concerns about the tax-base of 
some of the municipalities. 
 
AFRIMAP and the Open Society Foundation for South Africa, while investigating service 
delivery in the Health Department admit the grave dangers and challenges of diseases such as 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. The millennium goals of the Health Department are in 
line with those of the WHO (World Health Organisation), which includes reduction of child 
and maternal rates, with a controlling mechanism for their spread. However, life expectancy is 
on the decrease, as is spending on healthcare with regards to GDP. The scourge of HIV/AIDS 
is mostly responsible for lower life expectancy, but government intentions and efforts to 
improve healthcare are not being taken for granted, which increases in health facilities and 
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services could better explain (AFRIMAP and Open Society Foundation for South Africa 2007 
report). 
 
Booysen (2003) criticises the inequalities which exist in rural-urban health services in South 
Africa while noting the existence of discrepancies in the urban areas. The problem is over-
dependency of those who reside in rural areas on public healthcare, compared to those who 
reside in the cities, who have higher chances of private healthcare. Apparently, the public 
healthcare in South Africa is in a poor state; however, decentralisation of healthcare to local 
level may close the discrepancies. Whittaker, Burns, Doyle and Lynam (1999) emphasise South 
Africa’s position on the continent as the most industrialised country in Africa, with a population 
of over 40 million. The public and private sector provide healthcare but with a striking 
dominance of public sector providing healthcare for over 70-80 per cent or more of the total 
population. The paper argues that healthcare has changed drastically from a hospital base to 
primary healthcare in recent years. However, the latest trend is a multi-disciplinary approach 
in its provision. The paper is in agreement with that of Boosyen (2003) on over-dependency of 
the common people on healthcare in South Africa. 
 
Kuye and Naidoo (2003) were concerned about the impact of modern technology in service 
delivery in the computer age; however, they agreed on the need to utilise new technology and 
to improve the quality of service delivery in the socio-political system of South Africa. And 
the service delivery strategy in the public sector is aimed at re-engineering government efforts 
in the current way of running the political economy of the country, by involving the larger 
sectors, including the private sector and Small and Medium Enterprises (SMMEs), all of which 
have major roles to play in socio-political development (Kuye and Naido, 2003). 
 
Visser and Twinomurinzi (2008) observe that the failure of e-government and public service 
delivery in South Africa are not far from what is found in other developing countries. In the 
effort of governments around the world to seize the ample opportunity provided by the 
computer age to improve service delivery, attempts have been made to define e-government or 
e-governance. It is clear that both are methods of using information and communication 
technology (ICT) to enhance governmental processes. The paper notes that in South Africa the 
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principle of Batho Pele, or ‘people first’, does not align with e-government or e-governance. 
However, the paper suggests the alignment of e-government and Batho Pele principles to 
ensure effective use of e-government in service delivery in South Africa (Visser and 
Twinomurinzi, 2008). 
 
Researchers from the Centre for Sociological Research (CSR) list the following findings after 
in-depth research in the four areas that they identify as ‘service delivery hotspots’ namely, Piet 
Retief, Balfour, Thokoza and Diepsloot (Sinwell et al. 2009, p.1): 
 
 The communities involved in this recent cluster of service delivery protests share many 
of the same problems and frustrations. Poverty and unemployment levels are high 
compounded by a lack of basic services including water, sewage systems, street 
lighting, paved roads as well as adequate and appropriate housing. 
 It is clear that the four protests only occurred after unsuccessful attempts by community 
members to engage with local authorities over issues of failed service delivery.  
 The cases of Balfour and Thokoza suggest that the brutal response by police 
contributed to the violence, rather than the protesters themselves being solely 
responsible. 
 No evidence was found that xenophobia was the prime motivator behind the service 
delivery protests. While xenophobic attitudes are widespread, these protests have been 
primarily directed at issues pertaining to local government service delivery. 
 Political divisions clearly play an important role in producing frustrations among the 
masses, particularly in Thokoza where there is an IFP stronghold. In Diepsloot, protests 
have at least partially emanated from concerns that particular areas of the community 
are prioritised over others. No evidence was found that people’s demands were rooted 
in a campaign against the Zuma administration or the national policies of the ANC, but 
rather the failure of the ANC to implement policy at a local level. In fact, the case of 
Piet Retief revealed that the protestors were in support of the ANC. However, all the 
communities sampled in this research expressed discontent over what they felt was a 
lack of communication and accountability at various levels of local government. 
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 The findings presented confirm that the frustrations with government service delivery, 
and protests which result from this will remain part of the South African political 
landscape as long as people do not have access to basic services and are unable to find 
effective channels through which to express their demands. 
 
From the abovementioned findings enumerated by the Centre for Sociological Research, it 
seems that their conclusion is that the core causes of service delivery protests could be 
attributed to the continuing poverty, unemployment, inability of the ANC to implement policy 
and lack of participation by communities in local government structures and systems. They 
remarked that communities are not given an opportunity to express their grievances and 
demands and are not given a hearing by local government authorities. The police brutality in 
dealing with protests is not helpful either; it instead fuels the frustration and anger of 
communities leading to further violence (Manala, 2010). 
 
On effective service delivery, Whittaker et al. (1998) argue in favour of seemingly closing the 
gap between the private and public sector in a practical sense, because of the steady efforts 
being made to achieve effective service delivery in the right directions. Government of 
democratic states often involve the private sector in the service delivery through public sector-
private sector partnership or direct employment of the private sector by the public sector to 
deliver much desired service to the general public. The paper reiterates that the essence of a 
state is to ensure the stability of the system both politically and economically, in other words 
the welfare of the citizenry. In view of this function, the state would have to harness its 
resources to ensure effective service delivery. In South Africa, there are clear cases of private 
sector participation in the public service delivery (Whittaker et al., 1998). 
 
Elhiraika (2007), while writing on fiscal decentralisation and service delivery in South Africa, 
argues in favour of fiscal and financial autonomy on the part of sub-national government in 
South Africa and African countries. He observes that the political autonomy in the sub-national 
government of South Africa contrasts with the lack of fiscal and financial autonomy in the sub-
national government. Decentralisation is favoured in different countries for different reasons, 
but a constant reason is effective service delivery at the grassroots. Centralisation has hampered 
development and service delivery in South African. It has also affected accountability, since 
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monitoring inter-governmental transfers has increased corruption in Africa through lack of 
transparency in such inter-governmental relations. Using provincial government to theorise, 
the paper argued for improved accountability, transparency and effective service delivery to 
the people through greater revenue and fiscal autonomy on the part of lower levels of 
government (Elhiraika, 2007). 
 
Raga and Taylor (2005) researched accountability and ethics on public service delivery from 
South African perspectives but agreed that the principles are commonly used to promote good 
governance and effective service delivery. The paper agrees on the simple goal of 
accountability, which is giving account and being responsible for accounts. Ethics, on the other 
hand, underpin boundaries between rights and wrongs. The paper argues that ethics and 
accountabilities produce transparency and openness in the public sector, which apparently 
increases productivity in service delivery (Raga and Taylor, 2005). For failures of the 
democratic dispensation since 1994 on facts, fictions and fabrications of service delivery in 
South Africa, see Khosa (2001). 
 
Maserumule’s (2007) study on public service delivery in South Africa simply centred on the 
impact of misunderstandings between the director-general and ministers often negatively 
reported to the general public by the media. The paper notes the administrative roles of the 
director-general, whom the civil service rules agree are the administrative heads of the 
departments and part of the civil service, while the ministers are the political heads of the 
departments, though appointed by the President, who is the head of the Cabinet. The study 
further calls for the contribution of scholars in solving this problem of misunderstandings 
between the political heads and administrative heads, arguing that the assumptions of the media 
that both political and administrative heads adhere to their traditional roles cannot solve the 
problem. They rather call for postulations and theories that could be workable. 
 
Mc Lennan (2007) emphasises that since delivery is associated with redistribution, the stakes 
of non-delivery are politically high. Most state-driven delivery processes, while apparently 
technical or managerial, are political, as they define a power relationship between the state, its 
citizens and the economy. They are essentially about who gets what, when, in what ways and 
for what reasons. In South Africa, defining access denied by apartheid is central to this process, 
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given that apartheid was explicitly about limiting public services and economic opportunities 
to a select group. However, the emphasis on access gives primacy to the politics of distribution 
and a struggle over the proverbial slice of the pie. Service delivery improvement is seen in 
linear input-output terms as a more efficient or effective provision. The key improvement tactic 
is better management and strategies concentrated on speeding up supply chain routes, providing 
capital, better project management or improved distribution of resources. Often considerable 
effort is put into the development of systems and the restructuring of governance, management 
or policy implementation processes, with very little payoff. This is because these new systems 
are overlaid on institutionalised practices and routine ‘ways of doing things’ which disrupt 
delivery. 
 
Thompson (1995) observes that while the operational aspects of delivery cannot be ignored, 
improved access does not, on its own, secure a better life for all. In highly unequal societies, 
improving delivery has to do more than provide entry rights or reallocate the pieces of the pie. 
For example, electing women into parliament may redistribute a few limited positions, but it 
does not put rape or women’s impoverishment onto national agendas. In all societies, but 
particularly in unequal ones, the expectation is that improved delivery will shift established 
patterns of deprivation and improve life chances. 
 
Improvements then require a focus not only on distribution, but on the established social 
institutions, norms and practices that condition the citizens’ ability to control their lives and 
livelihoods. These practices define the politics of the delivery process - the unwritten rules, 
symbols, social constraints and power dynamics that define distribution. These institutions’ 
pattern distribution, by establishing boundaries for acceptable practice that mediate people’s 
ability to act, result in a growing distance from the resources necessary to sustain survival. 
Societies come to accept unequal, poor or uneven delivery outcomes as ‘the way things work’.  
 
Mc Lennan (2003) observes that, in practise, service delivery improvements are usually 
technical and focus on visible obstacles, while the less visible constraints, such as established 
social, economic and cultural patterns of social interaction are overlooked. If delivery is 
understood in terms of historically developed sets of practices through which social actors 
engage around the production and distribution of public goods, then improving delivery 
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requires an awareness of both operational and political processes. However, improvement 
strategies which focus on access only are insufficient to ensure that those historically excluded 
are integrated into government policies and programmes. A focus on access only gives primacy 
to having, rather than doing. Solutions are focused on giving. Simply giving, however, 
overlooks the extent to which social norms, structures and institutions authorise certain actions 
and processes and not others. 
 
Service delivery strategies need to disrupt established practices and institutionalise new ones 
in order to shift patterns of authority, access and distribution. This requires an understanding 
of the politics of delivery and an exploration of the political-institutional (government-citizen) 
interface as a contested space where public officials, citizens and institutions negotiate the 
legitimacy and value of decisions and processes related to service delivery (Mc Lennan, 2007). 
 
2.5 CHALLENGES FACING SERVICE DELIVERY 
 
Schwella, (2001, pp.367-368) states that the extent and effectiveness of service delivery is 
influenced by societal contextual realities and the needs of the client base. He argues that South 
Africa is a world in one country, characterised by diversity, pluralism, and inequality. The 
policies of the past, apartheid and ‘separate development’, contributed to the fragmentation of 
South African society through their emphasis on forced separation. In conjunction with 
diversity and pluralism, this has contributed to the deeply divided and unequal state of South 
African society. A deeply divided society is generally and technically regarded as difficult to 
govern and administer. South Africa is no exception to this generalisation (Schwella, 2001, 
pp.367-368). Higgins (2008, p.54), states that unauthorised expenditure and under-spending 
hamper service delivery, and he argues that there is no reason why the public should not be 
serviced, given the fact that, each year all three tiers of government approve and vote for the 
budgets of departments and municipalities throughout the country. 
 
 Higgins (2008, p.54) argues that it is difficult to govern and administer a divided society. His 
argument is evidenced by the following reports. Shiba (2011, p.10) reports that Tatane (33) 
was killed by the police during a service delivery march. He died struggling to get government 
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to provide a simple necessity, water. Shiba further reports that the Setsotso municipal manager 
admitted that Tatane’s death made them double their efforts to deliver the services to the 
community. Wallis (2011) states that when people riot for service delivery, they are fighting 
for the quality of life. Booysen (2007, pp.21-32) concurs with Wallis when he says that the 
rising number of local protests against poor service delivery reflects a tension between delivery 
and democratisation. Booysen (2007, pp.21-32) further states that managing the strain of 
securing “a better life for all” is difficult given that the apartheid legacy is not easy to eradicate. 
Ramoo (2008, p.60) indicates that, even though government has very good policies, 
government’s efforts to deliver on projects are being affected by a number of inhibitors. 
According to Ramoo (2008, p.60), the main factor working against government at the moment 
is a lack of skills and capacity in terms of its own employees implementing the policies and 
decisions made by the upper echelons in government. In the area of administration alone, 
numerous departments lack the skills needed to keep corporate services efficient and up-to-
date. 
 
Milazi (2007), as quoted by McLennon and Munslow (2009, p.7), concur with Ramoo’s 
statement. He states that efforts to match skills shortages by attracting foreign professionals 
were not pursued with sufficient vigour and were hampered by incompetence and rule 
complexities in government departments like the DHA. Ramoo (2008, p.60) highlights that the 
absence of a “culture of delivery” is noted especially among lower level employees. Although 
definite commitment and action from middle management and senior management in 
departments may be visible, he states that, there is lack of both at ground level. According to 
Ramoo (2008, p.60), improving work ethic needs to become a priority. He further states that 
people need to understand how they, as individuals, can enable delivery and to take pride in 
making things happen in their departments. 
 
In general, government’s strategy in managing poverty and unemployment has been to increase 
the number of social grants available to the poorest and neediest (Mc Lennan and Munslow, 
2009, p.7). This is not always completely successful due to the failure of the DHA in providing 
birth and identity documents (ID) timeously. Dlamini (2011, p.5) confirms that the DHA gives 
customers a hard time. According to Dlamini’s report, a 42-year-old man was classified as a 
woman in his identity book. The man felt his life was on hold. Dlamini (2011, p,5) further 
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states that Jabulani Ngcobo, of Itshelimnyama near Marianhill, experienced difficulties when 
it came to doing anything that required his identity document. The DHA records (ID book) 
reflected that Jabulani Ngcobo’s gender is female. The greatest challenge Jabulani Ngcobo 
faced was that he was required to go to the doctor and get a confirmation letter that stated that 
he was really a man. According to Dlamini (2011, p.5) Jabulani’s life was affected at work 
because he could not get his salary deposited in his account because he could not open an 
account. This difficulty confirmed that if any government department fails to offer effective 
and efficient services, the citizens ultimately suffer. 
 
McLennan (2007), as quoted by McLennan and Munslow (2009, p.9), suggests that South 
Africa should build capacitated administrative machinery capable of delivering to the poorest 
of the poor. The machinery is premised on the assumption that service delivery is best left in 
the hands of professional managers who are clear about their objectives and have the technical 
expertise to deliver. According to Mc Lennan and Munslow (2009, p.9), this created challenges 
for delivery, in the following areas: 
 
 It is not possible to assume that technical expertise always exists in the delivery system; 
 Challenges in capacity that undermine effective delivery, as a result of an over-reliance 
on consultants; 
 A lack of application of administrative due process and regulations; and 
 Inappropriate outsourcing or poor decision-making. 
 
Ramoo (2008, p.60) explains that exacerbating “the people inhibitor” is the fact that 
government is required to “do far more with far less”. Government does not have the resources 
required to deliver on its mandate. He adds that the myriad of complex legislation it has to 
adhere to in-terms of systems and processes compounds the situation of non-delivery that much 
more. Instead of focusing on getting the job done and actually delivering, officials often 
become bogged down in red tape. Mc Lennan and Munslow (2009, p.9) believe that effective 
management and political leadership emerged as key issues for the system to address and there 
is a general and worrying tendency to develop systems of patronage to get the job done. 
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Ramoo (2008, p.60) cites a disconnection between political promises and realistic operational 
delivery capacity and resources as another inhibitor of delivery. He further states that despite 
the promises politicians make, what is actually delivered is not according to expectations. This 
is due to expectations created by politicians that cannot often be met by officials as a result of 
financial constraints, lack of skills and capacity, procurement bottlenecks, limited timeframes 
and infrastructure realities on the ground and even corruption (Ramoo, 2008, p.60). 
 
2.6 IMPACT OF CORRUPTION ON SERVICE DELIVERY 
 
Corruption and its effects, “Corruption is the enemy of development and of good governance” 
(Patil, 2011 as quoted by Venter, 2011, p.1). Fraud and corruption are interchangeable terms 
and therefore their effects on government and beneficiaries are more or less the same. Fraud is 
a crime of deceiving people in order to get money, while corruption is dishonest or immoral 
behaviour, by people in official positions. The political cost of corruption is that it undermines 
democracy, weakens the developmental state and undermines responsibility, accountability and 
legitimacy. Corruption engenders perverse political dependencies, negates opportunities to 
improve the general wellbeing of the citizenry and fosters a climate of mistrust, particularly of 
public officials. Corruption erodes the ‘common good’ and the ‘people’s contract’. In eroding 
the ‘people’s Contract’, corruption alienates citizens from the very officials they have elected 
and also alienates people from each other. 
 
Corruption distorts and undermines the value systems of all societies. It also overrides any 
sense of the common good (Fraser Mokeleti, 2008, p.46). Corruption impedes a state’s ability 
to use its available resources to progressively achieve the full realisation of socio-economic 
rights as resources are instead diverted into the pockets of public officials, or development aid 
is mismanaged, misused or misappropriated. Corruption is costly; the state loses revenue from 
abuse of taxes, customs levies, licensing fees and traffic fines. It also leads to high spending 
due to corrupt loadings and fronting on state contracts. 
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According to Mbanjwa (2011, pp.1-4), the most common cases of alleged corruption relate to 
fraud and bribery, mismanagement of government funds, abuse of government resources and 
procurement irregularities. The distortion of policy and resource allocations increases 
inefficiency. Corruption also impacts on investment and growth, especially in countries where 
there is need of foreign productive capital. Foreign investors, especially those likely to make 
long term contributions to development, are discouraged, although some investors looking to 
make fast profits through questionable schemes may try their luck. Furthermore, corruption in 
aid programmes means less for those most in need and may compromise future funding. 
 
Corruption is costly, not only for the general public but mainly for the poor, as resources are 
diverted away from them. Service delivery and related policy is distorted if allocation and 
prioritisation are determined by bribes. It means a few benefits at the expense of many, which 
reinforces existing socio-economic inequality and makes the poor even more vulnerable. 
Structural inequality leads to many being denied access to education, information, and 
therefore to knowledge about their rights that could enable them to challenge abuse of power. 
 
Good governance is a fundamental right in a democracy and it implies transparency and 
accountability. Good governance entails an administration that is sensitive and responsive to 
the needs of the people and effective in coping with emerging challenges in society by framing 
and implementing appropriate laws and measures. It includes strict rules of accountability. 
Corruption exists in both democratic and nondemocratic states, but it develops “into an 
automatic by-product of the latter system and the chances for corrupt practices to be exposed, 
protested against and punished become much diminished under it”. Mbanjwa (2011, pp.1-4) 
states that the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) and the Department of Correctional 
Services in the Republic of South Africa are the most corrupt departments as per reports based 
on calls by anonymous whistle blowers to the National Anti-Corruption Hotline between 2004 
and 2010. Democratic governance is thus a necessary requirement to fight corruption. 
 
Corruption undermines the rule of law, democratic governance, accountability and sustainable 
development. It breaches the contract between citizens and public officials, and this has grave 
consequences for any government. Moreover, it is a recipe for the collapse of governance and 
is a cause of continued failure. Given that the Department of Home Affairs is the arm of 
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government that is needed by everybody who naturally enters, lives and exits South Africa 
through various processes, fraud and corruption are quite pervasive in these departmental 
regional offices. Mbanjwa (2011, pp.1-4) states that the Public Service Commission reported 
that the majority of cases lodged against the DHA involved the bribing of officials to obtain 
fraudulent identity documents, passports, marriage certificates and the sale of identity 
documents to illegal immigrants. Of the 3,554 cases reported to the hotline since 2004, the 
largest number involved the DHA, with 781 reported but only 142 resolved (Mbanjwa 2011, 
pp.1-4). 
 
The Public Service Commission expressed concern that the lack of action on reported cases of 
corruption by senior managers and director-generals is a ‘trend’ which compromises the 
integrity of the hotline and weakens the public’s confidence in government’s commitment 
towards fighting fraud and corruption (Mbanjwa, 2011, pp.1-4). Fraud and corruption are rife 
in the Department of Home Affairs and this is evidenced by the arrest of six officials and a 
marriage officer (Padayachee, 2011, p.6). Padayachee states that these arrests are part of an 
ongoing investigation aimed at rooting out corruption in the Department of Home Affairs. The 
officials arrested were suspected of facilitating ‘marriages of convenience’ between South 
Africans and foreign nationals (Padayachee, 2011, p.3). 
 
The Public Service Commission (2007), as quoted by Dorasamy (2009, p.58) states that 
concerns regarding service delivery can be attributed to the performance of public officials. 
Dorasamy (2009, p.58) argues that sustained efforts to improve standards while expanding 
services have failed in many of the government departments because of person-to-post 
mismatch, lack of skills and a lack of performance standards. She further argues that these 
contributory factors can be linked to egoistic leaders who assumed positions without giving 
consideration to performance based on accountability and responsibility (Dorasamy, 2009, 
p.59). 
 
The then Minister of Public Service and Administration, Fraser-Moleketi (2008, p.46) states 
that corruption violates the laws of the country. She further states that it flouts international 
conventions and treaties and undermines democratic values and ethos (Fraser-Moleketi 2008, 
p.46). Chinua Achebe and many other writers, as quoted by Fraser-Moleketi (2008, p.46) point 
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to the significance of fighting corruption because it erodes the social fabric of society like 
undermining communities, perpetuating poverty, inequality and under-development. As a 
country, people must be resolute and steadfast in the fight against corruption in all spheres of 
society. Fraser-Moleketi (2008, p.46) states the following important premises relating to 
corruption as outlined in the Africa Forum on Ant- Corruption held in March 2007. The first 
premise is that while corruption manifests itself in the relationship between individuals and 
institutions, corruption, as a practice, is rooted in the operation of market forces, the pursuit of 
individual prosperity and gain as opposed to the common good. This possessive individualism 
has undermined the goals and objectives of national and community level development. 
 
The second premise is that corruption is fundamentally undemocratic; it undermines the 
legitimacy and credibility of democratically elected governments and of responsible and 
accountable civil servants. The third premise is that corruption is about the interface of political 
and economic elites at a global, national and regional scale. The fourth premise is that the 
intentional preoccupation in the global corruption discourse with bribe-takers and bribe-givers, 
and particularly with bribe-takers, is disingenuous, ideologically loaded, and simplistic and 
certainly serves other agendas that are not linked to developmental goals. This discourse needs 
to be challenged precisely because it overlooks the complexity of the social forces, systems, 
processes and structures which underpin acts of corruption. 
 
The fifth premise is that corruption is a direct impediment to Africa’s development. The sixth 
premise is that corruption distorts and undermines the value systems of all societies and their 
peoples and possessive individualism and overrides any sense of the common good; and the 
seventh premise is that an anti-corruption strategy must be articulated by leaders in the political, 
economic and civil society spheres and must engage all sectors of society on the basis of a core 
set of leadership practices and values. The anti-corruption strategy must articulate an 
alternative ethos and value system. 
 
Unethical behaviour in the South African public service is characterised by the following: the 
lack of responsiveness to the needs of clients; tardiness in the discharge of duties; 
manifestations of inefficiency and ineffectiveness, and corruption (Mafunisa 2008, p.5). 
According to Mafunisa (2008, p.9), unethical behaviour often starts at the top of public service 
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leadership, where public service values are not personified and promoted. He attributes this 
largely to a lack of accountability for promoting quality public service. It can be argued that by 
placing greater accountability on adhering to rules and procedures instead of a similar focus on 
quality public services, effectiveness and efficiency in the South African public service has 
been negatively affected. 
 
The government of the day has an overwhelming task to do all things necessary to ensure 
effective and efficient public service delivery. However, achieving government’s mandate is 
greatly challenged by the prevalence of corruption, thereby placing severe constraints on the 
governance of this country (Heath, 2010). According to Heath (2010), corruption undermines 
our constitutional rights to human dignity, quality and freedom. It endangers the stability and 
security of our societies. It also undermines the institutions and values of democracy. He further 
states that corruption seriously jeopardises sustainable development, the rule of law and the 
credibility of our governments. It provides a breeding ground for the violation of the 
fundamental principles of Batho Pele. 
 
Mbanjwa (2011, pp.1-4) reports that the Public Service Commission (PSC) Report revealed 
that fraud and corruption are rife in most government departments. Mbanjwa (2011, pp.1-4)) 
further reports that the Home Affairs and Correctional Services departments are the most 
corrupt departments as per reports based on calls by anonymous whistleblowers to the National 
Anti-Corruption Hotline between 2004 and 2010. 
 
According to Mbanjwa (2011, pp.1-4), the most common cases of alleged corruption relate to 
fraud and bribery, mismanagement of government funds, abuse of government resources and 
procurement irregularities. The Public Service Commission expressed concern that the lack of 
action on reported cases of corruption by senior managers and director-generals was a ‘trend’ 
which could compromise the integrity of the hotline and weaken the public’s confidence in 
government’s commitment toward fighting fraud and corruption (Mbanjwa, 2011, pp.1, 4). 
 
Heath (2010) believes that corruption distorts the allocation of resources, thereby sharply 
increasing the cost of goods and services. Diverting scarce resources to non-priorities, largely 
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neglects fundamental needs, particularly basic needs such as food, health and education. He 
further states that corruption can act as a disincentive, possibly deterring prospective economic 
activities and investment. It increases the likelihood of committing other crimes. Corruption, 
therefore, becomes both the cause and consequence of under-development and poverty, in 
general which can be attributed to South Africa as well. According to Hassim (2007), the 
country we live in is engulfed in fraud and corruption and an escalating diminishing service to 
its citizens. 
 
Fraser-Moleketi (2008, p.46) argues that corruption reinforces the banality of evil and its 
conceit lies in its ability to implicate, its complicity and its ability to violate the laws of the 
country. She further states that it flouts international conventions and treaties and undermines 
democratic values and ethos.  
Corruption as an anarchy, has been loosed upon the world in which we live. The 
significance of fighting corruption erodes the social fabric of society like undermining 
communities, perpetuating poverty, inequality and underdevelopment. As a country, 
people must be resolute and steadfast in the fight against corruption in all spheres of 
society. 
The corrosive effect of corruption is experienced not only where corruption is perpetrated, but 
simultaneous reverberations of its effects are felt throughout the global economy and society 
at large. She further states that corruption is a global problem that affects both the developed 
and developing world, but it is in the developing world that it’s effect is most destructive.  
“It was Plato, who warned us to “do no service for a present”. Aristotle once said, “we 
become just by doing just acts”. Both the scholars quoted are addressing corruption of 
values, the corruption of the soul of the nation, the corruption of the institution of 
democracy, and the corruption of the individual (Fraser-Molekati, 2008, p.6). 
 
The researcher faced a number of people who would come to his office and say, “please help 
me, I have R200.00”. The people needing help are always people requesting letters that confirm 
that children receiving grants are enrolled in the institution. Some would be people who 
intended bribing the researcher to issue letters that state that they started schooling in the 
researcher’s institution, and issue late birth registration as well as identity book applications. 
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Giese and Smith (2007, p.54) concur with the above statement when they say that desperate 
clients are forced into a situation where they pay bribes to officials in order to bypass the 
inefficiencies in service delivery. Here, perpetrators of corruption are the customers apart from 
the employees. 
 
Fraser-Moleketi (2008, p.46) states the following seven important premises relating to 
corruption as outlined in the Africa Forum on Anti-Corruption held in March 2007: 
 The first premise being that while corruption manifests itself in the relationship between 
individuals and institutions, corruption, as a practice, is rooted in the operation of 
market forces, the pursuit of individual prosperity and gain as opposed to the common 
good. This possessive individualism has undermined the goals and objectives of 
national and community level development; 
 The second premise is that corruption is fundamentally undemocratic, it undermines 
the legitimacy and credibility of democratically elected governments and of responsible 
and accountable civil servants; 
 The third premise is that corruption is about the interface of political and economic 
elites at a global, national and regional scale; 
 The fourth premise is that the intentional preoccupation in the global corruption 
discourse with bribe-takers and bribe-givers, and particularly with bribe-takers, is 
disingenuous, ideologically loaded, and simplistic and certainly serves other agendas 
that are not linked to developmental goals. This discourse needs to be challenged 
precisely because it overlooks the complexity of the social forces, systems, processes 
and structures which underpin acts of corruption; 
 The fifth premise is that corruption is a direct impediment to Africa’s development. 
Corruption hurts the many and benefits the few. It inhibits the ability of government to 
respond to citizens’ needs and to utilise scarce resources in the most efficient and 
effective manner. It also hampers the continent’s efforts to instill sound political, socio-
economic and corporate governance; 
 The sixth premise is that corruption distorts and undermines the value systems of all 
societies and their peoples and possessive individualism and overrides any sense of the 
common good; and 
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 The seventh premise is that an anti-corruption strategy must be articulated by leaders 
in the political, economic and civil society spheres and must engage all sectors of 
society on the basis of a core set of leadership practices and values. Anti-corruption 
strategies must articulate an alternative ethos and value system. 
 
Corruption engenders perverse political dependencies, lost political opportunities to improve 
the general well-being of the citizenry and fosters a climate of mistrust, particularly of public 
officials. The losses that accrue from a culture of permissiveness with respect to corruption 
include a loss of revenue, loss of trust, loss of values, loss of credibility and legitimacy and a 
loss of the democratic ethos and impulse within institutions and organisations. Fraser-Moleketi 
further states that; 
…corruption erodes the ‘common good’ and the ‘people’s contract’. The political cost 
of corruption is that it undermines democracy, weakens the developmental state and 
undermines responsibility, accountability and legitimacy. Therefore, the state needs to 
take a lead in combating, preventing, managing and eliminating corruption (Fraser-
Moleketi, 2008, p.46). 
 
In eroding the ‘people’s contract’, corruption alienates citizens from the very officials they 
have elected and also alienates people from each other. Corruption destroys trust and erodes 
both the sense of global citizenship and the sense of shared responsibility as well as national 
citizenship and the sense of social cohesion. As opined by Fraser-Mokeleti: 
The time for complacency is over. Every day of inaction is a missed opportunity to create 
a more prosperous and transparent world. The greatest challenge is for those international 
commitments made on paper to become concrete action in order to eliminate corruption. 
South Africa’s fight against corruption can only be effective if government works in 
partnership with civil society and the business sector. The fight against corruption is 
growing and new manifestations of corruption show gaps in the application of existing 
legislation and policies (Fraser-Mokeleti, 2008, p.46). 
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2.7 TRANSFORMATION INITIATIVE TO SERVICE DELIVERY IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The term Batho Pele comes from the Sesotho language and its literal English translation is 
‘people first’ (Russell and Bvuma, 2001, p.245). Batho Pele is set out in the White Paper on 
Transforming Public Service Delivery (Government Gazette No 18340) dated 1 October 1997. 
This White Paper advocates that departments deliver responsive, quality services according to 
eight national service delivery principles referred to as the Batho Pele principles.  
 
The ultimate aim of this public service delivery transformation initiative in South Africa is to 
improve service delivery and emphasise the criticality of a customer or citizen-focused ethos 
in public service delivery and monitoring. The White Paper on Transforming Service Delivery, 
1998 (Batho Pele) provides a practical framework and implementation strategy for the 
transformation of service delivery, to encompass the recipients of services. It focuses on ‘how’ 
services are provided, allows ‘customers’ or citizens to complain and advocates a continuous 
improvement strategy in the quantity and quality of services. It also focuses on customer needs 
and responsiveness. Thus, Batho Pele principles reinforce a customer’s right to complain. 
Furthermore, they reinforce a customer’s right to courteous behaviour, transparency and 
openness at all times. The Batho Pele principles also emphasise redress, especially when a 
customer is not satisfied with the service provided (Russel and Bvuma, 2001).  
 
The Batho Pele principle of service standards thus sets important benchmarks for monitoring 
service delivery in all departments and state entities. It seeks to achieve this ideal by setting a 
baseline for customers to complain when service standards are not met. The seventh principle, 
for example, is quite explicit about the nature of redress customers are entitled to. It states that 
if the promised standards of service are not delivered, citizens should be offered a speedy and 
effective remedy, and when complaints are made, citizens should receive a sympathetic, 
positive response.  
 
The whole notion of Batho Pele demands a new approach to handling customers and citizens; 
many public servants often see complaints as an irritation and intrusion in their working lives. 
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Where complaints procedures do not exist, they often tend to defend or justify a department’s 
problems. By offering redress, Batho Pele not only appeases irate or unhappy customers, but 
aims to change the mind-set of service providers from a preoccupation with the processes of 
service delivery to a focus on deliverables and outcomes. It thus puts in motion a process of 
improving service delivery and ultimately continuous improvement and quality service 
delivery.  
 
While the White Paper on Transforming Public Services, 1998, among other things, stipulates 
that the public service would strive to provide services that are accessible, responsive, efficient 
and of good quality (Diphofa, 2002, p.24), evidence from a survey on compliance with the 
Batho Pele principles (Public Service Commission, 2000, p.17) suggests evidence to the 
contrary; customers are often not consulted about the level, quality and choice of service 
delivery they would expect.  
 
Another matter of concern is the fact that measurable targets are usually not specified to 
increase access to services, and in the case of the Batho Pele principle of ensuring courtesy, 
very few departments put a courtesy charter in place, in which courtesy standards are specified. 
According to the Public Service Commission (2000, p.110) and contrary to Batho Pele 
principles and vision, redress as promised is often not delivered. If this finding is anything to 
go by, the practice is grossly inconsistent with the Batho Pele requirement to provide citizens 
with full, accurate information about public services that they are entitled to receive.  
 
However, South Africa is inhabited by both citizens and migrants as well as immigrants (both 
white and people of colour) who equally depend on the South African service delivery 
departments (eg. Department of Home Affairs), and to whom Batho Pele principles were also 
meant to cover, though to a lesser degree as it seems that there is an ongoing debate about the 
supposed line between a citizen and others. Since South Africa is not an island, and even if it 
is South Africa cannot be excluded from the wave of human mobility around the globe, and 
this leads the study to migration conceptualisation.  
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2.8 THE PHENOMENA OF MIGRATION AND DEFINITION 
 
There is no single definition of migration that could easily be applied in all contexts. In essence, 
migration should involve change of residence, and must accompany the crossing of the 
boundary of a migration-defining area (Kok et al., 2003). Skeldon (1990) settles for a much 
simpler definition of migration where he sees it as referring to the spatial movement of people 
at various times of their lives for various reasons. That is, migration involves relocation within 
geographical space, and as such is characterised by a permanent or semi-permanent change of 
residence (Skeldon, 1990). Migration therefore takes into account simple events in the life 
cycle of the individual, such as moving from one place to another. Distance covered, or borders 
crossed qualify one as a local, national, regional or international migrant. 
 
2.9 MIGRATION IN AFRICA: THE BROAD VIEW 
 
The issues addressed in the postcolonial and post-apartheid migration literature are quite 
diverse. They include, among others, the following relationships between migration and other 
social phenomena; 
 Poverty and diversification of coping strategies; 
 Health and diseases (including HIV/AIDS); 
 Crime, prostitution and issues of social morality; 
 Social cohesion and fragmentation; 
 Entrepreneurship; 
 Xenophobia and identity. 
In addition, current migration debates deal with the use of space in both ideological and 
geographical terms, and the influence of migration in disrupting the planning and 
implementation of programmes and of sustainable development. 
 
2.9.1 Early Trans-National Migration: Africa as a Receiving and Sending Region 
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Much of the population movement that took place between the years of European expansionism 
and the end of colonisation/apartheid in Africa could be arrayed chronologically as 
commencing with trade, followed by slavery, and later on by the migration of Europeans to 
Africa. These episodes were followed by, and to an extent ran concurrently with, the shipment 
of indentured labour from India and other parts of Asia, as well as from central and southern 
Africa, to South Africa. To some extent, these movements were accompanied by some 
voluntary indigenous migration from the same source areas. This period was followed by the 
establishment of the migrant labour system, which existed together with the movement of 
individuals and families within and between Africa and other continents, before and during the 
struggle for independence. 
 
2.9.1.1 Slavery and Colonialism 
 
Slavery involved the capture and shipment of Africans to the Americas and Europe, where they 
arrived as commodities or commercial cargo (Becker, 1999). Involuntary migration under these 
conditions was akin, in a number of ways, to present-day human trafficking. Most of those who 
were abducted came from west and central Africa. This forced out-migration of Africans took 
place on a vast scale, with serious social consequences, and established a kind of early diaspora 
in Latin America, North America and the Caribbean in particular. 
 
The export of enslaved people was followed by in-migration of European colonisers, who 
scrambled for Africa and scattered themselves across the continent (Pakenham, 1990; Rodney, 
1973). However, the wide-scale occupation of Africa by European immigrants was preceded 
by the Dutch colonial occupation of South Africa, which began after the 1652 landing at the 
Cape. This period of occupation and colonisation brought European languages and 
metropolitan linkages, which have endured, with today’s African countries strongly linked to 
each other and to Europe by the Lusophone, Francophone and Anglophone connections. 
 
2.9.2 Trans-National Migration after the Formation of Colonies 
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Trans-national migration in colonised African countries worked differently for their black 
(native) and white (settler) people. The white population moved freely between countries, and 
regimes in recipient countries readily gave full citizenship to those who wanted to settle. At the 
same time, the citizenship of the black population was partial, and movement for them was 
minimal and heavily regulated to better support colonial control (Mamdani, 1996). Control 
measures notwithstanding, a great deal of illegal migration occurred away from the eye of 
power, and this movement followed social network lines. At the same time, most African 
women were more immediately confined and marginalised by the patriarchal principles of both 
the state and to a lesser extent, their own societies, which defined them as minors. 
 
There was little inter-regional migration during the days of colonialism in Africa because there 
was little direct socio-economic relationship between the African regions; communication and 
transport networks were not readily supportive of mobility. However, some intra-regional 
migration did take place, often related to trade and to mobile labour. 
 
2.9.2.1 Migration in Colonial West Africa 
 
Trade between localities and regions is a well-established economic strategy in West Africa 
that was fully developed long before colonial boundaries were drawn. As a result, the people 
of West Africa have a strong affinity for travelling, and migration levels were high even during 
colonial days. Ethnic relations transcended national borders and movement across borders was 
widespread. For instance, Benin and Nigeria have long had large Yoruba populations, which 
engaged in continued interaction and cross-border movement even during colonial days. 
Movement within the region was also exacerbated by the stronger economies of Nigeria, Cote 
d’Ivoire and Ghana which pulled migrants from the region. 
 
2.9.2.2 Migration in Colonial Central Africa 
 
Most of the central African countries such as Central Africa, Chad, Congo, Gabon, and 
Cameroun were members of the French Equatorial African Federation and this enhanced 
migration between these countries since communication. economic structures and institutions, 
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and a common language were in place (Adepoju, 2002). However, migrants also came from 
and went to other regions in search of work, or as forced labour migrants. 
 
2.9.2.3 Migration in Colonial East Africa 
 
After World War II, East Africa was united under British control into British East Africa. In 
the post-colonial era, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya were quick to form a three-nation bloc, the 
East Africa Community (EAC). These ties enhanced migration between these countries during 
and after colonialism. Migrants moved within the region to take up employment, trade, visit or 
join relatives, herd animals or engage in religious practices. 
 
The creation of national boundaries that separated communities of one ethnicity also ensured 
that trans-national migration would continue to exist regardless of state policies. People from 
ethnic communities such as the WaMaasai, the Hutu and the Tutsi continued to move across 
formal national borders in East and Central Africa since they had long-term, well-established 
relationships (Chachage, 2003; Mamdani, 2001). Uganda was also a prominent destination for 
many young Africans looking for university education because of its famous Makerere 
University, which attracted African migrants from all regions of sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
2.9.2.4 Migration in Colonial Southern Africa 
 
The countries of Southern Africa were basically English and Portuguese speaking from 
colonial times and were characterised by large-scale migrant labour exchanges from early in 
their written history. Originating with farm labour, labour migrancy exploded throughout the 
region with the rise to dominance of South Africa’s mining industry. As early as 1850, migrants 
from the Mozambican districts of Gaza, Inhambane and Lourenco Marques were moving onto 
farms in the Western Cape as seasonal workers (Wentzel and Tlabela, 2006). However, large-
scale migration began with the discovery of diamonds in Kimberly in the 1860s; although 
migration’s early diamond-mining boom was quickly overshadowed by the organised 
migration that followed the opening up of the gold mines on the Witwatersrand in the 1880s. 
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For close to a hundred years, massive migration from the Southern African Chamber of Mines 
established the Rand Native Labour Association and its successors to co-ordinate recruitment 
of labour and ward off competition (Wentzel and Tlabela, 2006). Most of the unskilled 
labourers who were brought to the gold mines in those days were sourced from Mozambique. 
 
2.9.3 Intra-National Migration in Colonial Africa 
 
Large-scale relocations of indigenous populations under state control occurred in settler 
colonies such as Kenya, Zimbabwe and South Africa, where laws were instituted to create 
separate geographical spaces for different races as a form of legal ethnic cleansing. Big internal 
displacements were involved in this kind of process. These racial restrictions also affected 
indigenous populations well beyond the boundaries of the countries actually involved. In 
response, people continued to make formally illegal moves openly or secretly in order to 
contest or invalidate these imposed boundaries, and in order to bring home livelihoods as best 
they could. Control of internal migration was therefore a central issue of the colonial period, 
with indigenous people using migration as a weapon against the state. During and after 
colonialism, internal migration in Africa therefore included rural-urban, intra-rural, intra-
urban, and urban-rural population movement, as well as within-country displacement of 
different kinds. 
 
The occupation of land by whites usually promoted the overcrowding and impoverishment of 
the so-called native reserves, which colonial interests wanted entrenched so as to ensure a 
reservoir of labour (Ranger and Peel, 1982). Expulsions for the creation of reserves or tribal 
trust lands in Zimbabwe and the invention of Bantustans in South Africa’s large-scale urban 
movement also occurred during the destruction of established native townships such as Sophia 
town. Administrative policy also ensured the movement of ‘natives’ from land earmarked for 
development, including land for towns, industries, mines, commercial farms, dams and military 
bases. All of these processes contributed to overcrowding of the indigenous population. Today 
the impact of past state-enforced migration still remains an issue in many African communities, 
as indigenous populations continue to fight to regain the lost land, and identity issues continue 
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to surface in the struggle for resources. The wide-scale compression of settlement and loss of 
resources under colonial rule has also reinforced the current growth of the problem of 
xenophobia (Mamdani 1996, 1998; Neocosmos, 1999).  
 
2.2.1.1 War-Related Migration in Colonial Africa 
 
During the height of the liberation struggles in Africa in settler colonies such as Kenya, 
Zimbabwe, South Africa and Mozambique, large numbers of people fled rural areas to seek 
refuge in towns. The remaining rural populations in places such as Zimbabwe found themselves 
being moved by the state into ‘protected villages’ where activities were closely monitored by 
security forces (Ranger, 1982). Rural-to-rural migration also increased as people moved from 
war-ravaged territories to relatively peaceful areas. 
 
The liberation struggles in places like Angola, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and northern 
Algeria also brought with it the intensification of women’s hitherto suppressed migration, just 
as it intensified the movement of men (Fanon, 1965, 1967; Ranger, 1982). Capitalising on their 
apparent harmlessness in the eyes of the state, women moved from place to place as they 
actively participated in the liberation struggle in various capacities, including a role as armed 
guerrillas. 
 
2.10  MIGRATION IN AFRICA AT THE TIME OF INDEPENDENCE 
 
As country after country attained independence in the 1960s and thereafter, migration patterns 
changed and the economic and political terrain of Africa changed as well. Both shifts in internal 
migration and in cross-border migration were involved. 
 
2.10.1 West Africa 
 
Independence broke barriers and increased migration across borders in West Africa. It is 
remarkable that West African countries managed to form an integrated sixteen-member country 
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regional economic community, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
by 1975, despite the fact that they were colonised by different colonial metropoles (Adepoju, 
2002). This was also a remarkable achievement considering that other member countries such 
as Nigeria and Ghana were under military rule, but more importantly, because they managed 
to overcome linguistic barriers, as nine members were Francophone, five Anglophone and two 
Lusophone (Adepoju, 2002). The founding of the ECOWAS led to increased regional socio-
economic interaction and subsequently heightened intra-regional migration. The ECOWAS 
ensured, among other things, the free movement of persons without visas within the region 
(Adepoju, 2003). 
 
 However, rising post-colonial conflict likewise influenced migration patterns in the region. 
The conflicts that emerged in Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia destabilised these 
countries, throwing refugees and asylum seekers across their borders. Nigeria had its own 
Biafra war and conflict with Cameroun, and these created massive movements of Nigerians 
across the world. For Nigeria, these conflicts also created many IDPs. In Mali and Burkina 
Faso, seasonal labour migration was a way of life for many who worked in the agricultural 
industry. However, the West African wars disturbed the economic performance of all the 
affected countries, giving rise to the out-migration of numbers of economic refugees of diverse 
socio-economic standing. Those who were formerly colonised by the French largely went to 
French-speaking countries, and former British subjects mainly went to English-speaking 
countries. 
 
2.10.2 Central Africa 
 
As a region, Central Africa has suffered more from war and conflict than any other part of the 
continent. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has had little peace after its liberation 
war, beginning with the assassination of its first head of state, Patrice Lumumba, which ushered 
in an era of political instability and misrule. The country quickly became a major source of out-
migration despite its rich natural resource endowment. Refugees and asylum seekers from the 
DRC, or Zaire as it was formerly known, could be found scattered in large numbers in countries 
such as Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Angola and 
Burundi. Very large numbers of people were also internally displaced, and many were left 
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without care as refugees or IDPs. Although Cameroun enjoyed relative stability after 
independence, it later found itself in a territorial conflict with Nigeria over the Bakassi 
Peninsula. This fighting destabilised the lives of many people who fell back into migration. 
Some left for France, while others went to many African countries (including South Africa), 
but many were left as IDPs. Professionals, students, job seekers, women and children were 
among those who left the country due to political instability and insecurity. 
 
 However, Gabon enjoyed relative stability after independence and its economy grew with each 
passing year. It rapidly became a popular migration destination, for migrants from the region 
and those from West Africa (Stalker, 1994), and has remained so up to the present. 
 
2.10.3 East Africa 
 
East Africa continued to experience economic migration within the region as well as from other 
regions, particularly from Southern Africa. Internal migration is considered to be generally 
high in Kenya, and it is estimated that during the 1980s one-third of rural household heads 
migrated (Sander, 2003). Though the post-independence period conflicts in Uganda, Sudan, 
Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi and Somalia resulted in refugee populations moving continually 
from one country to another, as well as the internal displacement of larger populations in these 
countries. In addition, the liberation wars in Southern Africa drew intensive support in 
Tanzania. A large population of exiles from Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa found 
refuge in this country, which due to its university was seen as the intellectual heart of the anti-
apartheid struggle. 
 
2.10.4 Southern Africa 
 
The labour migrant system mainly defined patterns in Southern Africa in these years. 
Governments in the region had agreements with South Africa regarding the shipment of their 
citizens as labour migrants to South African mines and farms (Wentzel and Tlabela, 2006). 
From 1975, Botswana began shifting from being a migrant-sending country to an international 
destination after the discovery of diamonds and the sudden growth of a mining industry. Many 
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people from Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe migrated within the region after the formation of 
their short-lived federation. In Zambia, intra-urban as well as state-orchestrated rural-urban 
migration took centre stage in the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
Post-independence mobility probably hit its peak in Southern Africa when thousands of 
Zimbabwean and Mozambican refugees went to Zambia and Tanzania during the height of 
their liberation struggles. From 1975 onwards, Zimbabwe sent thousands of refugees into 
Mozambique, with a smaller population going to Botswana. State policies together with the 
liberation struggle in Zimbabwe also led to increased rural to urban migration. The Renamo 
war that broke out in the late 1970s scattered Mozambicans across the region and Mozambique 
also experienced high levels of IDPs as it moved in 1975 from one war to another. At the same 
time, apartheid in South Africa sent many political exiles seeking refuge throughout the 
Southern African region and beyond. 
 
Later, the resolution of the region’s political struggles slowed the outflows and led to return 
migration on a significant scale. The attainment of independence in Zimbabwe and Namibia, 
the return of peace in Mozambique, and the fall of the apartheid state in South Africa, all 
combined to lead to return migration in the region in this period and beyond. IDPs, refugees, 
political exiles and many in the diaspora returned home. 
 
2.11 MIGRATION PATTERNS IN AFRICA TODAY 
 
Against this background of both violence and the struggle to institutionalise strong and capable 
governments throughout the continent, it is possible to locate the migration streams of the 
present day. These flows include labour migration to both international and internal 
destinations, and also particularly the involuntary migration flows represented by human 
trafficking and child migration, which are only now being recognised in the literature. 
 
2.11.1 International, Sub-Regional and International Migration in Africa 
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Migration patterns, both internal and trans-national, shifted significantly when the last 
countries of the south joined the rest of Africa in independence. A major change has been the 
emergence of the south as a migration destination for other African countries in the past 20 
years. Migrants to the southern region come from all corners of Africa and range from 
professionals to traders and job seekers. These migrants come from both rural and urban 
settings (Chimanikire, 2002). Upon their arrival in South Africa and Botswana, the regions’ 
prominent destination countries, migrants encounter high levels of xenophobia and much of it 
is institutionalised (Chimanikire, 2002). In these countries cross-border flows are interpreted 
by most of the population as a serious problem needing redress and prevention. Despite that, 
South Africa has accepted a number of professionals and intellectuals from elsewhere in Africa 
into high-level government and private jobs for which there are not enough local candidates. 
 
As this stream moves south, throughout Africa today people are migrating in large numbers 
from the rural village economy towards towns and cities in their own countries or sub-regions 
where there are more earning opportunities. This growing migration stream often brings the 
less educated, as well as women, children, and others who previously would have been unlikely 
to try migration, into contact with the developed economy, where they struggle to overcome 
barriers and disadvantages as they try to secure livelihoods and send remittances to their rural 
homes. 
 
As these movements take place within African countries and sub-regions and across its regions, 
large numbers of more educated people are also leaving Africa to join the African diaspora 
overseas. Many of these migrants are encouraged to go by recruiters from the developed world, 
who offer inducements and rewards. This part forms the greatest risk, as the ‘brain drain’ 
carries away the educated elite of a continent that badly needs its professional-level migrants, 
or otherwise, to help them to invest in their home communities and countries of birth. 
 
2.11.2 Internal Migration and the Rural Sector in Africa 
 
Internal migration is a thriving survival strategy in a country such as Eritrea, which like most 
African countries, has a large rural sector. A survey conducted in the early 1990s established 
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that Eritrean villages relied heavily on income from seasonal migration to nearby towns 
(Sander, 2003). In Mali, some tribal or ethnic groups are more given to migration than others, 
fundamentally the small number of available survival strategies have led to the embrace of 
migration as a tradition (Sander, 2003). Migration among the Bambara, for instance, is higher 
than it is among the Fulani and the Maure (Sander, 2003). There is also some evidence to 
support the prevalence of a pattern of replacement migration whereby migrants of rural origin 
move to towns to occupy positions vacated by nationals who emigrate to other countries. Such 
replacement migration is seemingly occurring in Mali, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Gabon and 
Senegal. 
 
Africa is also a leading world region in respect of the feminisation of migration. Women from 
the rest of Africa are joining West African women, who have historically been involved in 
international cross-border trade (IOM, 2003). Migration within and from sub-Saharan Africa 
is increasingly becoming feminised as women from all walks of life are migrating 
independently. 
 
Migration could also be seen as having an ethnic element in Kenya when one looks at other 
practices that are group specific. The WaMaasai, for instance, who are the cattle pastoralists of 
Kenya and Tanzania, are losing land to agriculturalists and to game parks, and the size of 
household herds is now a fraction of what it was before independence. Of late they have also 
started tracking into towns, where the men take up odd jobs while women often fall into 
prostitution (Chachage, 2003; May, 2004). The tragedy facing the WaMaasai is that they are 
largely uneducated and therefore excluded from taking up gainful employment as they lose 
their herding economy. 
 
At the other end of the continent, internal migration is particularly strong in South Africa, 
which with a cash-based, largely post-agricultural economy is now counted as a middle-income 
country. South Africans are highly mobile, and move as economic migrants from rural to urban, 
from urban to urban, and within both rural and urban areas; many or perhaps most of these 
migrants are of rural origin. However, some destinations predominate, with large populations 
moving from all corners of the country to Gauteng and Cape Town in search of better life 
opportunities. Internal migration into and within Gauteng is so high that its population is 
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considered to be one that is characteristically on the move. However, education levels are again 
not high enough on average to qualify all migrants for a job. 
 
2.11.3 Overseas Migration and the Diaspora 
 
In recent years, cross-border migration has gained significant attention in high-level policy 
dialogues in numerous countries. According to the World Migration Report launched by the 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM, 2010), the estimated total number of 
international migrants has reached 258 million, constituting over three per cent of the global 
population (IOM, 2010). Between 1960 and 2005 there was an approximately two-and-a-half-
fold increase in the number of people migrating across international borders, from 75 million 
to almost 191 million (WHR, 2006). The Americas (North, Central, and South America, and 
the Caribbean) are the largest destination of international migrants, here alone the figures rose 
from 47 million in 2000 to more than 57.5 million in 2012 (Raus and Lloys, 2012). The same 
phenomenon was also found in Europe which has seen a consistent rise in the trend of migration 
since 2005, with migrants now constituting 8.7 per cent of the total European population 
(Rausa and Lloys, 2012). It is noteworthy that 7–13 per cent of the foreign residents in Europe 
did not have a legitimate residence permit; as a result, they were often labelled as 
‘undocumented migrants’ (Karl-Trummer et al., 2010; Biswas et al., 2011). 
 
So far as the limited migration data allows, it has been established that the trend of emigration 
from sub-Saharan Africa to developed countries increased during the period 1990—2000 
(Sander, 2003).  
The number of international migrants worldwide has continued to grow rapidly in 
recent years, reaching 258 million in 2017, up from 220 million in 2010 and 173 million 
in 2000 (UN, 2017). 
An estimated 25 million Africans live in Europe and North America today, and among these 
there are many professionals (UN, 2017). For instance, Nigeria has about 600 medical 
specialists working in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and up to 12,000 in the USA. It has also been 
noted that migrants from Mali, who reportedly see migration as a legitimate way of dealing 
with poverty, go to France while English-speaking nationals from Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra 
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Leone migrate to the UK in significant numbers despite the inhibitive xenophobia they 
encounter there (DFID, 2004; Toulmin, 2000). 
 
It is not surprising that there should be large numbers of West African people in the developed 
North, since West Africa is perhaps the most easily mobile region of Africa. People from these 
countries form organisations that help them deal with life in the diaspora (DFID, 2004). 
 
It has also been estimated that compared to the whole of sub-Saharan Africa, Ethiopia has the 
second largest number of immigrants in the USA, after Nigeria. Increasingly, those from the 
‘Horn of Africa’ region are migrating to Australia, especially those from Ethiopia, Eritrea and 
Somalia, although many of them go under the refugee/humanitarian migration category rather 
than as economic migrants. Of late, 60 per cent of Zimbabwean doctors have moved to 
Botswana and South Africa as the Zimbabwean economy took a downturn (Adepoju, 2006). 
Cross-border traders, labour migrants, professionals and apparent asylum seekers and refugees 
are also moving from Zimbabwe to countries such as South Africa, Cananda, Austaralia, New 
Zealand, the UK and the USA (Bloch, 2005). 
 
2.12 CONTEXT OF MIGRATION IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD 
 
Since migration is one of the defining issues of the 21st century, it is an essential, unavoidable 
and potentially beneficial component of the economic and social life of countries and regions. 
As numerous research conducted have shown that the question should no longer be whether or 
not migration should be accepted. Instead, how to deal with it and manage it effectively should 
be investigated, so that the benefits it has to offer could be fully exploited and its negative 
effects reduced or minimised (Mckinley, 2006, p.1). Hence, the focus should be on multi-
dimensional aspects of international migration in order to identify appropriate ways and means 
of maximising developments and benefits and minimising negative impacts (Mapisa-Nqakula, 
2006, p.2; Crush, 2001, p.1.) 
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Depending on the context, the term migration can have various definitions, and is applicable 
to both humans and animals. Throughout the World’s history, people have been migrating 
across continents in search of food, shelter, safety and hospitable weather. Today, people are 
still on the move for the same reasons, as well as the new reasons arising, such as job relocation 
and overpopulation. As far as animals are concerned, migration is crucial to their survival, and 
are mostly dependant on the seasonal changes in weather and feeding patterns, or mating and 
breeding patterns (Grabianowski, 2008, p.6). Throughout the industrialised west, but also in 
the relatively rich eastern Asian countries and South Africa, immigration is becoming 
increasingly difficult (Fragomen, 1997). In South Africa where, during apartheid, large 
numbers of foreign workers were relied upon, opinions have turned against immigrants, 
mirroring similar concerns about foreign workers in Europe. It was alleged that Thabo Mbeki 
had warned, “Our people are just loafing in the street at the expense of foreigners flooding our 
offices and mines. The Home Affairs Ministry will have to sort this thing out ... I mean, these 
foreigners have got to go back home” (Layton and Henry, 1992).  
 
In West Africa, with its intensive migration systems, migration opportunities changed with the 
expulsion of between 200,000 and 1.5 million foreign workers from Ghana in 1969, the 
expulsion of some two million illegal 'aliens' from Nigeria in 1983, and the 'increasingly 
xenophobic Ivoirian public' during the last decade (Winter, 1997, p.28). 
 
However, views about migration and migrants are often based on an assumption of 
sedentarism, that populations used to be immobile and have been uprooted by economic or 
environmental forces. There is however much evidence to challenge this sedentary bias, and to 
view population movement as the norm rather than the exception (Skeldon, 1997). In historical 
Europe, pre-colonial developing countries, and current developing countries, migration has 
been an essential element in the livelihood strategies, of poor as well as better-off people. An 
emphasis on forced migration is warranted but should not be based on an assumption (which 
colonial authorities at times propagated) that before the entry of forced migration, populations 
were immobile.  
 
Furthermore, migration is not limited to the 'rural-urban' transition: much migration remains 
within rural areas (Mollett, 1991), and migrants to urban areas tend to maintain close links with 
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their areas of origin. For example, it is commonly argued that the history of Africa is a history 
of migration. Richard Waller describes East Africa, before the advent of colonialism, as, “... a 
frontier region where society was fluid, highly adaptable, and capable of absorbing outsiders 
easily”. Labour, rather than land, was the scarce resource. This placed a high premium on the 
ability of pioneering groups of individuals to contract and manipulate effectively a wide range 
of kinship and other ties in order to mobilise the social and political resources necessary for 
colonisation, as a result of the need for mobility, there were few barriers to the flow of 
populations from one small-scale unit to another and the definitions of identity tended to be 
inclusive rather than exclusive (McDowell, 1997). 
 
Migration means crossing the boundary of a political or administrative unit for a certain 
minimum period (Boyle et al. 1998, chapter 2). Internal migration refers to a move from one 
area (a province, district or municipality) to another within one country. International migration 
means crossing the frontiers which separate one of the world’s approximately 200 states from 
another. Many scholars argue that internal and international migration are part of the same 
process, and should be analysed together (Skeldon, 1997, pp.9–10). Rigid distinctions can be 
misleading:  international migration may be over short distances and between culturally similar 
people (e.g.  between the southern Philippines and Sabah in Malaysia), while internal migration 
can span great distances and bring together very different people (e.g. movements of the Uigar 
‘national minority’ people from the western provinces of China to cities in the East). 
Sometimes the frontiers ‘migrate’, rather than the people, making internal migrants into 
international ones. For instance, the break-up of the former Soviet Union turned millions of 
former internal migrants into foreigners in the successor states.  
 
The great majority of border crossings do not imply migration: as evidence shows that most 
travellers are tourists or business visitors who have no intention of staying for long. Migration 
means taking up residence for a certain minimum period - say 6 months or a year. Most 
countries have a number of categories in their migration policies and statistics. For instance, 
Australia distinguishes between permanent immigrants, long-term temporary immigrants who 
stay at least 12 months usually for work, business or education, and short-term temporary 
visitors. Yet Australia is seen as a ‘classical country of immigration’ because of its tradition of 
nation-building through immigration, and nearly all public debate is focused on permanent 
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immigration. Other countries prefer to see immigration as essentially temporary. When the 
German Federal Republic started to recruit so-called ‘guest workers’ in the 1960s, some were 
allowed in for a few months only as ‘seasonal workers’ while others received one-year permits. 
In time, it became difficult to limit residence so tightly: people who had been resident for a 
certain time obtained 2-years, then 5-years and finally unlimited permits. 
 
However, Goetz (1999, p.18) and Helton (2003, p.2) both maintain that there is no universally-
accepted single definition of migration. Goetz used a compromise definition which concerned 
only migration across state lines in the USA but excluded changes in residence within a single 
country. In Goetz’s opinion (1999, p.18), the definition of migration in the USA refers to 
another in order to seek new places of residence. The current research has adopted the above 
definition with a nuance, to mean ‘the movement of people across country (and state) lines 
within the African continent for the purpose of establishing a new place or seeking peace and 
stability’. 
 
As noted by both Serrie (1998, p.11) and Helton (2003, p.5), the numbers of immigrants to any 
nation, and their countries of origin are powerfully affected by the receiving countries’ 
immigration policies and laws, as well as the degree to which those laws are enforced. Colonial 
economic activities, by accentuating regional inequalities within and between countries, 
spurred internal and international migrations in varying degrees (Adepoju, 2006, p.32). Amin 
(1974) quoted in Adepoju (2006, p.32) found that in most Francophone west African countries, 
the fierce implementation of compulsory recruitment, contracts and forced labour legislation, 
and agreements to secure cheap labour, all of which the local people abhorred, sparked large-
scale clandestine internal and cross-border migration of unskilled adult males required for 
infrastructural work, especially transport networks in the north and plantation agriculture in the 
coastal countries.  
 
The way in which government label migration says much more about the nature of government 
policy on international migration, than the particular motivations and characteristics of the 
individuals who migrate. These different labels correspond to policies imposed on populations 
who crossed the borders, almost always with very mixed individual motivations. Only five 
nations on the planet encourage immigrants to settle permanently and obtain citizenship and 
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naturalisation: Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand and the United States. In addition, 
immigration policies vary from country to country. New Zealand’s regulations require proof 
of family income to prevent the immigrants from placing a burden on the social welfare 
services, while the United State does not require proof. 
 
Combing the world for opportunities, according to Cohen (1997), has historically been the 
privilege of the Europeans, who have been encouraged by their imperial governments to settle 
foreign territories, and who have benefited from fellow whites on the ground, from colonial 
officers to missionaries through businessmen, journalists and scholars (Cohen, 1997, pp.66-
81). Without necessarily being homogenous collectively, whites have always managed to tame 
their differences in the interest of the economic, cultural and political hegemonies of west vis-
à-vis the rest (Chinweizu, 1987). Thus, in South Africa for example, the Dutch who first landed 
in the Cape in 1652 actively encouraged immigration by whites from Europe and practically 
allowed them free access to the territory. Irrespective of locations, international migration has 
long been a topic of debate. In the West, questions concerning its causes and consequences 
have always influenced policy. As a result, much has been written on the historical role of 
immigration, although this has largely focused on social rather than economic history. 
 
 According to Nyamnjoh, (2006, p.28) the price for the European domestication was the 
systematic insulation and subjection of the indigenous populations by freezing migration from 
elsewhere, except for slaves or labour zombies, and on terms defined exclusively by the interest 
of the settler whites (February, 1991, pp.12-39; Cohen, 1997, pp.59-62; Elbourne, 2003, 
pp.380-88). While virtually ‘anyone with white skin was welcome’, non-whites, particularly 
from Africa, ‘are unwelcome’, and when it suited ‘apartheid’s pernicious “homelands” strategy 
of co-optation’, the state allowed entry to selected black skilled immigrants and ‘honorary 
whites’ from Asia (Crush and McDonald, 2001, p.2). The disintegration of apartheid in the 
1990s was accompanied by the scrapping of the whites-only immigration policy and thousands 
of Africans from the region and countries further north moved to South Africa. A new 
phenomenon was the inward movement of what can be called ’continental’ Africans, Africans 
from beyond the southern African region (Morris and Bouillon, 2001, p.10). 
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However, the deepening economic, social and political crisis in a number of African countries 
(Zaire, Nigeria, Somalia, Senegal, Cameroun, Congo Brazzaville, etc.) meant that thousands 
of Africans were looking for a new home. In their own postulation, Morris and Bouillon (2001, 
p.10) suggest that relatively, peaceful and successful democratisation process in South Africa 
made it an attractive option and tens of thousands of people from other African countries moved 
to South Africa in the 1990s. It is interesting to note that not one of the thousands of migrant 
workers from neighbouring countries who spent (and often lost) their lives on South Africa’s 
mines and farms ever qualified for permanent residence let alone citizenship in the country, as 
the system of contract labour compelled migrants to return home at the end of each contract 
and at the end of their working days (Crush and McDonald, 2001, p.3). However, in post-
apartheid South Africa there has been little, or no progress witnessed in how African migrants 
are received. 
 
2.13 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF IMMIGRATION TO SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
Rogerson (1999, p.2) and Posel (2003, p.5) both note that there has been an increase in 
movement of foreign migrants into South Africa since 1990. Immigration to South Africa has 
a long and complex history. It is worthy to note that African immigration is certainly a new 
phenomenon. The following is a brief sketch of immigration to South Africa. White immigrants 
arrived from as early as the middle of the 17th century. The discovery of gold and diamonds 
and the attendant industrialisation greatly increased immigration from Europe and the United 
Kingdom in the late 19th and early century. Slaves were brought in from various countries: 
Madagascar, Indonesia, Angola, China and from Gulf of Guinea. Indian indentured labour was 
used to cultivate sugar from the 1860s. 
 
From the mere fact that African population has a very old immigration history, an 
archaeological finding suggests that significant movements of population from the Bantu 
languages and cultures, goes back to the 3rd century AD (Cornevin, 1979, pp.77-95). From the 
last quarter of the 19th century, Africans from Mozambique and Nyassaland (Malawi), but also 
from Swaziland, Bechuanaland (Botswana), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Northern 
57 
 
Rhodesia (Zambia) and Angola, came to work on the mines of the orange free state and the 
Transvaal. Some farm labour was also drawn from surrounding countries. 
 
By the time the Union of South Africa was established in 1910, the basis for the system was 
already in place. Only whites were allowed to immigrate to South Africa, while black people 
were allowed to move to South Africa for a limited period of time if they had a job. They were 
not allowed to bring their families with them. As early as 1913 the law empowered the minister 
to refuse entry to the territory to any applicants who did not, in his judgement, ‘Conform to the 
needs of the state’ as per economic and cultural (linguistic) criteria. Bilateral agreements were 
concluded with neighbouring countries: Mozambique, Angola, and the protectorates and 
colonies of the British Empire to supply migrant labour (Peberby, 1997, p.3). Progressively, all 
the countries of the region were drawn into the migrant labour system. By the early 1970s, in 
many gold mines, eight out of ten workers came from Malawi, Mozambique, Angola, 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (Crush, 1995, p.11). 
 
Workers from surrounding territories could not stay permanently in the country and had to go 
home at least once a year to renew their contracts. Furthermore, they were not entitled to 
purchase a property or have their families with them. In the 1960s, the reinforcement of the 
legislation and controls, which were based on the compulsory carrying of identity documents, 
resulted in the massive expulsion of nationals from neighbouring countries (Peberdy, 1997, 
p.12). The increased repression of black foreigners by the apartheid government went hand-in-
hand with a massive increase in the implementation of the pass laws. Thus in 1967-68, over a 
12-month period, 693,661 persons appeared in court charged with having transgressed the pass 
law (Horrel, 1971, p.164). 
 
Conversely, with the coming into power of the National Party in 1948, immigration of whites 
or Europeans was systematically encouraged in order to reinforce the white minority and to 
provide for the ever-increasing need for skilled labour. Not all whites were welcome. Jews 
were subject to a good deal of discrimination. A government document issued in 1926 argued 
that immigration of Jews was incompatible with the reinforcing of the ‘white nation’ (Peberby, 
1997b, p.5). Once she/he could prove his/her capacity to assimilate, the applicant was said to 
be, according to the Aliens Act of 1937, ‘of good reputation and susceptible to being 
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assimilated by the white inhabitants…’, the European immigrant was granted permanent 
residence. When they took out South African citizenship they were allowed to retain citizenship 
of their country of origin. 
 
An interesting aspect of the apartheid state’s immigration policy was that the apartheid system 
gave the so-called homelands enough autonomy to facilitate the inward movement of thousands 
of African immigrants from neighbouring countries. The so-called homelands provided a space 
in the system for black foreign Africans to move into South Africa. The racial 
compartmentalisation of urban areas also facilitated inward movement. Urban segregation 
allows foreign Africans to settle in some black townships without being harassed by the 
authorities who, by the early 1980s, in many instances had given up endeavouring to regulate 
settlement in these areas. Thus, despite drastic measures, many inhabitants from neighbouring 
countries, particularly from Mozambique, were integrated into the local black communities. In 
the mid-1980s, besides poor immigrants from Mozambique and other African countries, the 
first wave of middle class professional immigrants started arriving from ‘continental’ Africa. 
They were employed mainly as academics and in the public health system. Ironically, the 1990s 
saw a significant tightening up of the regulations and the flow of professional continental 
Africans has subsequently slowed. The post-apartheid government vigorously opposed within 
the SAC the adoption of the protocol project on the free movement of persons’, arguing that 
the internal imbalances in the community would lead to an unbearable number of persons 
relocating to South Africa to look for employment. 
 
To complete this brief history of immigration to South Africa, an important post-apartheid shift 
is that the immigration policy is no longer premised on national-racial reasoning, but on the 
right to control entry based on South African citizenship. However, the system of migrant 
labour in relation to foreign nationals has not been abolished. The new regime inherited 
contracts made with Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland, and the legislation on 
the apartheid era. The revisions that have been made have not symbolised a significant shift in 
policy. In fact, since 1994, obtaining permanent residence status has probably become more 
difficult and the tracking down of Africans who are not South African and who are suspected 
of being illegal, and who are often accosted by the police on the basis that they look foreign. 
Police are supposedly able to identify foreign Africans by their accents, hairstyles or dressing 
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style, or in the case of Mozambicans, vaccination scars on the left front-arm (Minnaar, et al., 
1995, p.11).  
 
The administration of the Home Affairs Department persists in refusing to regularise ex-
migrant workers from neighbouring countries, even if they have spent a long time in the 
country, because according to legislation dating back to the days of apartheid, their presence 
in the country was not constant. The revising of the Aliens Control Act in 1995 did bring about 
some improvements. For example, foreigners can no longer be detained for longer than 48 
hours without an official renewal and detention cannot extend beyond thirty days without 
authorisation from a Supreme Court Judge. 
 
However, the revision of the law has done little to protect citizens (various cases have been 
reported of black South Africans being abused and arrested because they supposedly looked 
foreign) and non-citizens alike from the risk of arrest and, in the case of non-citizens, from 
arbitrary deportation (De La Hunt, 1997). Commenting on the revision of the legislation, the 
Labour Market Commission concluded that the revision had the potential for serious abuses of 
human rights (Commmission, 1996, paragraphs 541, p.174). Some analysts have argued that 
social reactions to immigration, especially irregular migration of foreign African nationals, 
have been shaped by the political discourses on immigration (see for example, Neocosmos, 
2006). The tone of the discourses is to a large extent anti-immigration while a great deal of 
uncertainty and speculation surrounds the real magnitude of undocumented migrants. The 
public’s perceptions on irregular migration remains driven by rumour, mediatised news, 
unrelated criminal activities or concerns over invasion by outsiders or aliens. 
 
The status of ‘illegal’ immigrants remains one of the most problematic aspects of South 
Africa’s immigration policy. Their rights are severely circumscribed. The suspicion of crossing 
a border illegally places the person concerned in an invidious position. If apprehended his/her 
rights are minimal. The situation creates a fertile climate for abuse and indeed many acts of 
brutality against foreigners have been reported. Looking at South Africa’s immigration history 
we can see continental African immigration is not only a recent phenomenon, but a 
phenomenon whose characteristics are dissimilar to traditional immigration, black and white. 
‘Continental’ African immigrants compared to the traditional African immigrants from the 
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SADC countries, are far more likely to have had a long urban experience and be relatively well-
educated. Culturally, the continental Africans will often be fairly distinct in terms of dress, 
mannerism, modes of life, etc.  
 
2.13.1 Emergence and Rise of Xenophobia 
 
Xenophobia is not a new phenomenon in the country, nor is South Africa the only country that 
is grappling with xenophobia. MacDonald and Jacobs (2005) define xenophobia as specifically 
referring to a “deep dislike of foreigners.” (p.295). According to them the definition describes 
a discrete set of attitudes that manifest themselves in the behaviours of governments, the 
general public and the media. They further explain that as a term, xenophobia cannot be 
separated from violence and physical abuse, but rather, it should be framed so that it includes 
the word ‘practice’, since it is not only an attitude, but also an activity. It is not just a dislike of 
foreigners, but this dislike extends to violent practices that may result in bodily harm and 
damage (MacDonald and Jacobs, 2005). Xenophobia can also be understood as a bitter 
outcome of the exertion of collective identity. This identity is characterised by the dominant 
ethnic, religious, economic, political and cultural demands (Shindondola, 2003). 
 
 Xenophobia is a form of attitudinal, affective, and behavioural prejudice toward immigrants 
and those perceived as foreign. The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary’s (n.d.) definition of 
xenophobia is the “fear and hatred of strangers or foreigners or of anything that is strange or 
foreign” highlights that the term has been historically used to emphasise a sense of fright of 
outsiders. However, more recent definitions of xenophobia suggest that the fear of foreigners 
and their impact is linked with ethnocentrism, which is characterised by the attitude that one’s 
own group or culture is superior to others (Merriam-Webster Online, n.d.). Reynolds and Vine 
(1987, p.28) state that xenophobia is a “psychological state of hostility or fear towards 
outsiders”. Crowther (1995, p.138) emphasises that xenophobia focuses on individuals who 
come from “other countries” and towards whom native individuals have “an intense dislike or 
fear”. 
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However, scholars have also used the term ‘nativism’ to describe negative feelings toward 
immigrants and immigration (Gellner, 1995). Higham (1988, p.2) provides the following 
definition of nativism in the United States: 
 Nativism is an intense opposition to an internal minority on the grounds of its foreign 
(i.e. un-American) connections. Specific nativist antagonisms may and do vary widely 
in response to the changing character of minority irritants and the shifting conditions of 
the day; but through each separate hostility runs the connecting, energising force of 
modern nationalism. While drawing on much broader cultural antipathies and 
ethnocentric judgments, nativism translates them into zeal to destroy the enemies of a 
distinctively American way of life. (Higham, 1988, p.2) 
 
The preference for the term ‘nativism’ is typically based on the emphasis of the neutrality of 
the word in contrast to ‘xenophobia’, which implies the presence of prejudice or fear (Fry, 
2001). However, even those scholars who use the term ‘nativism’ usually highlight the negative 
implications of nativist attitudes (Fry, 2001; Perea, 1997). Because these attitudes are not 
neutral, ‘xenophobia’ as a term, seems to more clearly indicate the presence of attitudinal and 
behavioural hostility towards non-native individuals. Moreover, the term ‘xenophobia’ is 
commonly used by social psychologists, human rights organisations, and the United Nations 
to describe anti-immigrant sentiments.  
 
As xenophobia is generally regarded as fear and intolerance of foreigners, Wimmer (1997) in 
his study opines that xenophobia is an expression or struggle over distribution issues. His study 
shows that downwardly mobile groups of national groups of solidarity appeal to reassure their 
place in the core of the social fabric. Hence people outside this group are perceived as 
competitors for state-organised promises of solidarity and security. Apparently, it is argued that 
xenophobia cannot just be framed as an attitude since there is no comment patterning the 
effects/consequences of that mind-set (Harris, 2002). However, believing such is misleading 
since xenophobia in South Africa is not restricted to only fear or dislike of foreigners, but rather 
xenophobia translates to violence and physical abuse and must be reframed to incorporate 
practice (Kappan,1999 cited in Harris,2002).  
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Be that as it may, Abdi’s contestation is that xenophobia arises as a result of cultural differences 
and the inability to assimilate the culture of the host communities which exposes the 
vulnerability of the immigrants (Abdi, 2011). Hence igniting dominion over them and to the 
extent that those official power-holders ignite a culture of exclusion through the 
institutionalisation of cultural social work. In the same way, this situation presents a breeding 
ground upon which xenophobia thrives. But this postulation does not show the way, form and 
extent of the exclusion. Research and historical events have indicated that if a majority group 
is in a perilous economic position they are more likely to feel threatened by minorities, 
especially if they are foreigners (Pettigrew, 1957; Blalock, 1967; Quillian, 1995). 
 
2.14 XENOPHOBIA IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 
 
Xenophobia is encountered in many contemporary societies. Its targets are different across 
countries and nations. In 1997, the European Union carried out a study on xenophobia in all 
member states. It was found that almost 33 per cent of the people interviewed were quite 
xenophobic or very xenophobic. Most of the responses revealed that the reasons for being 
xenophobic could be dissatisfaction with their life circumstances, fear of unemployment, 
insecurity about the future and low self-confidence in the way public authorities and the 
political establishment worked in their country (Shindondola, 2003). 
 
Xenophobia is a global problem that has been experienced in both industrialised and 
developing countries, it is not indigenous to any part of the world, nor alien to any. It is a reality 
in Germany, Japan, Britain, Nigeria and even South Africa. Large-scale migration has grown 
dramatically in recent years. Around the world, approximately 150 million people live outside 
their countries of origin, temporarily. Movement across borders is directly related to 
discrimination and intolerance (Chakma and Jensen 2001, p,111). Internationally, the emphasis 
on accommodating immigrants is on pluralism and multiculturalism, reflecting greater 
awareness of cultural diversity. When a society does not appreciate the differences of 
immigrant groups, such differences are seen as problems to be overcome (Motani, 2002, 
p.225). Focus will now be directed on other countries such as America, Japan, Germany, 
Britain and France to see how they have accommodated language and cultural differences in 
education. 
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2.14.1 America 
 
“America isn't a multicultural society. It's a melting pot with a tiny minority of radical 
separatists. The children of immigrants continue to learn English and assimilate despite the 
excesses of bilingual education, just as they always have” (Weisberg, 1995, p.43). The large-
scale entrance of legal and illegal immigrants into America has created economic problems as 
well as problems relating to social absorption. Marger (1991, p.533) maintains that this issue 
is debatable, since some argue that immigrants “constitute an added burden to the already 
swollen labour pool,” and others are of the view that “they create as many jobs as they take”. 
The current immigrants are “highly visible, bringing to American society cultural and physical 
features”. In America however, it is assumed that the use of English will encourage social 
integration. Initially English was promoted in schools and other educational institutions in the 
hope that the immigrants’ languages would be abandoned, if not by the first then by the second 
generation. Immigrants were permitted to have their own private schools and to publish their 
own newspapers, which served as a means of preserving culture and language. The language 
issue is a burning one and language assimilation is being challenged. Greater tolerance in 
American society has led to providing educational and other services in the languages of the 
new groups (Marger, 1991, p.535). 
 
An extremely old and familiar theme in U.S. history has been the episodic anti-foreigner 
xenophobia. So old and so familiar is this xenophobia that at one time it was illegal in 22 states 
to teach a foreign language. The Supreme Court overturned this policy but by 1954, only 56 
per cent of American high schools offered a foreign language as a subject with less than 14.2 
per cent enrolled in studying a foreign language. Today, less than 9.3 per cent of Americans 
are fluent in another language (Bouwer, 2005). 
 
Having emigrated from Iran after the hostage crisis I’ve endured stereotypes about 
being a terrorist, hostage taker, suicide bomber, etc. as a school yard taunt. To see a 
columnist insinuates a school is going to indoctrinate children to become terrorists 
merely because it teaches Arabic is highly offensive. On the second question of whether 
the school should exist given that it focuses on teaching students how to speak Arabic, 
is interesting” (Wolf, 2007, p.29). 
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Several scholars have noted that immigration in America has become a focal point of heated 
national debates (Dillon, 2001; Fuentes, 2006; Munro, 2006; Smith and Edmonston, 1997; Toy, 
2002). Immigrants are repeatedly associated with the declining economy, overpopulation, 
pollution, increased violence, depleted social resources (i.e. medical and educational), erosion 
of cultural values, and terrorism (Cowan, Martinez, and Mendiola, 1997; Munro, 2006). 
Immigrant individuals are often portrayed as criminals, poor, violent, and uneducated 
(Espanshade and Calhoun, 1993; Muller and Espanshade, 1985). According to Namtanbu 
(2012, p.4), in the United States of America, it seems that racial profiling only applies to 
African-American (black) males. His study also poignantly confirms the truism that “African-
Americans are over-stopped, over-frisked, over-searched and over-arrested” by white police 
officers in America. The 26 February 2012 killing of the unarmed 17-year old, Trayvon Martin 
in Sanford, Florida speaks volumes as to the omnipresence of white xenophobia (fear of other 
races) in America, and it must be pointed out that this putative fear, real or imagined, only 
targets the African-American (black) males. 
 
Indeed, one may have naively assumed that with the anomalous election of America’s first 
African-American (black) President, Barack Obama, this white xenophobia mind-set would 
have gradually been relegated to the ash heap of America’s societal history, but the reverse was 
the case. 
 
2.14.2 Japan 
 
Grant in Motani (2002, p.226) says that “an education system will naturally reflect the norms 
of the host society. For the schools, the question is how far they can or should take account of 
cultural differences, how much variation they can accept and whether they should seek to 
assimilate the minorities or encourage them to retain and develop their own cultures”. The 
Japanese government promotes immigration and even went to the extent of relaxing the 
requirement to allow immigrants to enter and work in the country. However, when it comes to 
education, no official policy on multicultural education exists because of the assimilation 
strategy. 
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Prior to 1965, educational discrimination against immigrant Koreans was deep rooted and one 
form of discrimination was the oppression by the Education Ministry; the government 
systematically suppressed the Korean language and culture by prohibiting the teaching of the 
Korean language, history and geography in schools (Motani, 2002, p.229). In another instance, 
media reports about the case of a Peruvian worker, arrested on suspicion of killing a seven-
year-old girl, have exposed the vulnerability of foreign workers to Japan's famous xenophobia. 
A Peruvian child in a Japanese public school talked of the mental pain and sadness she felt 
when the teacher in her class asked the students to name the nationality of the suspect. Activists 
contend that the hysteria over the murder fanned a deep undercurrent of distrust of foreigners 
who the police have linked to the rising crime in the country. Prof. Chikako Yamawaki at 
Bunkyoku University has launched a programme in two primary schools that teaches Japanese 
students the Spanish language and Latin American culture in the hope of fostering deeper cross-
cultural understanding. "I realised that the policy of teaching the Japanese language and culture 
to children of migrant workers does not result in equality for foreigners. Japanese people must 
learn more about the other side for real cooperation and understanding," she explained 
(Kakuchi, 2005, p. 68). 
 
At the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 
held in Geneva in 2001, the Korean delegation maintained that the Japanese government 
deprived children of foreign nationality of the right to education. While a child of foreign 
nationality has the option of going to a Japanese school, the problem is that the child will not 
have the right to a proper Japanese language education, or to learn his or her ethnic language. 
Consequently, many children cannot cope with the classes in Japanese schools, are unable to 
find opportunities to foster their identity, and are in reality excluded from education (UN Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 2001). 
 
To emphasise the plight of the foreigners in Japan, the committee highlighted that this was the 
fourth recommendation by the UN human rights bodies to urge the Japanese government to 
redress discrimination against the ethnic Korean schools and ethnic education of Korean 
residents in Japan. Furthermore, the committee expressed its concern about the fact that Korean 
schools were not officially recognised even when they adhered to the Japanese national 
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education curriculum and therefore, they neither receive central government subsidies nor are 
they able to provide qualification for university entrance examinations. The concluding 
observations also mentioned that “there are very limited possibilities for children in society, 
particularly in the fields of employment, housing and education” (UN Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 2001). 
 
2.14.3 Germany 
 
Germany has a thoroughly studied history of victimisation. The holocaust provides a unique 
example of the atrocities, victimisation and genocide against minority Jews. Xenophobia and 
racially motivated violence in Germany are rooted in this past. In 2001, a proposal was 
presented for a council framework decision to combat xenophobia and racism. According to 
this proposal (which has not yet been adopted as law), crimes committed against minority 
groups with “racist and xenophobia motives, should be made aggravating factors and enhance 
penalties” (Winterdyk and Antonopoulos, 2008, p.115). 
 
The following words of Veronica, a foreigner in Germany, emphasise the xenophobic 
behaviour of Germans towards foreigners:  
As an Asian, I felt so much discrimination in all aspects of life, especially in school. I 
came to Germany at age 16 and was hoping to go to university. Almost all the high 
schools we went to rejected me solely for the fact that my German wasn't good enough. 
No matter how I try to explain to people that I have nothing left in my home country 
and my new life is here, they always treat me as if I am exotic and that everything in 
German life is still new and novel to me. I have a German name, I have a German 
passport, but I look Asian, and therefore am a foreigner” (der Spiegel, ). 
 
According to a confidential government study on juvenile violence, it is inferred that 
xenophobia is widespread among German youth (Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung, 2008, p.4). 
Almost a third of all German schoolchildren agreed ‘completely’ with the statement that there 
are too many foreigners in Germany; another third of those who were asked ‘mostly’ agreed. 
Almost a fifth of the learners in the 9th grade who were asked also had open prejudices against 
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Islam, and one out of every 13 admitted to committing a hate crime such as spraying a swastika 
on a wall or damaging the property of foreigners. Gabi Elverich at the Centre for the Prevention 
of Right-Wing Extremism and Xenophobia at the German Youth Institute confirms the findings 
of the study. 
 
While many schools in Germany are working hard to combat racism and xenophobia, teachers 
often find it difficult to get to grips with the root causes of the problems. Elverich is of the 
opinion that "this kind of work (combating xenophobia) is not as easy as doing maths and 
geography. To teach the issues, teachers have to confront their own attitudes too. And at a time 
when we have lots of educational reforms, teachers are finding it a strain". According to 
Elverich, civic education is part of the German curriculum, but little time is devoted to the 
subject, much of the anti-racism education in schools takes the form of troubleshooting, with 
little regular attention given to the issue (Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung, 2008, p.4). 
 
A study conducted by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia in 2004 
shows that education systems have implemented new programmes and curricula to meet the 
needs of a more diverse body of pupils. This includes second language and native language 
programmes, intercultural education, and multicultural curricula. In addition, special teacher 
training programmes have been implemented to institute a more diverse teacher body (Luciak, 
2004, p.7). The population of foreign pupils has been considerably high, as a result of the 
migration of foreign labourers from the 1960s to the 1980s. Many pupils with citizenship from 
Turkey or Yugoslavia attend German schools. In the last decade, the migration inflow 
decreased but the share of migrant pupils in the school system increased. The enrollment rate 
of foreign pupils is above nine per cent of the schoolchildren in all schools, but above 12 per 
cent in primary schools (Luciak, 2004, p.9). 
 
On average, migrant pupils in comparison to German pupils finish school at an earlier age with 
significantly lower qualifications. In 2001, 74,381 migrant pupils with a foreign citizenship 
finished schools that offer general education (Hauptschule, 2005, p.7). While 20.3 per cent of 
these pupils left without any formal qualifications, this is true for only 8.6 per cent of the 
German pupils; 40 per cent of the migrant learners (compared to 24.2 per cent of the German 
pupils) left Hauptschule with a certificate; 29 per cent passed mittlere Reife, which is 
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comparable to a General Certificate of Secondary Education, (compared to 41.7 per cent of the 
German pupils). Only 10.7 per cent of the migrant pupils compared to 25.5 per cent of the 
German pupils obtained the right to study at universities. Prejudice, which tends to be expressed 
in harassment, racial slurs and scapegoating, results in migrant and minority pupils perceiving 
themselves as either not being accepted or being excluded by members of the dominant culture 
(Luciak, 2004, p.46). 
 
To further highlight the discrimination towards foreigners in Germany, in Bremen, the law 
aims at banning not only Muslims from wearing headscarves, but also nuns from wearing 
habits. Nevertheless, according to the Bremen Senator of Education, Christian and Jewish 
symbols are allowed provided they are shown in a ‘discrete and non-provocative way’. In 
Berlin, the wearing of all noticeable religious symbols, no matter whether Muslim, Christian 
or Jewish, is banned completely (Bosch and Peucker, 2005, p.33). Despite the xenophobia in 
Germany, the German school system promotes a policy for the integration of children from 
minority groups. A well-received campaign is the “Fairness and Understanding” campaign, 
which is aimed at informing and educating the young as they are vulnerable to the propaganda 
of right wing extremists (Europe’s Commission Against Racism and Intolerance – Report on 
Germany, 1998, p.9). 
 
2.14.4 Britain 
 
In Britain, the most widely researched aspect of education pertains to the under-achievement 
of minority groups. Tomlinson in O’ Donnell (1991, p.63) states that the ethnocentric nature 
of the curriculum, inappropriate curriculum materials, selection processes in schools, and 
subject selection in secondary schools has an effect on the educational performance of minority 
groups of immigrants in Britain. Raising the achievement levels of these learners is a complex 
issue that does not have simple answers.  
 
Archer and Yashamita (2003) are quoted in Murji and Solomos (2005, p.107) for their findings 
on working class 15 and 16-year olds who were not performing well at school. The teenagers 
had the notion that they were ‘not good enough’ and that they knew ‘their limits’. Caroline 
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Howarth (2002) found that 12 to 16-year olds from various ethnic groups recognised that they 
were stereotyped because of their area of origin. Many teenagers indicated that they became 
conscious of colour because of name-calling and racism. The following quotation depicts how 
an immigrant child felt at school: “There were quite a few black children in my school. I think 
it was in the second year – I had quite [a] racist teacher. I was very good at maths and I was 
kept back because – I don’t know, but I did have a – she was racist, a racist teacher and my 
mum had to go up and see the headmaster” (Murji and Solomos, 2005, p.115). 
 
Researchers focused attention on policies to change the situation for foreigners. The 1991 
census included a question on ethnicity to monitor ‘ethnic disadvantage’, and academics turned 
their attention to the impact of victimisation on immigrants. Chahal and Julienne, in 
Chakraborti and Garland (2004, p.86), interviewed 74 people and found that “racist 
victimisation ... turns normal, daily activities into assessments of personal safety and security”. 
It was concluded that immigrants were feeling “threatened, isolated and vulnerable”. In his 
research, Nizhar, in Chakraborti and Garland, (ibid) identified that government officials were 
also unresponsive to complaints from foreigners. One local government officer stated that “they 
should give up their identity and image and take on board white culture”. Chakraborti and 
Garland (2004, p.171) maintain that the Race Relations Amendment Act (2000) primarily aims 
at ensuring that education establishments are aware of policies and procedures to tackle 
xenophobia and racism effectively. In spite of legislation, research portrays a failure to stem 
the growing problem of xenophobia and racism in the education system. The lack of attention 
paid to the needs of minority ethnic groups in the classroom is well documented where 
“Lessons are habitually taught from a white perspective; leaving minority ethnic pupils feeling 
disillusioned and isolated” (Chakraborti and Garland, 2004, p.171). 
 
Researchers and academics emphasise that there is a clear case for ensuring that existing policy, 
guidance and examples of good practice are implemented across the entire education system 
from the central government down in a consistent and coherent manner. Regional conferences, 
held in 2003, examined issues relating to eradicating racism and xenophobia through education. 
The Stephen Report makes recommendations using the code of practice and outlines specific 
procedures to be followed for recording and dealing with racist incidents on school premises 
and on journeys to and from school. Young people are also empowered to address racism, 
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intolerance and xenophobia in schools. They are encouraged to support each other by being 
assertive, as opposed to being aggressive or submissive, when incidents occur at school. A 
further recommendation is to cover interpersonal relationships (including racism, xenophobia, 
bullying and name-calling) within the curriculum of learning for citizenship (Chakraborti and 
Garland, 2004, p.173). 
 
2.14.5 France 
 
France is no exception to racist and xenophobic ideas. Xenophobia exists amongst a substantial 
portion of the population, and manifests itself in the attitudes towards immigrants, minorities 
and foreigners. Immigrants are blamed by the majority of French citizens for the increasing 
unemployment and crime and decreasing educational standards. They are seen by nearly three 
quarters of the population as more likely to commit crimes than the average French person is. 
Nearly 40 per cent of the population supports forcible repatriation of unemployed immigrants, 
and 22 per cent supports forcible repatriation of all immigrants. Subtle forms of racism are 
reflected in the educational system because there is no disputing the fact that the most 
prestigious universities and graduate schools recruit almost all their students from a “limited 
sociological pool of the white, the wealthy and the well-connected” (Randall, 2001, p.86). 
 
In 2004, there was an unprecedented surge in xenophobic acts which increased by 25 per cent. 
Consequently, this resulted in an increase in intimidation and threats, which undoubtedly led 
to an increase in xenophobic acts committed in schools. Only 12per cent of the offences 
committed constituted violent racist threats or acts. These statistics indicate that xenophobic 
crimes increased by 20 per cent in 2004 and may not be a true reflection of xenophobia due to 
under-reporting. Bullying of foreigners was reported 210 times more than any other form of 
racism. It must also be pointed out that the emphasis is on inclusiveness of culture and that 36 
per cent of the French population have foreign parents or grandparents which may attribute to 
the reduction in intolerance in France. Attitudes of intolerance are “more widespread among 
men and the older generations” (Winterdyk and Antonopoulos, 2008, p.107). 
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According to the RFI (2013) report, the French are increasingly intolerant of and unwelcoming 
to immigrants, the CNCDH argues in its annual report on racism, anti-Semitism and 
xenophobia. As in many European countries, it stated that the financial crisis has boosted 
resentment towards immigrants, while last year's Toulouse killing spree by Islamist gunman, 
Mohamed Merah, and the row following the publication of caricatures of the prophet 
Mohamed, also helped feed anti-Muslim sentiment. According to the report, it also found a 30 
per cent rise in Islamophobic incidents as well as resentment of Roma and immigrants, with 69 
per cent saying that there are too many immigrants in France and believing that they do not 
want to integrate into French life, a rise of 10 per cent on 2011. Chen (2013, p.5) equally states 
that racism in public discourse has become especially conspicuous in recent years.  In the 
political arena, politicians are no strangers to dealing with xenophobia. This turmoil can be 
attributed in part to the influx of immigrants from post-colonial Africa. The floundering 
economy has prompted nationalists to protest that the immigrants are taking away opportunities 
from domestic candidates. Not surprisingly, the wave of political refugees from northern 
Africa, as a result of the ‘Arab Spring’, only exacerbated these concerns. 
 
HEALTH SERVICE DELIVERY ISSUE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 
 
The growing trend of migration has been mirrored by a demand for a reorientation of health 
policies to better protect migrants’ health (Macpherson et al, 2007). This fact is reflected by 
the content of a number of recent high-level, health-related international activities/meetings. In 
2006, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Global Commission on International 
Migration and the high-level dialogue called for a more collaborative and cohesive global 
response to the challenges of migration. In 2009, the Programme Coordination Board (PCB) 
of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) held its 24th meeting in 
Geneva, highlighting HIV-related needs for people on the move. The Board also articulated 
that the improvement of HIV information and services for migrants would buttress the 
development and implementation of international healthcare strategies (UN, 2009). The issue 
of the health of migrants has expanded from disease-specific care to health promotion and 
disease prevention. For example, the annual European Public Health Association (EUPHA) 
Conference in 2014 underlined the need for adaptation of health promotion and disease 
prevention interventions for migrants and ethnic minority populations (WHO, 2015). 
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In addition, the World Health Organisation (WHO) has been acting as a catalyst between 
various stakeholders, in addressing the health of migrants. Its action is visible through a number 
of relevant World Health Assembly Resolutions (WHR), for instance, WHR60.26 on ‘Workers 
health, global plan of action’, urging member states to work towards full coverage of all 
workers including migrants (WHO, 2007), and WHR61.17 on the ‘Health of migrants’, which 
calls for migrant sensitive health policies and practices (WHO, 2008). 
 
Challenges concerning the health of migrants cannot be tackled straightforwardly since the 
issue is highly dynamic and complicated, involving various stages of migration, from pre-
departure to early and late migratory status (Ullmann et al., 2011; Lassetter and Callister, 
2009). Furthermore, this matter is tightly intertwined with several social determinants, which 
are related not only to migrants’ characteristics (such as, different gender roles, cultural 
diversity, migration experiences, and precarious legal status), but also the contextual 
environment of migrant destination countries (such as, idiosyncratic health systems and 
cultural values) (Spallek, Zeeb, Razum, 2011; Malmusi, 2010). 
Though there exists some literature exploring the health status and perception migrants have 
towards service utilisation in many receiving countries (De Maio, 2010; Almeida et al. and 
Brewin, 2006), there is still little evidence that deeply examines the health services which 
migrants receive in actual practice from the viewpoint of service providers. This study could 
not systematically review the literature which has investigated the perceptions and practices of 
healthcare providers in managing care for migrants, as well as the challenges and barriers that 
health personnel faced. 
 
2.15 POPULATION OF FOREIGN-BORN IMMIGRANTS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
In the 2016 survey, StatsSA explained that, since the onset of democracy, “research has 
anecdotally reported more immigration numbers [migration into South Africa] relative to 
emigration [emigration outwards]StataSA, 2016, p.9”. This assumption appeared to be borne 
out by the data from the three census reports that followed 1994, conducted in 1996, 2001, and 
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2011. The 1996 census reported 958,188 foreign-born people in South Africa. By 2001 this 
figure had grown to 1,03-million. A decade later, census 2011 showed the number of foreign-
born migrants had more than doubled, to just over 2,1-million, people.    
 
However according to the 2016 survey, South Africa’s foreign-born population has now 
declined to 1,6-million. Diego Iturralde, chief director for demography at StatsSA, told Africa 
Check that the decline was “unexpected” and that StatsSA was investigating “to see what may 
have informed this change”. Hence, StatsSA suggests in the report that the decline could be as 
a result of foreign-born people lying about their nationalities, which may highlight an “instilled 
fear of disclosure of one’s origin”. The report also states that there was a need to investigate 
the enumerators’ capability to get correct answers on people’s countries of origin. 
 
In addition, the recorded number of foreign-born people in the 2016 Community Survey is also 
almost half the number of migrants estimated by the United Nations’ Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs (DESA). DESA in the Africa Check (2017) estimates that, in 2015, there 
were over 3,14 million international migrants living in South Africa. Pablo Lattes (2017), a 
population affairs officer from DESA’s population division, states that their estimates were 
based on the 2011 census figures, indicating 2,1 million international migrants. To this they 
added a rounded-up figure of 600,000 asylum seekers and refugees – based on the 2015 
UNHCR [the UN Refugee Agency] data – which then “puts the total foreign born to around 
2,7 million. The number of foreign born has been steadily growing in South Africa,” according 
to Lattes, “so we consider our estimate of 3,1 million to be a very likely estimate for the 
country” (Lattes, 2016). “The UN [estimate] is based on a model with a series of assumptions 
which in the past has tied up nicely with our data but this time round we seem to have diverged 
in our numbers,” as Iturralde argues (Iturralde, 2016).  
 
DESA’s report in Africa Check (2017) states that in 2000 there were just over 1 million 
international migrants in South Africa, or 2.25 per cent of the population. This figure ties in 
with previous numbers released by StatsSA, which found, in the 1996 and 2001 censuses, and 
the 2007 community survey, respectively, “2.1 per cent, 2.2 per cent and 2.3 per cent of the 
enumerated population”, were foreign born. The 2011 census was the first survey to estimate 
a significantly larger proportion of international migrants, at 4.2 per cent of the country’s 
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population (confusingly, some older StatsSA reports incorrectly cite this proportion as 5.7 per 
cent).  
 
2.15.1 Population, Gender and Age of Migrants 
 
Hence, both the 2016 Community Survey and Census 2011 found that there are more male than 
female migrants in South Africa – a 60:40 ratio – and that most migrants were of working age 
(between the ages of 15 and 64 years old). 
 
 
Figure 2. 15. 2: Population and Gender of Foreign Born Immigrants in South Africa 
 
Source; Africa Check (2017) 
 
2.16 XENOPHOBIA IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Unfortunately, the increasing diversity of post-apartheid South Africa’s population has not 
been welcomed by a large part of the population and xenophobia has become an increasingly 
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serious issue (Morris and Bouillon, 2001, p.10). The media is constantly reporting verbal and 
physical attacks on immigrants and of course many go unreported. A disturbing proportion of 
attacks involve excessive violence and even murder. Anti-immigrant sentiment is not only 
strong in South Africa, it is widespread (Danso and McDonald, 2001, p.116; Neocosmos, 2008, 
p.14; Gordon, 2010, p.46). It is on record according to Nyamnjoh (2006, p.38) that Black 
African migrants with whom very few South African nationals have had a ‘great deal of 
contact’ are negatively perceived by nearly all South Africans, and 75 per cent of whom 
associate them with all sorts of ills (Danso and McDonald, 2001, pp.115-117). With the 
exception of the occasional intervention of the Human Rights Commission, the failure of the 
South African constitution and authorities to protect the rights of non-citizens is clearly at 
variance with all claims that South Africa is building a culture of human rights (Nyamnjoh, 
2006, p.41). 
 
Hence Peberdy’s (2001, pp.28-29) submission that by limiting entitlements only to national 
citizens, the South African state has shifted the emphasis to “keeping out those who do not 
belong and preventing anyone else from joining”, especially those who have the “wrong 
citizenship”. Harris (2001, p.85) summarises the reasons for such negative perceptions towards 
black Africans to include the fact that they compete for scarce resources and public services 
such as schools and medical care, infrastructure and land, housing and informal trading 
opportunities, and with citizens who are already living in poverty and below the breadline. 
Sichone (2001, p.10) argues that the desperate economic positions of most African migrants 
mean that they accept lower wages and undo the bitter struggles of South African trade unions, 
by working as scab labour. 
 
Researching on a larger scale than before, Gordon (2010, p.46) observes that the victory over 
racial segregation and other aspects of apartheid only created a new era of contestation over 
social and economic rights, the product of which is a new discriminatory system that ensures 
exclusion of African immigrants from socio-economic rights in the political system. In his own 
submission, Gordon (2010, p.78) describes the law guiding immigration as ‘draconian’, and 
most are derived from apartheid rules and regulations. Hence the xenophobia which exists in 
the public is fuelled by a state policy that has failed to exhibit inclusive policy for foreigners. 
According to McDonald and Jacobs (2005, p.84), xenophobia seems to have fully matured and 
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is widespread in Southern Africa, and also that Southern Africa shows an extraordinary 
consistency in their antagonism towards foreigners, most especially those from other countries 
in Africa and particularly those deemed to be illegal immigrants in the region. 
 
Not only did migration during apartheid provide means of recruiting cheap labour from 
neighbouring countries, it also served to fuel the political and public debates around the 
formation of citizenship in South Africa (Klarreen, 2008; Belvedere, 2008; Neocosmos, 2006; 
Kabwe-Segatti and Landau, 2008). In the post-apartheid South Africa, as was in the apartheid 
era, migration is very central to the various entitlements to public goods and services through 
citizenship. A noticeable fact is the way in which entitlement has got entangled in xenophobic 
attitudes directed to African foreigners. Lesser expressed in the past, its virulence has gradually 
reached a level that one would qualify tense. However, the tension arising from the politics of 
entitlement goes beyond the 1994 elections. Neocosmos (2006) strongly argues that 
xenophobia in South Africa is a direct effect of a particular kind of politics, a particular kind 
of state which was forged in opposition to the manner in which the apartheid state interpolated 
its subjects. In the post-apartheid state, politicians and state institutions have their parts in the 
making of a culture of xenophobia, and this has filtered down to the whole of society. 
 
This statement echoes as well in Belvedere (2008) who problematises the state as a key player 
in reproducing xenophobia. To Belvedere, xenophobia is the effect of the ongoing and 
contradictory process of state formation in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa. In this 
process, two ideologies are at work: on the one hand, the affirmation by the South African 
‘state’ of its existence and sovereign character, and on the other hand the definition of a national 
identity for itself both in relation to ‘inside’ others (including civil society groups) and those 
perceived to be ‘outside’ others (including undocumented migrants and refugees). Klaaren 
(2008) too concurs that permanent residence, which finds its starting point in 1986 with the 
abolition of the Influx Control Act of 1986, is arguably the paradigmatic migration status for 
South Africa. What the above views suggest is the centrality of migration in the attribution of 
the resident status in the formation of South Africa as a state. 
 
Neocosmos found that those in government and positions of authority have made comments or 
statements which suggest that they are also xenophobic, for instance former Home Affairs 
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minister, Mangosotho Buthelezi, who said that if South Africans would have to compete with 
millions of aliens it means sacrificing the reconstruction and development programme of the 
country (Neocosmos, 2008 p.14). For a person at ministerial level to make such a xenophobic 
statement is an indictment of the political culture of South Africa. There are also indications 
implicating the democratic government in their failure to fulfil their political promises to the 
citizens and instead turning an accusatory finger at aliens as being responsible for 
unemployment, diseases, a high crime wave and general social instability. The police also 
engage in exploitation of immigrants, while the experience in the Lindela detention centre is 
that of exploitation and clear ill treatment of immigrants (Neocosmos, 2008, p.50). 
 
In most instances, media reports about immigrants are subjective as African immigrants are 
labelled as criminals. Researchers like Neocosmos, Danso and McDonald argue that the 
electronic and print media incites xenophobia in a society that already holds a negative view 
of foreigners (immigrants). The media has a responsibility for reporting to the general public 
about immigration and the cost of it to the South African society, but it must also balance such 
reports with positive aspects of immigration, including their contribution to the economy. For 
instance, immigrants compete with South Africans for jobs, but they are also wealth creators. 
Immigrants use basic facilities such as water, housing, electricity and basic amenities, but they 
are willing to pay for them, and to pay taxes (Danso and McDonald, 2001, p.60). 
 
Dodson and Oelefse (2000) make the point that the “xenophobia debate” in South Africa needs 
to be framed in terms of a “nesting of scales” from the local to the global, identifying which 
processes operate at what scale. They caution that there is a tendency to “generalise” 
xenophobia, to see all South Africans as complicit, “extending to the national scale competition 
and conflict which are far more localised in causation, character and extent” (p.126). 
Nevertheless, local case-study evidence to date suggests a remarkable similarity of attitude and 
perception amongst South Africans that is not place-dependent. Similarly, there is no 
suggestion in the literature that attitudes vary significantly by race, gender, age or educational 
level (though several have commented on the particular hostility of black South Africans to 
West and Francophone Africans). 
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However, even in the public domain, immigrants are subjected to steady verbal and physical 
abuse; the popular way of insulting immigrants is by calling them ‘Makwerekwere’. By so 
saying, citizens use the pejorative term to show outright rejection of aliens in their country. It 
amounts to rejection and humiliation, not far from terms in Namibia and Botswana (Morapedi, 
2007, p.23). There has been a new debate among scholars about what constitutes xenophobia 
in South Africa. Most of these scholars do argue that what is generally regarded as xenophobia 
in South Africa is also inclusive of Afrophobia to denote outright resentment of African 
immigrants. 
 
DEBATE ABOUT WHETHER SOUTH AFRICA IS XENOPHOBIC, OR ARE THESE 
JUST ACTS OF CRIMINALITY? 
 
There is currently a debate as to whether South Africa’s xenophobia or criminal problem is 
back in full force, including denials. With the recent violence in Pretoria (March, 2017), there 
seem to be traces of incoherence regarding how to understand what actually happened in 
Tshwane. One aide of the story says that the march that was organised against foreign nationals 
in Tshwane townships had nothing to do with a specific attitude of xenophobia that some South 
Africans tend to show towards foreign nationals in the country. 
 
Those who are set on making sure that communities look as angelic as possible have maintained 
that the march was aimed solely at highlighting the scourge of crime, and that it was not meant 
to target foreign nationals residing and doing business in the affected areas. When pressed for 
further details, those who drive this line of thinking, however, fail to explain why those who 
marched seem to believe that foreign nationals are solely responsible for crime in that area. If 
indeed this is the case, why did the march not also target local collaborators and enablers? The 
main problem with South Africa’s debate on xenophobia, or any debate on the issue, is that 
people believe that those who show xenophobic attitudes are justified in doing so because they 
have real socio-economic challenges such as unemployment and political or social destitution. 
The existence of socio-economic challenges is therefore taken to mean that the main problem 
is not xenophobia; it is rather these problems that cause the reaction by communities. Local 
leaders are then blamed for preying on the socio-economic challenges as they drive 
xenophobia. This explanation seeks to excuse communities that get involved in such activities. 
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It is so incoherent that it only seems aimed at protecting the image of South Africans and South 
Africa. It fails to properly explain a specific attitude displayed by some of the communities 
towards foreign nationals living in South Africa. 
 
It is impossible to resolve the problem of xenophobia if the nation continues refusing to 
acknowledge it exists in the first place. Of course, the existence of xenophobic attitudes will 
always be triggered and enabled by socio-economic challenges. Xenophobia is not a hobby or 
a pastime activity that people engage in only when they are bored. Xenophobia is anchored in 
real life challenges. When it is triggered by observable concerns such as crime and 
unemployment, it does not make the attitude any less xenophobic. The issues that trigger 
xenophobic attitudes may be genuine, but what is problematic and purely xenophobic is the 
belief that those problems can be addressed by getting rid of foreign nationals. This is when 
the presence of foreign nationals is seen as the cause for the socio-economic ills, which are 
genuine. 
 
It is plausible to state that it is dishonest for South Africans to blame their problems on the 
presence of foreign nationals in South Africa, especially when most of these problems are due 
to policy failures on the part of the ANC-led government. Even worse is the attitude by 
figureheads such as the DA’s Herman Mashaba, who seek to gain political mileage by blaming 
foreign nationals for causing crime and soiling the City of Johannesburg. If indeed some 
foreign nationals are involved in illicit business such as operating brothels and selling drugs, 
South Africans are actively playing a bigger role as enablers of such activities. Hence, it is the 
sole responsibility of law enforcement agencies to root out those that are involved. Therefore, 
it makes no sense to target foreign nationals as the sole root cause of the problems. 
 
When it comes to government’s claim that there is no xenophobia but only common acts of 
criminality, it calls for answers. Of course, South Africa generally has the problem of violent 
crime. Instances of looting businesses are also common when people gather and protest in 
South Africa. This means that patterns of xenophobia in South Africa will naturally attract 
criminal elements, but it does not mean that because crimes get committed during xenophobic 
instances such instances should be seen as mere criminal activities with no connection to 
xenophobia. 
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To put it differently, it is unrealistic to expect crime to stop during the days that xenophobic 
outbreaks take place. Xenophobia, in fact, takes the shape of some of the local challenges such 
as crime. In the USA, for example, it is hidden in the local right-wing agenda that seeks to 
expel foreign nationals and block some from travelling to the USA. Xenophobia is a parasitic 
attitude that preys on genuine local concerns, real or perceived. 
 
The Department of Home Affairs is charged with the popular functions of managing, making, 
and implementing immigration laws and policies by the Constitution, but the Department is 
regularly accused by the media and general public of not being accessible to the customers and 
media. Other functions that the Department is charged with include registration of births, 
deaths, and provisions of identity documents, including passports. The former Director- 
General (Barry Gilder) of the Department concurred with the accusation in 2003 when his 
nationwide tour revealed inefficiency and the ill-equipped state of the system (SAMP, 2005). 
The discovery by the director-general led to a ‘Turnaround Strategy’ in the Department’s 
service delivery, which among other things was intended to make it accessible to the customers. 
However, the survey sample showed that the Department’s officials were not conversant with 
the internal Turnaround Strategy; rather they were conversant with the popular Batho Pele 
principles of service delivery. However, the major deficiency in service delivery in South 
Africa has traditionally been the inability of the political system, policy makers, civil servants, 
and contributors on service delivery to strike a balance between the service delivery to South 
African citizens and African immigrants in South Africa. 
 
Policymakers have often been accused of making xenophobic statements, while writers and 
proponents of effective service delivery have often concentrated on the delivery, only with 
regards to South African citizens. In the case of the Department of Home Affairs the emphasis 
has continued to be in line with delivering to the South African citizens. It is only a handful of 
literature and policies that have been directed towards enhancing delivery to African 
immigrants, who have suffered humiliation in the form of xenophobia and diverse deprivation 
at all levels. 
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This study is therefore directed towards addressing service delivery to African foreigners in 
South Africa in general, as balance is required between service delivery to South Africans and 
migrants. As long as the Department of Home Affairs continues to be in charge of immigration 
and migration policies, effective service delivery cannot be achieved without inclusive policies 
towards foreigners, whose documentation is the responsibility of the Department. This study 
aims at addressing the issue by providing relevant research that could change from the 
conservative literature, which previously addressed service delivery from the point of South 
African citizens at the expense of migrants. 
 
It is of importance to address the issue since South African citizens have been able to express 
their feelings on what they perceive as poor service delivery through labour unions, strikes, 
protests including peaceful, violent, legal and even illegal means, but the most unfortunate 
direction taken was the violent protest against African foreigners in South Africa in 2008, 
which was xenophobic (Dodson, 2010). The attack on African foreigners, who experience even 
worse service delivery than their South African counterparts, is a clear indication of the 
alienation of migrants in the South African socio-political system. It is also unfortunate that 
African foreigners do not have any chance of protesting against poor service delivery. 
 
Consequently, Matsinhe (2011) contends that the asymmetries produced by the painful socio-
emotional situation of apartheid gave rise to a colonised self of black South Africans and argued 
that the psychosocial syndrome is used to exclude black African immigrants in socio-political 
terms. It is based on this aforementioned exclusion that the perception and experience of 
African immigrants regarding service delivery at the Durban Department of Home Affairs is 
explored in this study. Hence, this study searches beyond xenophobia and also investigates the 
phenomena via Afro-phobia, which has been referred to above. Hence, this study stands to be 
of immense benefit and contribute to the already existing body of knowledge and policy making 
with regards to migration. 
 
2.17 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Theories and Models of Migration 
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In attempting to explain the causes and consequences of migration, scholars have come up with 
a number of explanations. The longest-established models put economic gain first, emphasise 
rational choice, and define out other considerations. Alternatives have come from the political 
left, emphasising international power relations or stressing the internal workings of the 
household. Most recently, concern for human rights issues in migration has widened the sphere 
of the migration debate. 
 
2.17.1 Choice and Utility: Neo-Classical Economics 
 
The most famous migration theory within the neo-classical economic tradition is probably the 
classical Harris-Todaro model. It is a migration decision-making model, with Todaro 
postulating that an individual makes a rational choice to increase his/her welfare or utility by 
moving to another place where he/she expects to earn a higher income. Todaro defines expected 
income as the average income in the destination area multiplied by the probability of finding 
employment. According to neo-classical models, individuals search for places of higher 
potential advantage, and if any known place offers such an advantage compared to the present 
locality, then the individual takes a decision to migrate (Skeldon, 1990). Many other authors 
have since followed this economistic approach.  
 
According to this theoretical perspective, migration impacts positively upon all stakeholders, 
evidenced by the fact that sending sites and the migrants themselves benefit because migrants 
gets jobs, develop their skills, earn some money and remit part of it to their places of origin, 
while destination sites benefit from the skills and labour they get from the migrants. On the one 
hand, migration removes extra labour from one society while providing it to another causing 
insufficiency. However, sending sites benefit from remittances, which sometimes help in 
supplementing incomes, and in so doing ensures some kind of resource redistribution. As such, 
migration has the potential to contribute towards the development of receiving sites and of 
assuaging economic suffering at the place of origin. Looked at from this perspective, migration 
potentially leads to redistribution of resources and maintains social institutions (Jones, 1992). 
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 Migration also has an unintended consequence in that it maintains social stability by allowing 
for the departure of those dissatisfied by what the immediate environment offers, thereby 
preventing the rise of more discontent and as such, functions as a safety valve (Dasgupta, 1981). 
However, the choices of individuals to migrate are not unlimited, for states could either support 
or curtail such, depending on what they see as best. The Harris-Todaro model’s argument is 
that, the state could intervene to limit movement or to lend its support and evidently so, as 
travelling within or between countries is sometimes made easier or difficult by state laws and 
policies governing such. 
 
However, it is not fully accurate to argue that migration results largely from well-calculated 
rational choice, for there are circumstances that do not leave individuals or groups with any 
other choice but to migrate. In most instances, choices are very limited for marginalised 
communities, or for communities faced with war, famine, floods or any other man-made or 
natural disasters. Lastly, this model pays little attention to the complexities of the social 
economic context, or to structural disparities and institutional arrangements that compel 
individuals or groups to migrate. 
 
2.17.2 Reaction: Dependency and Disadvantage 
 
During and after the 1970s migration theory was expanded by the anti-capitalist dependency 
perspective, which took up the impact of structural and institutional arrangements on the lives 
of migrants. It criticised the neo-classical view that migration is caused by the individual’s 
choice to relocate to places of possible maximum utility. Dependency theorists argued that 
migration results from economic forces of a western-dominated world system characterised by 
structured inequalities, including the continued under-development of regions in the excluded 
periphery (Wallerstein, 1974). 
 
Under such circumstances, migration tends to entrench marginalisation in that labour and 
brains move to better-off areas and participate in the development of these, instead of 
developing their own places of origin. As such, peripheral areas exist as suppliers of natural 
resources and labour to the core, and hence the two are related in an unequal and exploitative 
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manner, locked in a negative power relation. Therefore, rural to urban migration disadvantages 
rural areas because it is characterised by the departure of younger, more innovative, educated, 
ambitious, skilled, more resourceful and more enterprising people, and represents a form of 
‘brain drain’ (Dasgupta, 1981). As this happens migration diminishes rural human capital, 
thereby causing the disempowered peripheral areas to fall far behind the centre (Dasgupta, 
1981; Jones, 1992). 
 
The dependency approach argues that the benefit that goes to the individual migrant has to be 
viewed in relation to the social costs incurred by the sending community. For instance, 
communities that send out trained and energetic personnel do not readily benefit from this 
population transfer as much as those that receive. It has been argued by neo-classical theorists 
that both sides benefit, since migration offers migrants what they need, and also reduces the 
chance of conflict within the sending region; however, it can also be counter-argued that this 
process forms a vicious circle, as it perpetuates the marginalisation of places of origin while 
developing destination sites. 
 
Much depends, however, on whether the migrants are skilled or unskilled, and whether enough 
opportunities exist for them at the receiving end. If most migrants are unskilled and there is not 
enough work for them, then the spread of shack settlement is only one of the potential 
disadvantages for the destination area. The share of skilled people in any migration stream 
relates in turn to the distances involved. Skilled people have resources to travel further looking 
for advantages, so that they form a larger share of international migration than of rural to urban, 
or rural to rural migration. 
 
2.17.3 Back to Economics: The Role of the Households 
 
More recently, the new economics of migration approach has emphasised the point that 
decisions to migrate are not always made by isolated individual actors per se, but sometimes 
by larger units of related people such as families, households and even communities (Massey, 
et al. 1998). Migration is not necessarily informed by the need to maximise expected income, 
but also by the need to minimise risks and to loosen the constraints threatening individuals, 
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families and communities. Migrants are not mere ‘labour units’ and ‘entrepreneurs’ and when 
migration is undertaken, be it by individuals or otherwise, it is usually practised as a household 
strategy and not as isolated individual behaviour (Cruch, 2001). More importantly, even when 
migration is primarily economically motivated, it takes place within a social context wherein 
family and gender relations influence migration behaviour. Coming from a somewhat different 
angle, the work of de Jong (2000) and his collaborators (de Jong and Gardener, 1981) balance 
the economics work by stressing the direct role of non-economic factors in triggering or 
attracting migration and strive to quantify these effects. 
 
2.17.4 Beyond Utility and Power: War and Human Rights 
 
None of these theoretical positions deal well with forced migration resulting from war, conflict 
and natural disasters, or from political and administrative decisions. The lack of theories 
addressing forced migration is evidence of the fact that such migrants have been left out of the 
migration debate for so long and as such many amongst those who found themselves mobile 
and adrift under these circumstances have suffered in obscurity. Although there are institutions 
which address forced migration – in particular the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR) – migration scholars have had little interest in studying how refugees are 
given refuge or support, or how peacekeeping forces relate to refugees and internally displaced 
persons (IDPs), or to similar questions. It is likely that many of the injustices in access to 
assistance by the displaced traces back to how poorly their movements are understood by the 
larger world outside the conflict zones. It is only recently that interest has started to rise since 
it has become evident that IDPs who are not covered by the mandate of the UNHCR are often 
left without help in miserable conditions, and that some refugees and IDPs become victims of 
human trafficking, prostitution and drug dealing, while unrecognised displaced children may 
be forced to become child soldiers. 
 
It is only now, after these concerns have started to surface, that migration studies are expanding 
towards the creation of an understanding of these issues. The migration debates have begun to 
extend beyond a preoccupation of these individual and group interests, to decision-making and 
utility maximisation. There arises a new dimension in the debate, which is concerned with 
human rights, and in particular with the rights of refugees and IDPs who usually find 
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themselves with very little in the way of rights to talk about. However, it is important too to 
recognise that the focus of the migration debate continues to shift as other categories of 
migrants continue to gain prominence and to impact more on governance. 
 
2.17.5 Theory of Relative Deprivation 
 
Davis (1959), proposed the first theory of relative deprivation by drawing from Stouffer et al. 
(1949) who used the theory of relative deprivation to explain some of their unexpected findings, 
suggesting that comparisons with in-group versus out-group members leads to different kinds 
of emotional reactions. Essentially, Davis proposes that comparisons with in-group members 
can produce feelings of relative deprivation or relative gratification (depending on whether 
one’s outcomes are worse or better than the referent persons) whereas comparison with out-
group members can produce feelings of relative subordination or relative-superiority. Thus, 
Davis explicitly limited the concept of relative deprivation to comparisons with ‘similar others’ 
(in-group members) who possess some desired object to which the deprived perceiver feels 
entitled. 
 
Runciman (1966) introduced a distinction between egoistical versus fraternal deprivation, both 
of which are presumably ‘relative’ in the sense described above. Egoistical deprivation refers 
to the perception that one’s own outcomes fall below a subjective standard (usually based on 
other individuals’ outcomes), whereas fraternal deprivation refers to the perception that one’s 
reference group as a whole is deprived (usually relative to other groups). Hence the experience 
of being deprived of something to which one believes to be entitled. Within this study, it refers 
to the discontent people (African immigrants) feel or perceive when they compare their 
positions to others (South African nationals) and they realise that they have less of what they 
believe themselves to be entitled than those around them. Thus, generally this study considers 
Davis thesis and particularly Runcimans theoretical version in arguing that immigrants (in-
group) are relatively deprived in terms of quality of service delivery at the Department of Home 
Affairs in relation to South Africans (out-group) as a result of their vulnerability. The relative 
deprivation theory in this circumstance equally portrays a view of social change and 
movements, according to which people take action for social change in order to acquire 
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something (for example, opportunities, status, or wealth) that others possess and which they 
believe they should have, too. 
 
The relative-deprivation theory offers a psychological explanation for scapegoating. Concepts 
of frustration and aggression are interpreted as subjective, intrapsychic processes. In this way, 
the theory understands xenophobia from the inside out. The psychoanalytic theory similarly 
offers an intrapsychic explanation of scapegoating as a projective and defensive process. For 
both these theories, De la Ray points out that, “The cause of social unrest cannot be simply 
located within subjective perceptions of reality. The search for causes of social action must 
extend beyond the subjective psychological realm to include its complex inter-relatedness with 
objective social reality” (De la Ray, 1991, p.41). 
 
However, critics of this theory have pointed out that this theory fails to explain why some 
people who feel discontent fail to take action and join social movements. However, this study 
contends to justify its relevance as regards to the plight of black African immigrants who 
presumably could not take action against the South African Government as a result of their 
vulnerability. 
 
Hence, this theory of relative deprivation is more relevant and appropriate in a study of this 
very nature for the mere fact that most participants are not citizens of the state. And to juxtapose 
this assertion, is the persistent civil disobedience by the citizenry who also complain of poor 
service delivery in the form of massive protests that engulf the state which are appropriately 
demonstrated ab initio in the literature review section. 
 
2.17.6 Social Comparison Theory 
 
This theory is construed from the concept of relative deprivation. According to Festinger 
(1954), the fundamental postulation of the social comparison theory is that humans have a drive 
to evaluate their opinions and abilities. Presumably, this motive has developed because 
erroneous appraisal of important opinions and abilities can have serious consequences for the 
individual. The theory specifies how perceivers will make these evaluations; in the absence of 
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objective, physical reality, people will evaluate their opinions and abilities by comparing with 
others. A central feature of the theory concerns who these comparative others are likely to be. 
According to Festinger, we maximise information and achieve stable and precise judgements 
when we compare to similar others (i.e. others who are close to us on the particular opinion or 
ability in question). Sometimes, though we must compare with dissimilar others, and according 
to the theory, this produces pressure toward uniformity. The theory specifies how these 
pressures differ for abilities and opinions and how these differences affect affiliation and group 
behaviour. Hence this study considers this theory in arguing that black African immigrants, 
irrespective of different nationalities and categories upon which they apply for status, are of 
the belief that by their uniform judgement they are treated unfairly by officials of the Durban 
Department of Home Affairs simply because they are black African foreigners in contrast with 
how they perceive white immigrants are treated. 
 
Tshitereke's (1999) psychological interpretation of scapegoating must not be divorced from the 
socio-economic realities of contemporary South Africa. He reminds us that the psychological 
process of relative deprivation rests on social comparison. Generally, the scapegoating theory 
explains xenophobia in terms of broad social and economic factors. Tshitereke (1999) 
introduces a psychological level of explanation to supplement this sociological interpretation. 
He conceptualises xenophobia in terms of frustration and relative deprivation. Relative-
deprivation theory suggests that “a key psychological factor in generating social unrest is a 
sense of relative deprivation. This arises from a subjective feeling of discontent based on the 
belief that one is getting less than one feels entitled to. When there is a gap between aspirations 
and reality, social discontent is likely to result” (De la Rey, 1991, p. 41). Tshitereke states that 
violence is not an inevitable outcome of relative deprivation. The anger caused by deprivation 
and perceived or real threats by immigrants as it relates to service delivery at the Durban 
Department of Home Affairs does not directly cause the nationals to commit violence, but it 
frustrates them. Political scientist, Annette Seegers states that, “frustration breeds anger, yet 
angry people do not always commit violence” p.31. They could turn their anger inwards and 
commit suicide.  
 
2.17.7 Afrophobia (Makwerekwere) Theory 
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Matsinhe, drawing from Elias’s dynamics of colonial relations, developed the ‘Makwerekwere’ 
theory to argue that what is called ‘xenophobia’ today in South Africa is very much beyond 
that. He prefers the term ‘Afrophobia’ and further contends that the asymmetries produced by 
the painful socio-emotional situation of apartheid gave rise to a colonised self of black South 
Africans. Matsinhe (2011); Neocosmos (2008); Isike and Isike (2012) cited in Umezuruike 
(2013) have argued that the psychosocial syndrome inherent in black South African nationals 
as a result of the apartheid system is used to exclude foreigners and mostly African foreigners 
in socio-political terms.  
 
This Afrophobic concept was equally alluded to by the ex-Police Minister, Nathi Nhleko 
(whilst addressing journalists in parliament on 14th April 2015) when he suggested that the term 
xenophobia, which had been used to describe the violence against black African foreigners in 
eThekweini, be renamed ‘Afrophobia’. As many of the black African immigrants attacked in 
the recent anti-immigrant violence in eThekwini were from other sub-Saharan African nations, 
such as Zimbabwe and Somalia. 
 
The HSRC research indicates that anti-immigrant sentiment in KZN was a little above the 
national average even though people in Limpopo, Gauteng and the Northern Cape also voiced 
strong anti-immigrant sentiment (HSRC, 2013). In order to better understand whether South 
Africans generally, and residents in KwaZulu-Natal specifically, exhibit a particular aversion 
to certain types of immigrants, respondents to the SASAS 2013 survey were asked, ‘which, if 
any, group would you least want to come and live in South Africa?’ The results for KZN in 
comparison to the rest of the country are portrayed in Figure below: 
 
 
Figure 2. 17. 7. 1: The Most Disliked Foreign Groups in South Africa 
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Source: HSRC SASAS, 2013. 
 
People in KwaZulu-Natal are more likely than those in the rest of the country to select groups 
from sub-Saharan Africa as their least tolerated foreign group. The results show that more than 
57 per cent of all adult respondents in KwaZulu-Natal selected a group from sub-Saharan 
Africa, compared with approximately two-fifths (42 per cent) in the rest of the country. The 
most mentioned foreign African groups were Nigerians (20 per cent), Zimbabweans (12 per 
cent) and Somalians (6 per cent), all of which tended to be associated with entrepreneurship 
and commerce in the province. Only a minority of those in KZN selected groups from Asia (6 
per cent) or from Europe and North America (4 per cent). The finding suggests that foreigners 
from Africa are not the only foreign groups that South Africans are hostile towards. The 
findings shown here raise questions about the existence of ‘Afrophobic’ attitudes among people 
in the province as well as the country as a whole. 
 
Other studies that share the same conceptual framework of analysis include Musuva (2015), in 
the study conducted in Cape Town with regards to the Department of Home Affairs. Given that 
the majority of migrants’ experiences with state officials were negative, that study inferred that 
black African immigrants generally experience poor treatment from state officials. According 
to the researcher,  
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…her finding which implies xenophobia based only on foreignness is not necessarily 
inconsistent with that of other researchers but rather it is a question of a different 
methodology and research question. The researcher did not ask South Africans for their 
opinions of different nationalities of migrants, which would likely have been similar to 
popular stereotypes such as those mentioned. Instead, this research was based on 
migrants’ experiences of state officials (Musuva, 2015). 
 
When it comes to DHA officials there is an apparent difference in the poor treatment they 
extend to foreigners based on their legal category. Migrants that are served at the RRO – asylum 
seekers and refugees – are treated differently from temporary and permanent residents who are 
served in the DHA offices. Interestingly, administering migrants in different offices based on 
whether they fall under the Refugees Act or the Immigration Act translates into different 
treatment of migrants on this ground. Those black African migrants with asylum seeker and 
refugee permits are treated worse than those with various categories of temporary residents and 
permanent residents.  
This implies that there is a hierarchy of migrants in the eyes of the DHA officials with 
temporary and permanent residents at the top and asylum seekers and refugees at the 
bottom (Musuva, 2015). 
 
However, the findings show that the treatment of migrants has less to do with the extent of the 
rights they are entitled to and more to do with which DHA office they receive their services 
from depending on whether they are classified under the Refugees Act or the Immigration Act. 
…the mostly negative experiences of migrants can be linked to the prevailing negative 
discourse on black African migrants which casts them as a danger to the South African 
nation (Musuva, 2015). 
 
Experiences with DHA officials at their offices were singled out as being particularly appalling. 
With regard to the above, the findings of Musuva (2015) indicate that the basis for state officials 
treating specifically black African immigrants poorly, is simply their status as non-South 
Africans. 
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However, in addition, Kollapan’s (1999) discourse warns that xenophobia cannot be separated 
from violence and physical abuse. In this sense, a rewriting of the dictionary definition of 
xenophobia is necessary. 'Xenophobia' as a term must be reframed to incorporate practice. It is 
not just an attitude: it is equally an activity. It is not just a dislike or fear of foreigners: it is 
equally a violent practice that results in bodily or psycho-social harm and damage. More 
particularly, the violent practice that comprises xenophobia must be further refined to include 
its specific target, because, in South Africa, not all foreigners are uniformly victimised. Rather, 
black foreigners, particularly those from Africa, comprise the majority of the victims. It is also 
important to explore why 'the unknown' represented by (largely black) foreigners should 
necessarily invite repugnance, fear or aggression. These questions and a revised definition of 
xenophobia was borne in mind throughout the study.  
 
This study in the same line of concept and application considers this ‘Afrophobic’ theory in 
arguing that poor service delivery, which foreign and mostly black African immigrants receive, 
is caused by the same syndrome exhibited by officials of the Department of Home Affairs. 
Hence, Afrophobia informs an explanation for the phenomenon and underpinned issues 
regarding why, how and whom xenophobia targets.  
 
However, it will be pertinent to delve into DHA with regards to what its service delivery 
function according to the act establishing such institution is all about based on their mission, 
legislative framework, mandate and challenges. 
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3 CHAPTER THREE: THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME 
AFFAIRS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS SERVICE 
PROVISION 
 
This chapter unpacks the Department of Home Affairs as an entity or department of the South 
African government with the sole responsibility of managing migration in and outside its 
territory. Thus, explanation is given regarding the legislative framework that underpins the 
responsibility of the department and the challenges hindering its service delivery function. 
More light is thrown on the newly introduced immigration regulation, emergence of Visa 
Facilitation Service Global and its role in visa processing, and also on how applications are 
processed by the VFS Consortium. 
 
However, operational processes of VFS are equally unpacked and some of the challenges of 
VFS as encountered by black African immigrants are also briefly explained as it relates to this 
study eg; waiting times, ease of getting appointments and attitudes of the staff of the VFS who 
are not public servants that are subjected to Batho Pele principles. 
 
Each and every government department in the Republic of South Africa is guided by its vision, 
mission and value statement. According to the Department of Home Affairs Strategic Plan 
(South Africa, 2010/11-2012/13, p.2), the department is guided by the following: 
 
Vision 
A safe secure South Africa, where, all of its people are proud of, and value, their identity and 
citizenship. 
 
Mission Statement 
The efficient determination and safeguarding of the identity and status of citizens and the 
regulation of migration to ensure security, promote development and fulfil our international 
obligation. 
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Value Statement 
The DHA is committed to being: people-centred and caring, patriotic, professional and having 
integrity, corruption free and ethical, efficient and innovative. In the spirit of Batho Pele, the 
department is guided by the following principles: ethical conduct, accountability, transparency, 
flexibility and professionalism. 
 
3.1 DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS 
 
The Department of Home Affairs has two core responsibilities (South Africa, 2010, pp.14-15): 
 Civic services: To administer citizenship and provide enabling documents to South 
African citizens; and  
 Immigration: To facilitate the movement of people in and out of South Africa. 
There are five core civic services, namely (South Africa, 2010, pp.14-15): 
 Issuing of birth, marriage and death certificates and this includes: 
o Registration of births up to 15 years, marriages and deaths - this 
information is captured on the National Population Register (NPR); 
o Applications for abridged birth, marriage or death certificates; 
o Applications for unabridged birth, marriage or death certificates; 
o Rectification of personal particulars – this includes alteration of 
forename, surname, amendment of date of birth etc. 
 Late registration of births for persons over the age of 15 years (late birth registration 
for applicants over the age of 15 years are always accompanied by an application for a 
first issue of an identity document); 
 Issuing of ID books: 
o Application for an ID document for persons over the age of 15 years; 
o Application for re-issue of ID book; and  
o Temporary ID. 
 Citizenship 
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 Passports. 
 
3.1.1 Legislative Framework 
 
The DHA mandate is derived from numerous pieces of legislation, which creates a complex 
legal framework. Amongst the documents, the work of the DHA is governed by the following 
(South Africa, 2010, pp.14-15): 
 Births, marriages and deaths; 
o Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, No. 66 of 1998. 
o The Births and Deaths Registration Act No. 61 of 1992 subsequently amended in 
Act No. 67 of 1997 and in Act No. 43 of 1998. 
o The Regulations promulgated in terms of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 
No.61 1992 as amended. 
o Delegation by the Minister in terms of the Births and Deaths Registration Act No. 
61 of 1992. 
o The Marriage Act No. 25 of 1961. 
o The Regulations promulgated in terms of the Marriage Act No. 25 of 1961. 
o Recognition of Customary Marriages Act No. 120 of 1998, that came into effect on 
15 November 2000. 
o The Regulations in terms of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act No. 120 
of 1998 (Government Gazette No. 21700, 1 November 2000) that came into effect 
on 15 November 2000. 
 Identity documents and Identification; 
o Identification Act No. 68 of 1997. This Act repealed previous Identification 
Acts (Act No. 72 of 1986, Act No. 21 of 1991, Act No. 4 of 1993 and Act No.47 
of 1995). 
o The Regulations in terms of the Identification Act No.68 of 1997. 
 Citizenship; 
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o The South African Citizenship Act No. 88 of 1995 as amended. 
o The Regulations in terms of the South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995 as 
amended. 
o Delegations in terms of Section 22 of the South African Citizenship Act No.88 
of 1995. 
 Travel documents and passports; 
o South African Passports and Travel Documents Act No. 4 of 1994 as 
amended. 
o South African Passports and Travel Documents Regulations, 1996 as 
amended. 
 Immigration; 
o The Refugees Act No. 130 of 1998. 
o The Regulations made in terms of the Refugees Act No.130 of 1998. 
o The Immigration Act No. 13 of 2002. 
o The Regulations made in terms of the Immigration Act No. 13 of 2002. 
o The Criminal Procedure Act No. 51 of 1977 
 Other relevant mandates include: 
o The South African Constitution; 
o The Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 
o The Public Service Act No. 103 of 1994, and associated regulations; 
o The Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000; 
o The White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service, 
Government Gazette No. 1227, 24 November 1995; 
o The White Paper on the Transformation of Public Service Delivery: 
Batho Pele, government Gazette No. 18340, October 1997; 
o The White Paper on an Integrated National Disability Strategy, 1997; 
o Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 2000; and 
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o The Intergovernmental Relations Framework, Act No.15 of 2005 (Giese 
and Smith, 2007, pp.15-16). 
 
All government departments are directly or indirectly linked to the Department of Home 
Affairs since failure of this department to perform a certain function may result in another 
department suffering. A practical example is if a person fails to get an ID book, the Department 
of Human Settlement and Social Welfare cannot provide a service to the needy citizen. 
 
According to Zuma (2009), The Batho Pele principles require public servants to be cautious 
and responsive by offering good quality and value for money services. He further states that, 
as a country we must move faster and make our public service to begin to embody and practise 
these noble principles. This is highlighted in the following statement: “We are pressing ahead 
with the implementation of services, coupled with service delivery improvement mechanisms 
internally in the public service.  We have to continue with our efforts to re-orientate our public 
service toward putting people first. Well-crafted policies mean nothing if they do not change 
the lives of ordinary people” (Zuma, 2009, p. 43). 
 
Despite being a public-sector institution with clearly defined roles and responsibilities, the 
Department of Home Affairs is still reputed for “being one of South Africa’s most 
dysfunctional departments” (Msimang, 2009). This suggests that the Department of Home 
Affairs is not effective in its day-to-day operations. The Department of Home Affairs Annual 
Report (South Africa, 2008, p.26) reveals problems that include the lack of a properly 
functioning Electronic Document Management System (EDMS) which assists with record 
management and the lack of efficient information services (IS) systems. Xenophobic violence, 
causing significant backlogs at the Refugee Appeal Board (RAB) and the Standing Committee 
on Refugee Affairs (SCRA), have resulted in cases not being finalised and clients returning 
repeatedly to centres for extensions. The aforementioned report suggests some of the reasons 
that influence customers to bribe officials from DHA to fast-track the processing of documents 
and obtain documents illegally. 
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3.2 CHALLENGES HINDERING SERVICE DELIVERY IN THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS 
 
Giese and Smith (2007, p.52) state that in South Africa the demand for legal and illegal 
citizenship documents is large and growing. They further state that some DHA officials are 
clearly torn between keeping illegal immigrants out and facilitating access to enabling 
documents for legitimate applicants. According to Giese and Smith (2007, p.52), the dual 
mandate of immigration and civic services places pressure on departmental officials, which 
ultimately impacts on service delivery and access for clients. The former Minister of the DHA, 
Dlamini-Zuma highlighted the following challenges (2009a): 
 How people are channeled into queues; 
 Bribing of officials to avoid queues; 
 Lack of floor managers who assist to ensure a smooth flow of people; 
 Forms are not filled in correctly and people have to come back; 
 Large volumes of paperwork on a daily basis and loss of some documents; and 
 Attitudes of employees. 
Msimang (2009) cites the following challenges: 
 In 2009, the department had a backlog of some 600,000 identity document (ID) 
applications; and  
 Over 144,000 refugee applications backlog. 
Msimang (2009) cites the following as the common cases: 
 Misappropriation of state funds; 
 Aiding and abetting illegal immigrants; 
 Illegal issuing of documents; 
 Selling fraudulent documents; 
 Abscondment; 
 Soliciting bribes and theft of face-value documents; 
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 Fraudulent marriages; 
 Marriages of convenience; and 
 Crime syndicates. 
 
Corruption, being an act of dishonesty and accepting of bribes, is prevalent in the department. 
Padayachee (2009, p.4) reports that two female teachers from the Clermont Schools in Durban 
allegedly misled DHA officials and obtained a death certificate fraudulently. A sum of R25,000 
was claimed and paid out by insurance companies. Padayachee further reveals that the victim 
found out that she had been declared dead when her government grant was not paid to her. This 
is further supported by the Home Affairs Annual Report (South Africa, 2008, p.80), which 
states that corruption is the single highest challenge to the department. According to the World 
Bank (1992, p.16) corruption hinders efficiency in service delivery, for instance, the bribing of 
officials to avoid queues, fraudulent marriages and selling of fraudulent documents. Poor 
customers end up not being attended to because officials want quick cash, which results in them 
attending to those who will pay. 
 
Giese and Smith (2007, p.53) state that challenges to obtaining proof of birth and maternal 
identity leave many applicants at a loss. They argue that it might seem that legitimate applicants 
are caught between a rock and a hard place.  Being unable to negotiate their way through the 
bureaucracy, many are forced to resort to fraudulent means of obtaining documents. According 
to Padayachee (2011, p.6) seven officials were arrested for fraud. These seven officials 
included a marriage officer and six DHA officials at the Durban Regional Office. Padayachee 
(2011, p.3) states that these arrests occurred during a police raid at the offices in Umgeni Road 
on Wednesday, 6 April 2011. Padayachee states that these people were arrested as part of an 
ongoing investigation aimed at rooting out corruption at the Department of Home Affairs. The 
investigation was carried out following a tip off from citizens. It is further revealed that officials 
arrested were suspected of facilitating ‘marriages of convenience’ between South Africans and 
foreign nationals. The so-called marriages aimed at helping foreign nationals to get South   
African citizenship (Padayachee, 2011, p.3). This has necessitated the department recently 
appoint a new investigator to deal with fraudulent activity at the Department of Home Affairs 
(Padayachee, 2011, p.6). 
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Dorasamy (2009, p.58) argues that by being manifested with widespread corruption, the 
subordination of public interest has negated the requirement for accountability and 
responsibility in this department.  She postulates that the influence of personal advantage over 
the general desire to do what is right or what is in the best interest of the public has resulted in 
people’s rights being violated, leading to a loss of credibility for this department. Klitgaard 
(1995) states that the following three factors are particularly critical in creating opportunities 
for officials to engage in corruption: 
 The monopoly power of officials; 
 The degree of discretion that officials are permitted to exercise; and 
 The degree to which institutions are accountable and transparent. 
 
The aforementioned challenges, especially corruption related, highlight the gross violation of 
service delivery and the Batho Pele principles of consultation, service standards, redress and 
courtesy. Such acts, like the bribing of officials and selling of fraudulent documents deny 
citizens of good quality service because customers, who matter most, are likely to be the people 
who do not have money. Therefore, the DHA needs to monitor the implementation of Batho 
Pele principles of openness, accountability and transparency in an attempt to eradicate 
corruption. Further, it would also contribute to ensuring that consultation, service standards, 
redress and information requirements are not compromised. 
 
3.3 NEW SOUTH AFRICAN IMMIGRATION REGULATION 
 
On 16th May 2014, after months of speculation and anticipation, the Department of Home 
Affairs made the new immigration laws official. President Jacob Zuma and the former Minister 
of Home Affairs, Naledi Pandor, signed off on new immigration regulations in a move that 
marked the first time since 2004 that the law had been adjusted.  The changes officially came 
into effect on Monday, 26 May 2014, and the amendments to the act impacts foreigners looking 
to visit, study, work, live and own a business in South Africa. 
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In the course of this research, the study turned to expert consultancy Integrate Immigration 
which helped to unpack the 272-page government gazette that stipulates the modifications. As 
one of the largest service providers in South Africa, the company is well-versed in navigating 
the Department of Home Affairs’ (DHA) web of legislation and visa requirements. 
 
3.3.1 Applying for Visas/Permits 
 
 The Department of Home Affairs (DHA) has officially outsourced the handling and 
processing of visa applications to a company called Visa Facilitation Services (VFS).  
 
3.3.2 VFS Role in Immigration to South Africa 
 
Many people have started to question the role of the VFS in immigration to South 
Africa. As a background, the Department of Home Affairs on the 16th May 2014 
announced the decision to outsource certain parts of the application process for 
obtaining a visa or permit for South African immigration. The reason behind this 
decision to choose VFS as the service provider as stated by the Department of Home 
Affairs was as a result of a lack of budget. 
The decision to outsource was in line with that of governments all over the world, but 
with one big difference – whereas the international trend was to seek a third-party 
provider only for applications made ‘outside’ of their borders, the South African 
Department of Home Affairs made the decision to outsource these functions ‘inside’ its 
borders. 
 
The apparent rationale behind this was a lack of budget and a seeming admission from 
the DHA that current processes were ineffective. Kudos are deserved for this frank 
admission. Apart from the additional cost factor to applicants, the news was generally 
welcomed by those in the industry and applicants alike. There was a hope that this 
would lead to a more welcoming environment, better service and quicker turn-around 
times. 
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The role of VFS as they describe it on their website: 
 VFS Global manages Visa Facilitation Centres for the Department of Home Affairs in 
South Africa, where you should submit your completed application form, supporting 
documents and biometric data. 
 Your visa application will be processed and decided by the Department of Home 
Affairs, Head Office in Pretoria. VFS Global does not play any part in or influence the 
outcome of your application process. 
 The company will not render any advisory services but merely technical services 
relating to the submission of applications which includes compliance with the checklist 
of requirements as instructed by the Department of Home Affairs. 
 In addition, VFS Global will hand over outcomes to applicants in the form of visas and 
permit labels, rejection letters, appeals and any other documents destined for the clients. 
 
3.3.2.1  How VFS Process Applications? 
 
 The VFS has opened 11 offices which are referred to as Visa Application Centres 
(VACs), around South Africa beginning on 2 June 2014. 
 At the VACs, applicants can submit their applications and biometric data for 
processing.   
 Once the applications have been thoroughly checked, they will then be scanned and 
forwarded to the Head Office of Home Affairs in Pretoria.   
 The VFS operates strictly as a processing operation and does not offer potential 
immigrants any advice on immigration rules etc.  Therefore, prospective immigrants 
will still have to seek advice from immigration consultants, and the consultants will be 
able to accompany applicants.   
 Zimbabwe nationals on the Special Dispensation for Zimbabweans Project, Asylum 
and Refugee cases will still be directly handled by the Department of Home Affairs.  
 The VFS does not have the authority to grant or refuse visas as that decision still lies 
with the DHA.   
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 The VFS charges an additional service fee of R1350, including VAT per application. 
(Do note that this amount excludes the standard DHA application fee).  
 Submission timings are between 8am and 4pm (Monday to Friday). 
 
3.4 CHANGING TO ANOTHER VISA WHILST IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 New regulations also state that one cannot change from a Visitor’s Visa to another type 
of visa; these applications for change of conditions must be made at a mission abroad, 
i.e. an embassy or consulate, where the applicant is an ordinary resident or holds 
citizenship. 
 However, exceptional circumstances include if an applicant is in need of life saving 
medical treatment or is an accompanying spouse or child of a business or work visa 
holder who wishes to apply for a study or work visa. 
 
3.5 LIFE PARTNER AND SPOUSAL VISA 
 
 Life partners looking to apply for temporary residency in South Africa based on a life 
partner visa will need to prove that they have been together for two years; those 
applying for permanent residency will need to prove that they have been together for 
five years. 
 Spouses looking to apply for temporary residency in South Africa based on a spousal 
visa will NOT need to prove that they have been in a previous relationship for a certain 
number of years.  
 If a partner or spouse was in a previous marriage, it is necessary to provide official 
documents that prove the dissolution of such marriage either by divorce or the death of 
the other spouse. 
 The updated regulations also state that life partners will need to attend separate but 
simultaneous interviews to determine the authenticity of the existence of their 
relationship. 
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3.6 ERADICATION OF EXCEPTIONAL SKILLS AND QUOTA 
PERMIT CATEGORIES 
 
 The DHA has officially eradicated the Exceptional Skills and Quota permit categories. 
 It is unclear whether those who have submitted an application under one of these 
categories will still have their application processed. Consult your nearest DHA branch 
for specifics. 
 Current Exceptional Skills and Quota Permit holders will not be able to renew their 
permits going forward. 
 
3.7 RENEWING A VISA WHILST IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 Those looking to renew their visa while in the country must do so 60 days before the 
current one expires.  This change was reportedly made due to the DHA’s inability to 
process an application in the previous time period (30 days). 
 
3.7.1 General Work Visa 
 
 Applications for this visa will have to include a certificate from the Department of 
Labour confirming the following: 
 Despite a thorough search, the prospective employer could not find a 
South African employee with the skills and experience equivalent to 
those of the applicant. 
 The applicant has proven skills and experience in line with the job offer. 
 The salary and benefits of the applicant are not inferior to those of 
citizens or permanent residents. 
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 The contract signed by both the employer and applicant stipulates 
conditions that are in line the labour laws of South Africa. 
 You will also need a document to prove that your qualifications have been approved by 
the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA). This document must be translated 
into one of the official languages of South Africa by a sworn translator. 
 The work visa will be valid for a maximum of five years. 
 
3.7.2 Critical Skills Work Visa 
 
 This visa is based on a list of occupations that are considered critical (examples include 
Agricultural Engineers, Land Surveyor and Forestry Technicians) in South Africa. 
 To apply for a visa in this category you do not need a job offer, but within one year of 
being granted a visa, you do need to prove that you’re gainfully employed within your 
field. 
 This visa replaced the Exceptional Skills and Quota Visas. 
 
3.7.3 Visitor’s Visa 
 
 Visitor’s Visa holders who wish to change the terms or status of their visa must submit 
an application no less than 60 days prior to the current visa’s date of expiration. 
 It is no longer possible to change from a Visitor’s Visa to another visa category within 
South Africa. 
 
3.7.4 Business Visa 
 
 It will now be a requirement for businesses to get a recommendation letter from the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). 
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 The DTI will conduct a thorough forensic assessment of the feasibility of the business 
entity as well as the contribution to the national interest of South Africa. 
 A minimum of R5 million must be invested into the book value of the business. 
 Any accountant registered with the South African Institute of Professional Accountants 
or the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants can verify the availability of 
funds for a business visa. Previously, this would have to have been done by a chartered 
accountant (not just any professional accountant). 
 Sixty per cent of the business owner’s workforce must be South African or must be 
permanent residents employed permanently in various positions. 
 Business visas will be granted for no longer than three years at a time 
 No business visa will be issued to a foreigner who intends to establish or invest in a 
business that is listed as an undesirable business undertaking. 
 
3.7.5 Intra-Company Visa 
 
 The employee in question must be employed with the foreign office/business for a 
minimum of six months before being eligible for transfer to South Africa. 
 This visa will now be available for four years but is non-renewable. 
 
3.7.6 Study Visa/Exchange Visa 
 
 Holders of a Study Visa may not conduct part-time work exceeding 20 hours of labour 
a week. 
 Both Study and Exchange Visas will only be issued for the duration of the study period 
or exchange programme respectively. 
 An exchange visa (for persons under 25 years) will not be granted to conduct work 
pertaining to an undesirable work as published by the Minister in the gazette, after 
consultation with the Minister of Trade and Industry. 
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3.7.7 Retirement Visa 
 
 There are no age limitations on the retirement visa. 
 Applicants have to prove a R37,000 monthly incomes per person per month from 
pensions, retirement annuities or property rentals. Alternatively, applicants can also 
prove they have a capital sum in the bank that is equivalent to R444,000 per annum 
(R1,776,00 for the full four years). For an additional R3,000 per month, a pensioner can 
put his or her life partner onto the retirement visa. 
 
3.7.8 Asylum/Transit Visa 
 
 An Asylum/Transit Visa issued at a port of entry will be valid for a period of five days 
to enable the holder to report at a nearest Refugee Reception Office. 
 
3.7.9 Fines 
 
  Fines will no longer be charged for overstaying. Persons who overstay for a prescribed 
number of times will be declared as undesirable.  
 
3.8 CHALLENGES IN VFS AS ENCOUTERED BY BLACK AFRICAN 
IMMIGRANTS 
 
However, three years in, there are a number of issues that have arisen: 
 
3.8.1 The Fees 
 
It did not start well with the fee of R1350 being announced – payable in addition to the 
normal DHA fees. 
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The fee, which was agreed on with the department, covered the cost of 11 new VFS 
centres across the country, the 100 or so staff needed, as well as the provision of 
biometric services. The fact is that this charge is not just more expensive than any over 
visa application centre provider but is also far more expensive than what VFS charge 
applicants for other countries. 
Let us take for example the below VFS fees in South Africa (Intergate, 2017): 
 For a visa to New Zealand ZAR 546 
 For a visa to Sweden ZAR 390 
 For a visa to Greece ZAR 280 
 
The charge (ZAR 1,350) for South African immigration applications is significantly 
higher. According to Intergate Immigration (2017), even the VFS in the UK offering a 
Belgium visa charge is just GBP 24. VFS generated about R2.4 billion in revenue from 
all of its contracts last year, according to its parent company’s annual report (Intergate 
Immigration, 2017). That revenue came off the back of 18 million visa applications, 
meaning that the average revenue was a relatively paltry R135 per application. 
That figure and the R1350 charged locally are “not comparable at all”, says chief 
operations officer for Africa, Jiten Vyas (Intergate Immigration, 2017). Accordingly, 
the price follows the complexity of the solution with regards to infrastructure, staff and 
the technologies requested. 
There are some contracts where there are very low requirements for these 
factors. In fact, for one major contract we do not even have an application Centre 
Intergate immigration, 2017, p. 1) 
The study argues that what can be agreed on is that the fee attached to the VFS is a huge 
negative as it is a 200 per cent increase and deviation from the status quo at the 
Department of Home Affairs. The requirements for a visa application centre are very 
similar and there is no rational explanation as to why the fee levied for a South African 
application is so high. The contract with the Department lasts five years and promises 
about 100,000 applicants a year. That amounts to about R650 million in revenue or 
R135 million a year before income from additional services, such as a premier lounge 
at an additional R500 per applicant – which incidentally has a much reduced waiting 
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time for an appointment. These figures do not include the recent Zimbabwean Visa 
applications which could be as much as another 250,000 applications. 
 
Former Home Affairs Minister, Malusi Gigaba, has dismissed questions around the new 
fee by insisting that foreign citizens applying for visas are in any case supposed to prove 
a certain income and that R1350 is ‘actually nothing’ in many foreign currencies. 
Again, this study cannot agree and also stands to remind the Minister that many of these 
applicants are married to South African citizens. However, with cognisance of the fact 
that the requirements are the same, it is not plausible to justify the fee. When one 
considers that it costs less than R500 to apply for visas to Greece and Sweden from 
within South Africa at the time, one can understand why this new fee for South African 
applications are viewed as exorbitant and inhumane by black African immigrants. 
 
3.8.2 Waiting Times 
 
Maybe the justification is in the waiting times, surely ZAR 1350 would see applicants 
in and out in 15 minutes as the large fee would surely mean that VFS can overstaff in 
terms of resources. After all, with a ZAR 135-million rand a year budget to play with 
there is ample room to train and recruit adequate staff. The reality is that some 
applicants are waiting hours and hours, with young children as they make their 
applications. The record to date being an astounding seven hours, where out of ten or 
so counters only three were manned! 
 
3.8.3 Ease of Getting an Appointment 
 
It was also hoped that making an appointment might be a quicker process, but going by 
records here are the waiting times in reality:  
Cape Town - Regular fee service: 19 January 2015 and Premium lounge: 1-2 weeks 
Johannesburg - Regular fee service: March 2015 and Premium lounge: 3 weeks 
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Port Elizabeth - Regular fee service: 19 February 2015 and Premium lounge: in N/A 
Durban - Regular service: 1 week and Premium 2 days 
 
In essence these lack of appointments are placing people who need to renew visas in a 
situation where they will become illegal, not because of their own fault but because 
VFS cannot give them an appointment. It is also severely threatening the South African 
tourist trade with visitors who would like to extend their stay beyond three months now 
highly unlikely to be able to do so. 
 
3.8.4 Attitude 
 
When there are issues and applicants look for a response, applicants allege that they got none. 
Another example was when VFS announced that they would be closing their offices from 22 
December 2014 - 5th January 2015. They made provision for two ‘collection only’ days on 
the 22nd  and the 23rd of December 2014. Rather than open for extra hours or extra days and 
put right what was wrong they closed for the holidays. It would seem applied only to the 
South African Visa Centres they run though: 
VFS visas for Sweden 
VFS visas for New Zealand 
 
3.9 WHAT A VISA CENTRE IS NORMALLY OBLIGED TO PROVIDE 
 
3.9.1 Pricing 
 
Tender documents for applying to run a visa centre are readily available, and are 
normally quite specific in terms of what the provider must supply and what they may 
charge. In fact, the price is an absolute must when it comes to any tender application. 
When it came to South Africa, and the announcement of the awarding of the tender 
document, the price apparently, was still under discussion and would be announced 
later. This was confirmed at meetings held in Johannesburg and Cape Town attended 
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by immigration practitioners with presenters from both sides (Intergate Immigration, 
2017). It must be questioned as to how this is possible when pricing plays such a major 
role in the decision as to who to grant the tender to and one also wonders at what price 
the other companies who tendered for the contract desired. Furthermore, there is 
normally a limit as to what charges can be made and the increases over the period of 
time of the contract. 
 
3.9.2 Service Standards 
 
 Typically, phone calls for advice are to be free of charge and answered within one 
minute. 
 Applicants must be processed in a certain time period in the application centre (standard 
20 - 30 minutes). 
 Opening hours – include extended hours to facilitate applicants wishing to submit in 
the evenings. 
 Days of closure – typicality just weekends and official holidays. 
 Service fees should be lower than DHA fees. 
 Urgent applicants always need to be accommodated within the same day. 
 The list goes on… 
The main point here is that because the market for visa application centres is extremely 
competitive, the DHA was in a position to dictate the standards they expected, the 
penalties if not met and ultimately to a large degree the pricing. 
However, given what has been uncovered from all of the above, it is plausibly a given that 
some of the responsibilities expected of the Department of Home Affairs by the legislative 
framework have been outsourced to a third party, and this outsourcing has its own challenges 
as it relates to black African immigrants that frequent this office. The responsibility with 
regards to the mandate of the department was gauged as it affects black African immigrants’ 
resident precisely in KwaZulu-Natal and the rest of South Africa in general. 
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Thus, it is in line with this anticipated phenomenon that this study has come to unravel the 
discrepancies and challenges of black African immigrants at the Department of Home Affairs 
vis-à-vis VFS Global. Another critical issue that arose is the fact that the outsourcing of some 
of the responsibilities of the DHA to VFS Global on its own is found wanting, given the fact 
that the Batho Pele precepts that regulate public/civil servants’ operations and responsibilities 
are not applicable to the employees of VFS. 
 
The succeeding chapter explains the schemata, and underlying organisational pattern or 
structure upon which this study was conducted. 
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4 CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND 
METHODS 
4.1 LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS 
 
This study has three limitations. The first limitation is that it is not representative of the entire 
Departments of Home Affairs and the whole black African migrant population. The second 
limitation is that although it is about the state, it relies heavily on the experiences of black 
African migrants and key informants, because of the challenges of gaining direct information 
from state officials. Related to this is the fact that not all immigrants of all races were sampled. 
So, while it is guaranteed that this study relied on the experiences of black African immigrants, 
the experiences of their counterparts (whites) who might have had different or similar 
experiences with the DHA, were not captured due to challenges on how to access them. The 
third limitation is that generalisability is difficult. However, Bryman (2008, pp.391-392) points 
out that “the findings of qualitative research are to generalise to theory rather than to 
populations”. Furthermore, Williams (in Bryman, 2008, p.392) argues that it is possible to 
make what he refers to as moderatum generalisations “in which aspects of the focus of enquiry 
can be seen to be instances of a broader set of recognisable features”. 
 
4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The case study approach was used, and the study applied a mixed-method approach, which is 
qualitative and quantitative in nature. White (2000, p.39) defines a case study as an extensive 
study of a single situation such as an individual, family or organisation. He further states that 
a case study employs a variety of different techniques that include questionnaires and 
interviews. According to Sekaran (2007, p.125), case studies that are qualitative in nature are, 
however, useful in applying solutions to current problems based on past problem-solving 
experiences. He further states that they are also useful in understanding certain phenomena and 
generating further theories for empirical testing (Sekeran, 2007, p.125). Black African 
immigrants accessing the services at the regional office of the Department of Home Affairs in 
Durban were used as a case study. Quantitative research aims to determine how one thing 
affects another in a population, by quantifying the relationship between variables (Altinay and 
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Paraskevas, 2008, p.75). The study used questionnaires distributed to black African immigrants 
making application at the Department of Home Affairs Durban regional office to explore their 
perception and experience of service delivery. 
 
According to Creswell (2008, p.3), a research design are the plans and procedures for research 
that spans the decision from broad assumptions to detailed methods of data collection and 
analysis. Mouton (2001, p.55) defines a research design as a plan or blue print of how one 
intends conducting the research. Mouton (2001, p.55) further states that the research design 
focuses on the end product. He views research design as a point of departure which equates the 
research problem or question and believes that it focuses on the logic of research. According 
to Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2010, p.78), research design is governed by the notion of 
‘fitness for purpose’. 
 
In essence, this research study adopted methods advanced for collecting the relevant data and 
the techniques used in their analysis, keeping in mind the objectives of the research study. As 
a good research design is often characterised by its flexibility, appropriateness, efficiency and 
economy, this research study was not an exception, hence the case study approach was chosen 
as the research design suitable for this project. Two approaches were used to collect data viz., 
a survey via questionnaires (quantitative approach) and semi-structured interviews and 
document analysis (qualitative approach). This can be referred to as a mixed method approach. 
Mixed   method   studies   are   those   that   combine   the   qualitative   and quantitative 
approaches into the research methodology of a single or multiphase study (Tashakkori and 
Teddlie, 1998, p.17). 
 
An overview of the mixed methods and its advantages is that qualitative research generates 
rich, detailed and valid data that contributes to in-depth understanding of the context. 
Quantitative research generates reliable population based and general data and is well suited to 
establishing cause-and-effect relationships. The advantages of the mixed method research 
include: 
 Increased validity: confirmation of results by means of different data sources; 
 Complementary: adding information i.e. words to numbers and vice-versa; 
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 Research development: one approach is used to inform the other, such as using 
qualitative research to develop an instrument to be used in quantitative research; and 
 Creating new lines of thinking by the emergence of fresh perspectives and 
contradictions (UK Geocites, 2007, pp.2-3). 
 
Qualitative research deals with data that are verbally presented while quantitative research 
deals with data that are numerically presented (de Vos, 1998, p.15).  Document analysis   
provides   a   secondary   source   of   information.   According   to   McNeill   and Chapman 
(2005, p.131), secondary data is evidence used that has been produced either by organisations 
such as the state or by individuals which usually takes the form of official statistics and various 
types of documents. 
 
4.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Research methods are a variety of techniques that are used when studying a given phenomenon. 
They are planned, scientific and value-neutral. Research method is deliberately employed in a 
way that is designed to maximise the accuracy of the results (Methods Tutorial, 2008, p.1). 
 
The case study approach was used because the study is both quantitative and qualitative in 
nature. White (2000, p.39) defines a case study as an extensive study of a single situation such 
as an individual, family or organisation. He further states that a case study employs a variety 
of different techniques that include questionnaires and interviews. According to Sekaran (2007, 
p.125), case studies that are qualitative in nature are, however, useful in applying solutions to 
current problems based on past problem-solving experiences. He further states that they are 
also useful in understanding certain phenomena and generating further theories for empirical 
testing (Sekeran, 2007, p.125). The regional offices of the Department of Home Affairs in 
Durban were used as a case study. 
 
Quantitative research aims to determine how one thing affects another in a population, by 
quantifying the relationship between variables (Altinay and Paraskevas, 2008, p.75). Hence, 
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the study utilised responses derived from questionnaires distributed to black African migrants 
who accessed services at the Durban regional Department of Home Affairs to identify and 
analyse their various experiences and perceptions on effective and efficient public service 
delivery. According to Cooper and Schindler, (2008, p.162), qualitative research is designed to 
tell the researcher how (process) and why (meaning) things happen as they do. It aims to 
achieve an in-depth understanding of a situation. Penzhorn (2002, p.244) states that the 
qualitative approach involves investigating individuals and phenomena in the natural settings 
to gain a better understanding of the area under research. White (2000, p.28) believes that 
qualitative research is a descriptive, non-numerical way to collect and interpret information. 
Hence, the study equally utilised excerpts derived from interviewed black African clients that 
patronise the Durban regional offices of the Department of Home Affairs to determine their 
perceptions of customer service. 
 
Although the sample of black African migrants that patronise the Durban regional offices of 
the Department of Home Affairs was cited as a case study, the implementation of Batho Pele 
principles in government departments is bound to differ within each regional office. This means 
that the findings of a study of this nature may not necessarily apply to all regional offices in a 
generalised manner.  Thus, a case study approach was most appropriate as it strived to portray 
‘what it is like’ to be in a particular situation, to catch the close-up reality and give a ‘thick 
description’ of participants’ experiences and thoughts (Geertz, 1973). The advantage of this 
case-study approach is that it assisted the researcher to not depend solely on already published 
works, as White alludes to (White, 2000, p.39). This also reinforced the use of multiple sources 
of data which, in turn, facilitated the validation of data derived from this research study as 
opined by Descombe (2003, p.38). Hence, the research design combined the adoption of both 
questionnaires and interviews for use in this study. 
 
As evidenced by the sample below, it is pertinent to reiterate that officials of the Department 
of Home Affairs were deliberately not interviewed because of the sensitive nature of the subject 
matter, as well as the plausible practical difficulties this might pose for the researcher to gain 
unhindered access. Additionally, getting the perspective of ‘white immigrants’ might also have 
proven cumbersome for the researcher to obtain access to them and their version of their 
perceptions of the department for correlation purposes. The fact that the study was piloted by 
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a black African had its own challenges. Hence, it would have been more useful to get the 
perspective of staff of the Department of Home Affairs and white immigrants. It is presumable 
that this might impose some degrees of limitation in generalising the outcome of the study at 
the conclusive stage of this project. But all the same, this is a grey area that this study is 
recommending for further research study. 
 
To summarise the findings pertaining to the second research question, an inference must be 
made from the findings of the previous research question as the research question here is an 
extension of the first question. Given that the majority of migrants’ experiences with state 
officials were negative, it can be inferred that migrants generally experience poor treatment 
from state officials. 
 
According to the researcher, the finding which implies xenophobia based only on foreignness 
is not necessarily inconsistent with that of other researchers, but rather it is a question of a 
different methodology and research question. The researcher did not ask South Africans for 
their opinions of different nationalities of migrants, which would likely have been similar to 
popular stereotypes such as those mentioned. Instead, this research was based on migrants’ 
experiences of state officials. 
 
When it comes to the DHA officials there is an apparent difference in the poor treatment they 
extend to foreigners based on their legal category. Migrants who are served at the RRO – 
asylum seekers and refugees – are treated differently to temporary and permanent residents 
who are served in the DHA offices. Interestingly, administering migrants in different offices 
based on whether they fall under the Refugees Act or the Immigration Act translates into 
different treatment of migrants on the ground. Those with asylum seeker and refugee permits 
are treated worse than those with various categories of temporary residence and permanent 
residence. This implies that there is a hierarchy of migrants in the eyes of DHA officials with 
temporary and permanent residents at the top and asylum seekers and refugees at the bottom. 
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However, the findings show that the treatment of migrants has less to do with the extent of 
rights they are entitled to and more to do with which DHA office they receive their services 
from, depending on whether they are classified under the Refugees Act or the Immigration Act. 
From the two research questions discussed so far, the mostly negative experiences of migrants 
can be linked to the prevailing negative discourse on black African migrants which casts them 
as a danger to the South African nation. 
 
Experiences with the DHA officials at their offices were singled out as being particularly 
appalling. With regard to the above, the findings indicate that the basis for state officials 
treating migrants poorly is simply their status as non-South Africans. 
  
4.4 POPULATION 
 
The population of the study was international migrants resident in South Africa, particularly 
the city of Durban, with a clear choice of black African migrants being selected from seven 
nationalities. Thus, nationals from two countries were selected from each of the three regional 
economic communities in Africa, and nationals of one country from one inter-regional 
economic community in Africa, which represented seven countries in total. In the Southern 
Economic Development Community (SADC) the study selected nationals from the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Malawi. In the East African Community (EAC), Tanzanians were 
selected, and in the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), the study selected 
Ghanaians and Nigerians, whilst in the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) 
Somalians were selected, and Ethiopians from Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa were equally selected. The reason why aforementioned nationals were chosen was 
because of their relatively large numbers in relation to other African nationals resident in South 
Africa in general, and the city of Durban in particular. Malawi (74,180), Swaziland (33,151), 
Zambia (27,163), Ethiopia (25,578), Congo (25,031), Nigeria (23,757) and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (22,538) also counted as having some of the largest numbers of nationals 
residing in South Africa (Stat SA, Census Report, 2011). Additionally, in 2008 the United 
Nations equally estimated that 72 per cent of international migrants to South Africa came from 
African countries (United Nations, 2008). In 2009 the total number of migrants was estimated 
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to range between 1.2 million and 1.7 million, or less than four per cent of South Africa’s 
population by the African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS) (Landau, Polzer and Wa 
Kabwe-Segatti, 2010, p.220). These migrants enter and remain in the country through both 
legal and illegal means. 
 
This population of black African migrants comprised of all those who patronised the offices of 
the Department of Home Affairs for all documentation related purposes eg. registration and 
collection of certificates of any type that the offices issues, application for status on Temporary 
Resident Permits (TRPs) and Permanent Resident Permits (PRPs) at the Umgeni and Moore 
road Department of Home Affairs offices. Black African migrants applying for such status on 
Temporary Resident Permits (TRPs) include those in the following categories: relative, visitor, 
work, study, medical, business, retired-person, treaty, corporate, exchange and asylum seeker. 
While those on Permanent Resident Permits (PRPs) involve the following categories: relative, 
work, business, retired-person and refugee. Black African migrants applying on Temporary 
Resident Permits and Permanent Resident Permits were chosen for the mere reason that these 
are basically the critical bases upon which migrants apply for documentation at the Department 
of Home Affairs. Besides, according to Statistics South Africa (2012), immigrants are 
documented on the status of Temporary and Permanent Resident Permits.  
 
In the 2016 survey, StatsSA explained that, since the onset of democracy, “research has 
anecdotally reported more immigration numbers [migration into South Africa] relative to 
emigration [emigration outwards]”. This assumption appeared to be borne out by the data from 
the three census reports that followed 1994, conducted in 1996, 2001, and 2011. The 1996 
census reported 958,188 foreign-born people in South Africa. By 2001 this figure had grown 
to 1,03-million. A decade later, census 2011 showed the number of foreign-born migrants had 
more than doubled, to just over 2,1-million, people.   
  
However according to the 2016 survey, South Africa’s foreign-born population has now 
declined to 1,6-million. Diego Iturralde, chief director for demography at StatsSA, told Africa 
Check that the decline was “unexpected” and that StatsSA was investigating “to see what may 
have informed this change” StatsSA, 2016, p. 18. Hence, StatsSA suggests in the report that 
the decline could be as a result of foreign-born people lying about their nationalities, which 
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may highlight an “instilled fear of disclosure of one’s origin” p. 20. The report also stated there 
was a need to investigate the enumerators’ capability to get correct answers on people’s 
countries of origin. 
 
In addition, the recorded number of foreign-born people in the 2016 Community Survey is also 
almost half the number of migrants estimated by the United Nations’ Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs (DESA). The DESA in Africa Check (2017) estimates that, in 2015, there 
were over 3,14-million international migrants living in South Africa. Quoting from a report, 
Pablo Lattes (2017), a population affairs officer from DESA’s population division, states that 
their estimates were based on the 2011 census figures, indicating 2,1-million international 
migrants. To this they added a rounded-up figure of 600,000 asylum seekers and refugees – 
based on 2015 UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency) data – which then “puts the total foreign-
born around 2,7-million. The number of foreign-born has been steadily growing in South 
Africa,” according to Lattes, “so we consider our estimate of 3,1-million to be a very likely 
estimate for the country” (Lattes, 2016). “The UN [estimate] is based on a model with a series 
of assumptions which in the past has tied up nicely with our data but this time round we seem 
to have diverged in our numbers,” (Iturralde, 2016).  
 
DESA’s report in Africa Check (2017) states that in 2000 there were just over 1-million 
international migrants in South Africa, or 2.25 per cent of the population. This figure ties in 
with previous numbers released by StatsSA, which found, in the 1996 and 2001 censuses, and 
the 2007 community survey, respectively, “2.1 per cent, 2.2 per cent and 2.3 per cent of the 
enumerated population”, were foreign-born. The 2011 census was the first survey to estimate 
a significantly larger proportion of international migrants, at 4.2 per cent of the country’s 
population (confusingly, some older StatsSA reports incorrectly cite this proportion as 5.7 per 
cent).  
 
With the aforementioned statistics in mind, the Department of Home Affairs when approached, 
could not give accurate figures of both documented and yet to be documented black African 
migrants resident in the city of Durban, since the result of 2011 data from the Department of 
Home Affairs only shows that one hundred and sixteen thousand, one hundred and eighty-four 
[116,184] was the total number of international migrants  documented on the status of both 
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temporary and permanent permits in South Africa (STAT South Africa,2012). Out of which, a 
total of 106,173 temporary resident permits (TRPs) were approved, while a total of 10,011 
permanent resident permits (PRPs) were issued at the Department of Home Affairs. Thus, there 
is no precise reliable/exact number of the documented population of black African migrants 
residing in the various areas in the city of Durban where samples were to be selected by the 
researcher. However, given the enormous population of 116,184, though not a certain or exact 
population, through rule of thumb this research study relied on the figure of one thousand five 
hundred and sixty-two (1,562), which was a rough estimate of the number of black African 
migrants (of both documented and yet to be documented status) resident in the city of Durban. 
This was based on the total number of registered memberships of socio-cultural organisations 
representing each of the seven (7) nationalities sampled. 
 
Thus, from this figure, a total of one hundred and fifty-nine (159) questionnaires were 
administered to both documented and yet to be documented black African migrants and this 
number forms the total respondents for this research study. Ultimately, only one hundred and 
forty (140) questionnaires were retrieved, and this number became the sample number for the 
study (quantitative approach). Out of this population of one hundred and forty (140), fifteen 
(15) research participants were co-opted for an in-depth interview (qualitative approach) which 
completed the mixed method adopted from the onset. 
 
4.5 METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION 
 
Data was collected from two major sources namely; the primary sources and secondary sources. 
4.5.1 Primary Sources 
 
Most primary data were generated from responses from structured closed-ended questionnaires 
(eg. frequencies and percentages used for analysis), responses from in-depth interviews (eg. 
excerpts from respondents used in analysis), some primary statistical figures as reported on 
Statistics South African websites which was used by this research study in both the presentation 
and analysis sections, as well as direct observation of events (at the premises of the Durban 
regional offices of Department of Home Affairs). 
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4.5.1.1 Questionnaires  
 
The questionnaires were structured in a format that directly addressed the study objectives and 
which were closely linked to the literature review. The Likert Scale was used because it was 
appropriate and quick to construct. This produced a real picture of a well-defined sample group. 
It was also a popular summated scale to express an either ‘favourable’ or ‘unfavourable’ 
attitude toward the object of interest (Cooper and Schindler, 2008, pp.306-309), as well as on 
Likert’s five-point rating scale in the following order (e.g. agreed, strongly agreed, neutral, 
disagreed, strongly disagreed etc.) in the form of an ordinal scale. The questionnaires were 
structured and delivered in the English language as it is the medium through which most black 
African migrants from all walks of life and different backgrounds communicate with each other 
in South Africa. The questionnaires were accompanied by a covering letter which stated the 
purpose of the study and the possible use of the findings as well as a promise of confidentiality 
and anonymity. It included both interview questions and instructions on how to respond to 
those questions and how to complete the blank spaces. 
 
These questionnaires were distributed through three research assistants who were recruited 
among familiar black African migrants willing to participate in the study. Hence, this situation 
assisted the researcher in gaining access to black African migrants. Respondents/research 
subjects were approached at the premises outside the offices of the Durban regional Department 
of Home Affairs and were issued informed consent forms after introduction with a request and 
offer to help fill-in the questionnaires if they are comfortable. In situations where some of the 
respondents were uncomfortable outside the premises of the Department of Home Affairs, the 
second option utilised was to approach specific individuals in authority (gate-keepers) such as 
owners of black African migrants’ renowned restaurants, socio-cultural organisations, religious 
leaders and community leaders in social gatherings for permission to access data from their 
clients/customers or members. 
 
4.5.1.2 In-depth Interviews  
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These were conducted with the respondents before (pilot study phase) and after filling in the 
questionnaire schedule, in an informal way for the sake of familiarity, and also to elicit more 
information around areas that the questionnaires could not cover initially. Hence, a focus group 
of twenty (20) respondents were recruited as a sample unit out of the initial one hundred and 
forty (140) sample of survey participants for this purpose. The bulk of the informants were 
drawn from the Democratic Republic of Congo (five) and Nigeria (five), the rest were two 
nationals each of the remaining five countries. Congolese and Nigerian constituted the bulk of 
this in-depth interview because they are the largest group among other Africa migrants’ 
resident in the city of Durban. The informants in this study all had harrowing tales of prejudices. 
The discussions examined their experiences and how they perceive and make sense of them 
with regards to the Department of Home Affairs. The interviewees were found mainly through 
snowball sampling techniques. In most cases it was only through personal introductions and 
careful negotiations that people were willing to be interviewed. Of the twenty interviewed, 
fifteen lived in inner-city (Congella, Central Business District, Point, Berea, South Beach) and 
five lived in suburban areas. All of them were interviewed in English. They all had sufficient 
English to make themselves understood. 
 
The persistent reiteration of perceptions and patterns in the interviews indicated that more 
interviews would not have generated much new data. The informants within these respective 
African migrant groups, especially those living in inner-city neighbourhoods, had broadly 
similar perceptions and understanding of their current situations. The informants living in the 
suburbs were employed in the formal sector and were more settled and affluent than their 
counterparts in the inner-city. Not surprisingly, their experiences of prejudices in the 
Department of Home Affairs were less harsh and their perceptions not as damning. The venue 
and time for the interviews were arranged in conjunction with the interviewees. In most 
circumstances, permission was granted for the use of a tape/voice recorder as well as detailed 
notes being taken in a fieldwork notebook. The content of the interviews was transcribed and 
portions extracted to be used as excerpts. The real names of the participants were not used in 
order to ensure anonymity and confidentiality. In-depth interviews were beneficial to this study 
as they encouraged participants to come out of their shell to articulate their perceptions and 
also give detailed accounts of their experiences.  
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The interview format was used because of its flexibility, the response rate, observance of non-
verbal behaviour, and control over the environment. Open-ended interview questions were 
posed to this focus-group of 20 black African migrants to obtain data, gauge/determine 
feelings, attitudes and opinions in a structured framework, and also to ensure that they were 
able to lead the conversation so as to alleviate/quash initial fears or suspicions about the 
research study. According to Bailey (1994, p.120), open-ended questions are useful if the 
possible answers are unknown or the question is exploratory. 
 
Effort was made to ensure that membership of this focus group discussion, was balanced to 
reflect the views of both males and females respectively in a ratio of two to one (2:1), with ten 
(15) males and five (5) females participating. No identifying information about research 
subjects was recorded and they were equally assured of the confidentiality of their involvement 
in the focus groups. There were mixed reactions to the research initially as some of them felt 
that the research was unlikely to change their situation and would therefore be a waste of their 
time (however, when given the option to leave without participating in the research, none of 
these individuals chose to leave), while others were eager to participate. At the conclusion of 
the interviews, almost all participants wanted to receive a copy of the final research report. 
 
4.5.2 Secondary Sources 
 
Secondary data utilised for this study was collected from written books eg. published materials 
that were relevant to the study e.g. South African policy statements that govern the management 
of migrants, Statistics South Africa discussion reports/documents, textbooks, journal articles, 
monographs, newspapers and internet sources, as well as other library materials that were of 
immense benefit to the study was consulted. 
 
4.6 SAMPLE AND SAMPLING TECHNIQUE 
 
Because the study was interested in precision and thoroughness, it discovered that none of the 
methods of probability and non-probability sampling technique alone could give the exact 
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sample size required. Also, since the study discovered that the distribution of the population 
was so complex, to select its sample, the need for more than one sampling technique arose. 
However, the study also had to resort to sampling in stages, and this was the principle behind 
the choice of multi-stage sampling for this research study.  
 
In selecting a sample of 140 respondents from black African migrants resident in South Africa 
and specifically Durban, the study found it more convenient to divide those black African 
migrants into nationals from African Regional Economic Communities and Inter-Regional 
Communities: Southern Economic Community (SADC), Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), East African Community (EAC),Community of Sahel-Saharan 
States (CEN-SAD), and Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA). This was 
stratified sampling. Two countries were selected from each of the two regional Economic 
Communities and one country from the last three Inter-Regional Economic Communities 
which sums-up to seven countries in total. 
 
These countries were selected purposively because they have large populations in relation to 
other African nationals resident in South Africa in general, and the city of Durban in particular. 
Then, from each of the seven countries, the study selected twenty (20) respondents 
proportionately using a systematic sampling technique to ensure that the entire sample was 
proportionately a thorough reflection of black African migrants who were on Temporary 
Resident Permits (categories; relative, visitor, work, study, medical, business, retired-person, 
treaty, corporate, exchange and asylum seeker), Permanent Resident Permits (categories; 
relative, work, business, retired-person and refugee), as well as males and females inclusively. 
The seven nationalities (Ethiopians, Ghanaians, Tanzanians, Nigerians, Congolese, Malawians 
as well as Zimbabweans) represented black Africa migrants’ resident in Durban which sums-
up the sample frame based on referral. 
 
4.6.1 Sample Frame 
 
 According to Asika (1991, p.41), a sample frame is the working universe which the researcher 
actually uses for the purpose of sampling. There was no precise figure of black African 
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migrants residing in Durban, except the estimated population of 116,184 which was a total 
number of all international migrants residing in South Africa in general (StatsSA, 2012). 
However, this research study relied on the figure of one thousand five hundred and sixty-two 
(1,562) as the sampling frame, which was a rough estimate of black African migrants (of both 
documented and yet to be documented status) resident in the city of Durban. This was based 
on the total number of active registered memberships of socio-cultural organisations 
representing each of the seven (7) nationalities sampled. These reflected those applying for all 
documentation related purposes such as registration and collection of birth certificates, and 
those applying for both temporary and permanent resident permits. These black African 
migrants were resident in South Africa with particular reference to the city of Durban which 
comprises areas such as; North beach, South beach, Durban central (Central Business District), 
Greyville, Morningside, Windermere, Essenwood, Sydenham, Overport, Musgrave, 
Sherwood, Westville, Glenmore, Umbilo, Glenwood, Congella, Bluff, Clairwood, Seaview and 
Westridge etc. Specific individuals in authority (gate-keepers) in both formal and informal 
organisations in which black African migrants can be located were approached for their 
permission and consent prior to conducting the research. 
 
Hence a detailed explanation was given to those gate-keepers concerning the objectives of the 
study. It was made clear to the members that there would be no victimisation, and that the 
research participants would be free to participate or opt out should they feel uncomfortable. In 
most possible situations, the researcher got authorisation from specific gate-keepers to address 
the congregation or members before commencement of fieldwork in terms of distribution of 
questionnaires and granting of interviews. It was made known to the participants that 
participation was absolutely voluntary. Besides, some of the participants were on referral from 
already existing participants.  
 
The reason why the study used some non-probability sampling techniques in a multi-stage 
procedure was because with the Statistics South African record of documented migrants in 
South Africa, the results obtained from 2011 data from the Department of Home Affairs did 
not give a precise number of black African migrants residing in the city of Durban. However, 
according to Statistics South Africa (2012) a total number of immigrants in the whole of South 
Africa documented as at 2011 was one hundred and sixteen thousand, one hundred and eighty-
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four (116,184). There is no precise reliable number of documented and undocumented black 
African migrants residing in the various areas in the city of Durban where samples were to be 
selected by the researcher. The study equally adopted a cluster sampling technique because of 
the prior knowledge of locations of some of the black African migrants from certain 
nationalities in South Africa, and it was pivotal in identifying those clusters in which those 
nationalities to be studied where located eg. Ethiopians, Congolese, Zimbabweans, Tanzanians, 
Nigerians, Ghanaians and Malawians. 
 
4.6.2 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY  
 
As reliability is defined as the consistency between independent measurements of the same 
phenomena, hence it is the stability, dependability and predictability of a measuring instrument. 
It is the accuracy or precision of a measuring instrument as enunciated (Asika, 1991, p.73). 
However, the research study was more concerned with the consistency of the results that were 
obtained with the measuring instrument. Thus, the study ensured that the instrument used 
would give similar, close to or the same result if the study to which the instrument was applied 
is replicated. In order to test for reliability, the study conducted a test-retest reliability test. With 
this test, the same measuring instrument was used to take two separate measurements on the 
same population at different times and intervals. The higher the correlation between the two 
measurements, the higher the reliability of the measuring instrument. 
 
Swetnam (2000, p.30) also postulates that validity is about carefully constructing definitions 
of concepts, hypothesis or prepositions so that they can be translated clearly and predictably 
into detailed operational methods, down to the level of specific questions and observations. It 
is about ensuring that there are strong transparent relationships between the conceptual or 
theoretical part of the research, the phenomenon identified for investigation and the method a 
researcher intends to use to get access to that phenomenon. Validity refers to the degree to 
which an instrument measures what it is supposed to measure. Face-to-face interviews and 
questionnaires are valid instruments of collecting data. The questions in the interview schedule 
to the customers and the questionnaire administered were compared with the objectives of the 
study.  
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However, Mouton (1998, p.156) states that triangulation can be seen as an aspect that combines 
qualitative and quantitative approaches in research. For several authors, triangulation means 
the cross validation among data sources. The inclusion of multiple sources of data collection 
in a research project is likely to increase the reliability of the observation. A content analysis 
was conducted on the data gathered from the interviews and questionnaires (primary data) and 
the organisations’ reports and other documents (secondary data). Lee and Lings (2008, p.239) 
maintain that triangulation is one way in which one can try to enhance validity. Therefore, the 
findings were valid as the study used data triangulation to attempt to corroborate findings 
according to different approaches.  
 
Validity of measurements is defined in relation to the measuring instrument. The validity of a 
measuring instrument is defined as the ability of the measuring instrument to measure what it 
is supposed to measure (Asika, 1991, p.71). However, the validity of the research instrument 
in this study was conducted using independent research experts with expertise in migration, 
demography and research methods. In addition, academic input from research scholars with 
qualifications and vast years of experience in this field of study was equally beneficial. 
 
4.6.3 Pilot Test  
 
The questionnaire was pilot-tested prior to its finalisation. Pre-testing of the questionnaire was 
done to make sure that respondents could understand and interpret the questions accurately and 
to enable collection of the required information (Hussey, 2000, p.87). Hence, those 
questionnaires were pre-tested in-house and pilot tested on fifteen (15) African immigrants 
residing in Durban (those residing in the central business district to be precise). Thereafter, a 
review was made and corrections undertaken against identified weaknesses in the 
questionnaire. The interviews were used because of their flexibility, response rate, non-verbal 
behaviour, and control over the environment. Open-ended questions were posed to a focus 
group of fifteen black African immigrants. 
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4.6.4 Limitations 
 
Vithal and Jansen (2006) as quoted by Naicker (2011, p.55), state that all studies are limited 
by time, resources, access, and availability of data and credibility of data. This is a small scale, 
in-depth study that took place in a particular context. The findings may not be applicable to 
different contexts. 
 
4.6.5 Administration of Research Instrument (Questionnaires) 
 
With a multi-stage sampling technique, a sample size of 159 was finally arrived at. It was these 
159 black African migrants that the questionnaires were administered to. The study adopted 
Yamani’s (1964, p.280) formula to analyse the sample technique. 
                        n          =                 
𝑁
1+(N2)
 
Where             n          =                  sample size 
                        N         =                  population 
                        e          =                  level of significance 
                        I          =                   constant 
i.e.       
                        n          =                   264 
                        N         =                    0.05  
                         I          =                    constant 
                         n         =                  
264
1+ (264(0.05)
 
                         n         =                  
264
1+ (264∗0.0025)
 
                         n          =                  
264
1 + 0.66
 
                         n          =                 
264
1.66
 
                         n          =                   159 
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However, only 140 respondents were able to return their questionnaires, hence the researcher 
relied on these 140 respondents for the information (data). Significantly, 140 stood as the actual 
sample for the study. 
 
4.7 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS 
 
This study engaged in method triangulation, for example, by analysing data collected through 
both survey (quantitative) and interview (qualitative) methodological approaches. Statisticians 
insist on the use of non-parametric statistics for the analysis of data gathered through non-
probability sampling methods (Asika, 1991, p.47), hence non-parametric statistics were used 
to analyse the data. 
 
4.7.1 Quantitative Data 
 
Data (derived from survey questionnaires) were analysed with the use of the Statistical Package 
for Social Sciences (SPSS), and the method of analysis was descriptive because it deals with 
the study of the distribution of the variables of study (in relation to subjects), such as the profiles 
of the respondents, groups or any other subjects (Asika, 1991, p.118). As for the questionnaire, 
respondents were provided with questions, which were framed in such a way as to demand a 
limited number of definite and readily tabulated answers (closed-ended or fixed alternative 
questions). This method involves describing the data collected using simple statistical tools 
such as tables, pie-charts, bar-charts, histograms, means and percentages. The organisation of 
data using this method of data analysis made the results easy to appreciate and understand. 
 
However, responses to each question from the questionnaire were presented and analysed using 
separate tables/charts. With this, it is easy to see the opinions of the respondents at a glance 
and conclusions can easily be drawn. As for the questionnaires, respondents were provided 
with questions, which were framed in a format that demanded a limited number of definite and 
readily tabulated answers (i.e. closed-ended or fixed alternative questions). The highest 
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number/percentage of respondents to a particular option was used to draw a conclusion at that 
point. Though the study could not determine precisely the strength of the conclusion, it is based 
on a simple majority of responses to each question (i.e. any alternative response with majority 
[frequency/percentage] concludes the decision to each question). Data analysis was presented 
in such a way that it would be easy to see the opinion and pattern of the respondents on different 
questions raised. 
 
Finally, through a rigorous and painstaking exercise, the hypothesis of the study was tested 
using the Chi-square (𝑿𝟐) Test of Independence and Homogeneity with the formula below: 
Equation  𝐸𝑖𝑗 =
(𝑛𝑖 𝑥 𝑛𝑗)
𝑛
, was used to compute the expected cell frequencies for all the cells 
(alternative response to each question as applicable to each hypothesis) 
Where ni = Row Total 
nj = Column Total  
n= Actual Sample 
 
4.7.1.1 Chi-square Formula 
 
The following formula was then applied in computing the chi-square value for the data: 
𝒙𝟐 = ∑
𝒏𝒓
𝒊=𝟏
= ∑
𝒏𝒄
𝒋=𝟏
(𝑶𝒊𝒋 − 𝑬𝒊𝒋)  𝟐
𝑬𝒊𝒋
 
Where Oij = Observed frequency 
Eij = Expected frequency 
However, Healy’s Five Step Model for Hypothesis Testing was equally adopted sequentially: 
STEP 1: Making an assumption. 
STEP 2: Stating the null hypothesis. 
STEP 3: Selecting the sampling distribution and establishing the critical region. 
STEP 4: Computing the test statistic. 
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STEP 5: Making a decision. 
Conclusively, with the adoption of the Chi-Square Test of Independence and Homogeneity, it 
is plausible to state precisely and with certainty, the strength of the observed association (proof 
of hypothesis). 
 
4.7.2 Qualitative Data 
 
Data were analysed using the thematic analysis approach. Thematic analysis is a qualitative 
analytic method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data. The 
study ensured that the entire procedure engaged and revolved around three critical stages; 
descriptive, analytic and theorised. It minimally organised and described data sets in detail. 
However, it goes further than this by interpretation of various aspects of the research topic. 
Hence, thematic analysis used in the study adopted the following rigor: 
 careful transcription of extracts; 
  checking of themes; 
  ensuring that themes are coherent, consistent and distinctive; 
  congruence between extracts and analytic claims; and 
 balance between narrative and extracts etc. 
 
Mouton (1998, p.156) states that triangulation can be seen as an aspect that combines both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches in research. For several authors, triangulation means 
the cross validation among data sources. The inclusion of multiple sources of data collection 
in a research project is likely to increase the reliability of the observation. Thematic/content 
analysis of this study was conducted on the data generated from the interviews and 
questionnaires (primary data), organisations’ reports and other documents (secondary data). 
Lee and Lings (2008, p.239) maintain that triangulation is one way in which one can try to 
enhance validity. Therefore, the findings were plausibly valid as the study used data 
triangulation as an attempt at corroboration of findings accordingly with different approaches. 
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Conclusively, this research study decided to adopt the triangulation procedure because it 
maximises the strengths and reduces the limitations of a single method, more especially for a 
study of this nature. 
 
4.7.3 Ethical Requirement 
 
The credibility and authenticity of the study was imperative such that the research was done in 
a manner that ensured ethical standards. Prior to the commencement of the fieldwork, the 
prospective respondents to whom the questionnaires were administered received an 
introduction from the researcher highlighting the reason for the research. This introduction 
included an explanation of the importance of a research study of this nature and also sought the 
permission of the respondents who participated in the research, and was equally accompanied 
by a statement on the questionnaires to be endorsed by each respondent as indication that they 
understood the nature of the research. Much effort was made to inform the respondents 
concerning the voluntary nature of participation. Hence the attachment of an informed consent 
form for the participants’ signature. 
 
Ultimately, the study complied to all the ethical requirements and guidelines of the University 
of KwaZulu-Natal, and also a formal letter submitted to the University’s ethics committee for 
clearance prior the commencement of study was equally approved. All data generated during 
the research process was submitted to the International and Public Affairs cluster for onward 
transfer to the school of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal. 
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5 CHAPTER FIVE: PERCEPTION AND EXPERIENCES OF 
AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS ON SERVICE DELIVERY AT 
THE DURBAN DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS 
 
5.1 SECTION A: ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHIC DATA 
 
Figure 5. 1A: Nationality and Gender Representation 
 
 
The figure above indicates that fourteen percent (14) per cent of the entire sampled population 
of respondents, which is one hundred and forty (140), constituted each nationality of seven 
countries, out of which eight (8) per cent males and six (6) per cent of females respectively 
represent Ghana. Whilst seven (7) per cent of males and seven (7) per cent of females 
respectively represent the Democratic Republic of Congo, whereas eight (8) per cent males and 
six (6 per cent) of females constitutes Ethiopia. Six (6) per cent of males and eight (8) per cent 
of females represent Malawi. Thirteen (13) per cent of males and one (1) per cent of females 
represent Nigeria. Nine (9) per cent of males and five (5) per cent of females represent 
Tanzania. Lastly, six (6) per cent of males and nine (9) per cent of females represent Zimbabwe. 
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However, it is significant that the figure above indicates that whilst the Democratic Republic 
of Congo percentages of both gender were equally balanced, the Nigerian percentage of female 
representatives are disproportionate to the male percentage. 
 
Figure 5. 1B: Age Bracket of Respondents 
 
 
The figure above indicates that thirty-two respondents (23 per cent) of the entire sampled 
population are between the age bracket [40 - 49], thirty-nine respondents (28 per cent) of the 
entire sampled population are between the age bracket [30 - 39]. Whilst four respondents (3 
per cent) of the entire sampled population are between the age bracket [50 - 59], whereas sixty-
five respondents (46 per cent) of the remaining respondents are between the age bracket [20 - 
29]. 
 
However, almost half (46 per cent) of the entire sampled population is of a youthful age. This 
portrays a significant indication and goes to prove that majority of African migrants residing 
in South Africa and particularly in Durban are young men and women of a productive age, 
which includes relatively (28 per cent) young but not so young male and females between the 
age bracket [30-39]. 
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Figure 5. 1C: Marital Status 
 
 
The figure above indicates that forty-two respondents, which is 30 per cent of the entire 
sampled population (140) are still single, whereas ninety-eight respondents, which is 70 per 
cent of the total sampled population (140) are married, and this number constitutes the majority 
of the entire sampled population of African migrants. The highest percentage of respondents 
that are married is located among the Congolese (19 per cent), followed by the Malawians (18 
per cent), Zimbabweans (17 per cent), Ethiopians (15per cent) and Nigerians (13 per cent), 
Ghanaians (9 per cent), Tanzanians (7 per cent]. The highest percentage of respondents of the 
sampled population that are still single (eligible bachelors) is recorded among the Tanzanians 
(31 per cent), followed by Ghanaians (26 per cent), Nigerians (17 per cent), Ethiopians (12 per 
cent), Zimbabweans (7 per cent), Malawians (5 per cent), and Congolese (2 per cent). 
 
It is significant to note that the least/lowest percentage of the entire sampled population of 
African migrants that are still single (eligible bachelors) is located among the Congolese with 
two per cent, whilst the majority/highest percentage is recorded among the Tanzanians (31 per 
cent). However, the majority/highest percentage of respondents of African migrants sampled 
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that are married is recorded among the Congolese (19 per cent), whereas the least/lowest 
percentage is recorded among the Tanzanians (7 per cent). 
 
Figure 5. 1D: Citizenship of Respondents Spouses 
 
 
The figure above indicates that thirty-two (33) per cent of respondents out of ninety-eight, 
which is a sum total of the sampled population of those married, are married to a South African 
spouse. Whereas sixty-six (66) per cent of respondents are married to a non-South African 
spouse. It is notable that the highest percentage of respondents from a particular nationality 
that are married to non-South African spouses is recorded among the Congolese (25 per cent), 
followed by Malawians (21 per cent), Ethiopians (20 per cent), Zimbabweans (20 per cent), 
Tanzanians (6 per cent), Ghanaians (5 per cent), Nigerians (3 per cent), respectively. Whereas 
the highest percentage of respondents from a particular nationality that are married to South 
African spouses is recorded among the Nigerians (34 per cent), followed by the Ghanaians (19 
per cent), Zimbabweans (16 per cent), Malawians (13 per cent), whilst the rest of Tanzanians, 
Ethiopians and Congolese are at two (2) per centage each. 
 
However, its outstanding to see that the highest percentage of the nationality of the sampled 
married population that are married to a South African spouse is recorded among Nigerians (34 
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per cent) which might give credence to the outcry of most South African men that Nigerians 
are taking their women, and the least/lowest percentage of the nationality of the sampled 
married population that are married to a South African spouse is recorded among the 
Tanzanians, Ethiopians and Congolese (25 per cent respectively). Whereas, the most/highest 
percentage of the nationality of the sampled married population that are married to a non-South 
African spouse is recorded among the Congolese (25 per cent) and the least/lowest percentage 
of the nationality of the sampled married population that are married to a non-South African 
spouse is recorded among Nigerians (3 per cent). 
 
Figure 5. 1E: Level of Education of Respondents 
 
 
The figure above indicates that among all the African migrants sampled none was without any 
kind of formal education. Eighteen (18) per cent of the entire sampled respondents completed 
primary school, whilst fifty-nine (59) per cent completed secondary school, and fifty-nine (59) 
per cent of the respondents also completed matric, while twenty-three (23) per cent completed 
tertiary education. It is obvious from the figure that the respondents indicated completed twice 
for secondary and matric, which stands for the same level with both. 
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This goes to prove that whilst eighteen (18) per cent, which is the least/lowest percentage of 
the entire sampled population completed primary, which is the barest minimum in the rung of 
educational hierarchical system. Whereas the majority (59) per cent of the sampled African 
migrants completed secondary and matric, which proves that most of African migrants in South 
Africa are literate, meaning that they can read and write. Even the number of those who 
completed tertiary (23 per cent) is significantly remarkable. 
 
Figure 5. 1. 2: Participants’ Duration of Years of Residence in South Africa? 
 
 
The figure above indicates that sixty (43 per cent) of the sampled African migrants had been 
resident in South Africa for a duration of more than ten (10) years. Whereas twenty-three (16 
per cent) had been resident in South Africa for a duration of less than ten [10] years, twenty 
(14 per cent) of the sampled African migrants had been resident for a period of less than five 
(5) years. Whilst fifteen (11 per cent) of them had been resident for a period of less than three 
(3) years, and twenty-two (16 per cent) had been residing in South Africa for a duration of 
more than fifteen (15) years. 
 
Ab initio, during the course of data collection, effort was made to avoid sensitivity of the 
research subject. However based on trust, via word of mouth, the study kept records of the ratio 
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of those on Permanent residency status and Temporary visas (5 per cent vs. 95 per cent). 
However, what this study can conclude from the above is that close to half the percentage of 
African migrants sampled, which is a greater figure, have been residing in South Africa for 
more than ten (10) years and still counting. In addition, if the study combines/adds that figure 
with the ones (African migrants) that have been resident in South Africa for a period of more 
than fifteen (15) years, which is sixteen (16) per cent, it totals fifty-nine (59) per cent as against 
the rest that have been resident for less than ten (10) years, which is only forty-one (41) per 
cent. 
 
5.2 SECTION B: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Number of times you have gone to Home Affairs within a year for documentation purpose? 
Figure 5. 2. 1: Participants Number of Visitation to Department of Home Affairs. 
 
 
The figure above indicates that within a year, twenty-four (17 per cent) of the entire sampled 
African migrants (respondents) had gone/visited/or made appearance at the office of 
Department of Home Affairs for one single application related purposes an uncountable 
number of times. Whilst fifteen (11 per cent) of the sampled African migrants (respondents) 
Once a year; 13 Twice a year; 14
More than five times; 
45
More than ten times; 
11
Uncountable; 17
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Once a year Twice a year More than five
times
More than ten
times
Uncountable
R E S PON D E N T S (p e r  c e n t )  N U M B E R  OF V I S I T A T I ON  T O HOM E  A FFA I R S  
W I T HI N  A  Y E A R  FOR  D OC U M E N T A T I ON  PU R POS E S
Once a year Twice a year More than five times More than ten times Uncountable
141 
 
had gone to the offices of the Department of Home Affairs for single application related 
purposes on more than ten (10) occasions, sixty-three (45 per cent) had gone there more than 
five (5) times in a year for one single application related purposes. Whereas twenty (14 per 
cent) of the sampled African migrants (respondents) had made an appearance twice at the 
offices of the Department of Home Affairs for one single application related purpose in a year, 
eighteen (13 per cent) had visited the office once for a single application related purpose in a 
year. 
 
However, it seems that those who had been to the office on more than five (5) occasions, which 
is forty-five (45) per cent of the entire sampled African migrants, are the majority. This is in 
contrast with those who have appeared at the office once (13 per cent) and twice (14 per cent) 
respectively (which is reasonable, should the study factor-in efficiency and effectiveness in 
productivity/turn-around time of the office).  
 
In conclusion, it is plausible to state that this attests to the fact that there is no doubt about the 
inefficiency of the office as experienced by African migrants in South Africa, which used to 
be a peculiar widely held view in the South African society (Dlamini-Zuma 2009, Msimang 
2009, Dorasamy 2009 and Musuya 2015). Hence, this situation can be attributed to debateable 
factors from the office of the Department of Home Affairs’ perspective and specifically that of 
an African migrant’s perspective which this study is all about. 
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From below how can you rate your experience at the Department of Home Affairs, for example; 
the way you were spoken to, time spent in a queue, abuse from officials….? 
Figure 5. 2. 2: Participants Rating on Degrees of Their Experience at Department of Home Affairs. 
 
 
The figure above indicates that the view/opinion of twenty-three (16 per cent) of the entire 
sampled African migrants (respondents) rated the degree of their experiences of service 
delivery at the Department of Home Affairs as very poor. Whilst the opinion of sixty-four (46 
per cent) of the sampled African migrants rated the degree of their experiences of service 
delivery of the office as poor, the views of twenty-six (19 per cent) rated their experience as 
fair. The opinion of seventeen (12 per cent) of the sampled African migrants rated their 
experiences of service delivery of the Department of Home Affairs as good, whereas the views 
of ten (7 per cent) rated theirs as very good. 
 
So, it’s probable to state that the majority (45 per cent) of the sampled African migrants’ 
experiences of service delivery at the Department of Home Affairs are of the view that it is 
poor. Which is in contrast to the minority (7 per cent) of the sampled African migrants who are 
of the view that their experiences of service delivery of home affairs is very good. 
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Did the officials attend to you professionally? 
Figure 5.2. 3: Participants Rating of Degrees of Professionalism at The Department of Home Affairs. 
 
 
The figure above indicates that thirty-one (22 per cent) of the sampled African migrants agreed 
with the statement that there is evidence of professionalism at the offices of the Department of 
Home Affairs, whereas twenty-four (17 per cent) strongly agreed, forty-two (30 per cent] of 
the sampled African migrants were undecided about the statement that there is evidence of 
professionalism at the office. Whilst forty-three (31 per cent) disagreed with the statement that 
there is evidence of professionalism, none of the African migrants strongly disagreed with the 
statement. 
 
Since forty-two (30 per cent) were undecided and the greater per cent of sampled African 
migrants, forty-three (31 per cent) which are in the majority, disagreed with the statement in 
contrast to those sampled African migrants twenty-four (17 per cent) who strongly agreed, it 
could be concluded that African migrants are of the view that there is a minimal rate of 
professionalism at the offices of the Department of Home Affairs. 
 
 
22
17
30
31
0
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Agree Strongly Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
P
ER
C
EN
TA
G
E 
O
F 
R
ES
P
O
N
D
EN
TS
ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES
RESPONDENTS RATING OF DEGREES OF PROFESSIONALISM AT HOME AFFAIRS
144 
 
 
In your opinion, do you think you are treated in the same way as other immigrants (white) at 
Home affairs? 
Figure 5. 2. 4: Participants Perception on Whether Their Application is Treated in A Similar Way as other 
Migrants. 
 
 
The figure above stipulated that fifty (36 per cent) of sampled African migrants strongly 
disagreed with the statement that their applications are treated in a similar manner as other 
migrants’ (white counterparts) applications in South Africa. Whilst seventeen (12 per cent) 
disagreed with the statement, fifty-three (38 per cent) were undecided with the statement that 
their applications are treated in a similar manner as their counterparts. Whereas ten (7 per cent) 
of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement that their applications are treated in a 
similar manner as others (white counterparts), ten (7 per cent) agreed with the statement. 
 
Thirty-six (36) per cent of sampled African migrants strongly disagreed and thirty-eight (38) 
per cent, which is the majority were undecided, in contrast with seven (7)  per cent who strongly 
agreed with the statement that applications of African migrants are treated in a similar manner 
as others (white counterparts). It is tenable to conclude that in as much as the greater percentage 
of African migrants were undecided, the majority proves their perception on the existence of 
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doubt concerning the equality of treatment of their applications in relation to other migrants 
(white counterparts) by the Department of Home Affairs. 
 
Are you worried regarding the situation at the Home Affairs office? 
Figure 5. 2. 5: Participants Concern on Whether they Are Worried About Situation of Things at Department 
of Home Affairs. 
 
 
The figure above specified that ten (7 per cent) of the sampled African migrants (respondents) 
strongly agreed with the statement that they are worried about the situation at the Department 
of Home Affairs. Whereas ten (7 per cent) disagreed with the statement, eighteen (13 per cent) 
of the respondents were undecided with the statement that that they are worried about the 
situation at the office of the Department of Home Affairs. Whilst eighty-five (61 per cent) 
strongly agreed with the statement, seventeen (12 per cent) agreed with the statement that they 
are worried about the situation at the Department of Home Affairs. 
 
Conclusively, since sixty-one (61) per cent of the sampled African migrants, which is the 
majority, strongly agreed that they are worried about the situation at the Department of Home 
Affairs is in contrast to only seven (7) per cent who strongly disagreed, it is pertinent to state 
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that the situation with regards to applications of African migrants at the Department of Home 
Affairs does not inspire confidence. 
 
 
Before your visit to the Department of Home Affairs, did you expect to be treated differently 
from others (whites) with regards to quality of service delivered by the staff members? 
Figure 5. 2. 6: Participants Opinion on Whether they Expected to Be Treated Differently from Others. 
 
 
The figure above shows that ten (7 per cent) of the sampled African migrants agreed with the 
statement that they are aware ab initio (knew beforehand) that their applications would be 
treated differently from other migrants’ (white counterparts) applications. Whilst eight-two (59 
per cent) strongly agreed, fifteen (11 per cent) were undecided about being aware that their 
applications might be treated differently from others. Whereas nineteen (14 per cent) disagreed 
with the statement that they were aware that their applications would be treated differently from 
others, fourteen (10 per cent) strongly disagreed with the statement regarding their applications. 
 
Since fifty-nine (59) per cent strongly agreed with the statement, which is the majority, is in 
contrast to ten (10) per cent, who are in the minority, that strongly disagreed with the statement, 
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it is plausible to conclude that the perception of African migrants is that their applications are 
not given the same attention as the applications of other migrants (white). However, the study 
did not discount the fact that it seems that most black Africans are coloured by their prior 
expectations that they would be treated in a discriminatory way. 
 
Do you agree that the officials of the Department of Home Affairs are to be blamed for the 
manner in which they attend to you? 
Figure 5. 2. 7: Participants Response to Whether Officials of Department of Home Affairs Are to Be Blamed 
for How African Migrants Are Treated At Their Offices. 
 
 
The figure above indicates that ten (7 per cent) of the respondents strongly disagreed with the 
statement that officials of the Department of Home Affairs are to be blamed for how the 
applications of African migrants are treated at their office. Whereas sixteen (11 per cent) 
disagreed with the statement, fifty-four (39 per cent) were undecided. Whilst twenty (14 per 
cent) of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement that officials of the Department 
of Home Affairs are to be blamed for how their applications are treated, forty (29 per cent) 
agreed with the statement. 
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Thirty-nine (39) per cent of the respondents, which is the majority, were undecided and twenty-
nine (29) per cent agreed with the statement that the officials of the Department of Home 
Affairs are to be blamed for how the applications of African migrants are treated at their offices. 
This is in total contrast with seven (7) per cent who strongly disagreed with the statement and 
are in the minority. It is hence plausible to state that African migrants are in doubt that officials 
of the Department Home Affairs are to be blamed. Hence, the significant effect of this doubt 
opens a Pandora’s box. 
 
Do you think they are not the ones to be blamed? 
Figure 5. 2. 8: Participants Opinion on Whether Officials of Department of Home Affairs Are Not to Be 
blamed Regarding How African Migrants Applications Are Treated. 
 
 
The figure above shows that none of the sampled African migrants agreed with the statement 
that officials of the Department of Home Affairs are not to be blamed for how their applications 
are treated at their office. Whilst forty (29 per cent) strongly agreed with the statement, eighteen 
(13 per cent) were undecided. Whereas eighty-two (59 per cent) disagreed with the statement, 
none of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement that officials of the Department 
of Home Affairs are not to be blamed for how their applications are treated at their offices. 
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Fifty-nine (59) of the sampled African migrants who disagreed with the statement are in the 
majority, and this is in contrast with twenty-nine (29) per cent of those who strongly agreed. It 
is therefore plausible to state that African migrants disagreed with statement that officials of 
the Department of Home Affairs are not those who decide how their applications are treated at 
the office. Hence, the significant effect of this opens another Pandora’s box just like the 
preceding results. 
 
 
 
It is generally agreed that there is huge evidence of good customer service at the Department 
of Home Affairs? 
Figure 5. 2. 9: Participants Response to General Agreement that there is A Huge Evidence of Good Customer 
Service at the Department of Home Affairs. 
 
 
The figure above depicts that none of the respondents either agreed or disagreed with the 
statement that there is huge evidence of good customer service at the Department of Home 
Affairs. Whilst forty-eight (34 per cent) of respondents were undecided, none of them disagreed 
with the statement. However, ninety-two (66 per cent) of the respondents strongly disagreed 
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with the statement that there is huge evidence of good customer service at the Department of 
Home Affairs. 
 
Conclusively, this portends that there is a general perception among African migrants that there 
is little or a significant lack of good customer service at the Department of Home Affairs. 
 
 
 
 
If you strongly disagree with the above, would you then agree that lack of good customer 
service is often linked to the negative attitude of officials of the Department of Home Affairs? 
Figure 5. 2. 10: Participants Thought on Whether Lack of Good Customer Service is Often Linked to the 
Negative Attitude of Department of Home Affairs. 
 
 
The figure above shows that fifty-nine (59) per cent of sampled African migrants agreed that 
the lack of good customer service at the Department of Home Affairs is often linked to the 
negative attitude of its officials. Whereas none of the respondents strongly agreed with the 
statement, thirty-eight (27 per cent) were undecided about the statement. Whilst twenty (14 per 
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cent) disagreed with the statement, none of the respondents strongly disagreed with the 
statement that the lack of good customer service at the Department of Home Affairs is often 
linked with the negative attitude of its officials. 
 
Fifty-nine (59) per cent of the respondents, which is the majority agreed with the statement that 
the lack of good customer services at the Department of Home Affairs is often linked to the 
negative attitudes of its officials, in contrast with fourteen (14) per cent of the respondents, who 
are in the minority. It is therefore plausible to conclude that the generally held perception of 
African migrants is that the lack of good customer services at the Department of Home Affairs 
can be attributed to the negative attitudes of its officials. 
 
Are you proud of your identity (as a black African migrant) in South Africa in relation to how 
you are received and treated by the officials at the Department of Home Affairs? 
Figure 5. 2. 11: Participants Response to the Proudness of their Identity with Regards to their Presence at the 
Department of Home Affairs. 
 
 
The figure above indicates that eleven (8 per cent) of the sampled African migrants agreed that 
they are proud of their identity as black African migrants in South Africa in relation to the 
services at the Department of Home Affairs. Whereas nine (6 per cent) strongly agreed with 
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the statement, twenty-four (24 per cent) were undecided. Whilst thirty-two (23 per cent) 
disagreed with the statement that African migrants are proud of their identity in relation to the 
services at the Department of Home Affairs, thirty-nine per cent strongly disagreed with the 
statement. 
 
Fifty-five (39 per cent), which is the majority strongly disagreed with the assertion that African 
migrants are proud of their identity, in contrast with six (6 per cent) who strongly agreed with 
the statement. Hence, it is plausible to state that African migrants are not proud of what their 
identity will fetch them in relation to service delivery at the Department of Home Affairs. 
 
If you Agreed or Strongly Agreed, is it because your applications are treated professionally by 
the officials of Department of Home Affairs? 
. 
 
ALTERNATIVE 
RESPONSE 
FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
Agree 7 5 
Strongly agree 3 2 
Undecided 23 16 
Disagree 61 44 
Strongly disagree 46 33 
TOTAL 140 100 
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Figure 5. 2. 12: Participants Response that Applications Are Treated Professionally Due to Having a Black 
African Identity in Relation to Services at the Department of Home Affairs 
 
 
The figure above shows that forty (40) per cent [the sum of those that both agreed and strongly 
agreed with the preceding statement] strongly disagreed with the succeeding statement that the 
reason why African migrants are proud of their identity is because their applications are treated 
professionally. Whilst twenty-five (25) per cent disagreed with the statement, twenty (20) per 
cent were undecided about the statement. Whereas five (5) per cent strongly agreed with the 
statement, ten (10) per cent agreed with the statement which is because their applications are 
treated professionally. 
 
Conclusively, forty (40) per cent of the sampled African migrants, which is the majority, 
strongly disagreed and twenty-five (25) per cent disagreed with the statement, as opposed to 
five (5) per cent who strongly agreed, and ten (10) per cent, which is the minority agreed with 
the statement. It is therefore plausible to state that some African migrants’ resident in South 
Africa are still proud of their identity irrespective of the kind of treatment they got from offices 
of the Department of Home Affairs. 
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Do officials of the Department of Home Affairs honor the documents you present for your 
application? 
Figure 5. 2. 13: Participants Response that Officials of Department of Home Affairs Do Honor Documents 
They Tendered for Documentation Purposes. 
 
 
The figure above indicates that twenty-five (18 per cent) of African migrants agreed with the 
statement that officials of the Department of Home Affairs honor documents tendered for 
application purposes. Whereas fifteen (11 per cent) strongly agreed with the statement, forty 
(29 per cent) were undecided about the statement. Whilst thirty-nine (28 per cent) disagreed 
with the statement, twenty-one (15 per cent) strongly disagreed with the statement. 
 
Since twenty-nine (29) per cent of the sampled African migrants were undecided, which when 
combined with those twenty-eight (28) per cent that disagreed with the statement, and is in 
contrast with eighteen (18) per cent of those who agreed with the statement, it is plausible to 
conclude that African migrants have the perception that officials of the Department of Home 
Affairs do not honor some of the documents they tender for applications. Further clarification 
was sought during the course of the qualitative study where most undecided respondents were 
of the view that they could only give assurance for themselves that they present genuine 
documents, meaning that they can’t vouch for others. 
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Most times, if not always, officials of the Department of Home Affairs are in doubt of the 
documents you present for your applications? 
Figure 5. 2. 14: Participants Response to Statement that Most Times, Officials of Department of Home Affairs 
Are Often in Doubt of Papers Tendered for documentation Purpose Prior Formal Verification. 
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The figure above indicates that thirty-three (33) per cent of the sampled African migrants 
disagreed with the statement that most times officials of the Department of Home Affairs are 
often in doubt about the papers they tender for documentation purposes prior to formal 
verification. Whilst twenty-three (23) per cent were undecided about the statement, none of the 
respondents strongly agreed with the statement. Whereas forty-four (44) per cent of the 
sampled African migrants agreed with the statement that most times officials of the Department 
of Home Affairs are in-doubt of the papers they tender for documentation purposes prior to 
formal verification, and none of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement. 
 
Conclusively, since forty-four (44) per cent of the respondents, which is the majority, as 
opposed to thirty-three (33) per cent, which is the minority, who agreed with the statement, it 
is plausible to state that most times African migrants have the perception that officials of the 
Department of Home Affairs are always suspicious of some of the papers African migrants 
submitted for documentation purposes even before such documents are placed under formal 
verification. 
 
Would you rather contract an agent for your application if you have the resources/money? 
Figure 5. 2. 15: Participants Response to Whether They Would Consider Contracting an Agent to Make 
Application on their Behalf Should They Have the Means. 
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The figure above depicts that eight (6 per cent) of the sampled African migrants agreed with 
the statement that African migrants do consider contracting an agent to make application on 
their behalf should they have the means (money). Whereas ninety-two (66 per cent) strongly 
agreed with the statement, ten (7 per cent) were undecided with the statement. Whilst seven (5 
per cent) disagreed with the statement that African migrants do consider contracting an agent 
to make applications on their behalf, twenty-three (16 per cent) strongly disagreed with the 
statement. 
 
Since sixty-six (66) per cent of the respondents, which is the majority, strongly agreed with the 
statement which is in contrast with sixteen (16) per cent,which is the minority, it is plausible 
to conclude that African migrants have the perception that if they have the funds, it is far better 
and productive to contract the services of agents who, according to them, have strong 
connections and networks within the Department of Home Affairs. 
 
In your opinion during the course of presenting documents for application, do you think that 
black African immigrants are treated in a similar manner as their counterparts (white)? 
Figure 5. 2. 16: Participants Response that African Migrants’ Application Are Treated in a Similar Manner as 
their other Counterparts. 
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The figure above indicates that seventeen (12 per cent) of the sampled African migrants agreed 
with the statement that applications of African migrants are treated in a similar manner as others 
(white counterparts). Whilst ten (7 per cent) of the sampled African migrants strongly agreed 
with the statement, forty-one (29 per cent) were undecided about the statement. Whereas 
twenty-five (18 per cent) disagreed with the statement, forty-seven (34 per cent) strongly 
disagreed with the statement. 
 
Conclusively, since thirty-four (34) per cent of the respondents, which is the majority, strongly 
disagreed with the statement that African migrants are treated in a similar manner as their 
counterparts (white), and twenty-nine (29) per cent are in direct contrast and with seven (7) per 
cent of the respondents in the minority, it is plausible to state that African migrants have the 
perception that their applications are treated differently as compared to their counterparts 
(white migrants). Hence, they believe that they are relatively deprived of the kind of 
attention/treatment their counterparts get. 
 
If you strongly disagree with the above, does it mean you think that other counterparts (white 
immigrants) are treated with dignity and less suspicion of presenting fraudulent/fake 
documents for application at the Department of Home Affairs? 
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Figure 5. 2 17: Participants Reason for Disagreement with the Preceding Statement is Because they Believed 
that the Application of other Counterparts is Treated Differently with Less or No Suspicion. 
 
 
 
The figure above shows that twenty-four (17  per cent) of the sampled African migrants agreed 
with the statement that their reason for rejecting the preceding statement is because their 
counterparts’ (white migrants) applications are treated differently and with less/no suspicion at 
all, unlike theirs. Whilst thirty-five (25 per cent) of respondents strongly agreed with the 
statement, thirty-five (25 per cent) were undecided about the statement. Whereas twenty-six 
(19 per cent) of the respondents disagreed with the statement, twenty (14 per cent) strongly 
disagreed with the statement. 
 
However, since twenty-five (25) per cent of respondents, which is the majority, strongly agreed 
with the statement and twenty-five (25) per cent were undecided, as opposed to fourteen (14)  
per cent of the respondents, which is the minority, it is effectively significant to state that 
African migrants have the perception that their applications are not treated on an equal footing 
as their counterparts (white migrants) who are often perceived by South Africans as 
investors/job-creators whereas they (African migrants) are perceived as competitors/job-takers. 
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Do you agree that most times, if not always, black African immigrants do present/submit 
fraudulent documents for applications? 
Figure 5. 2. 18: Participants Response that African Migrants Do Submit Fraudulent Papers for Documentation 
Purpose. 
 
 
The figure above indicates that twenty-two (16 per cent) of the sampled African migrants 
strongly disagreed that African migrants do submit fraudulent papers for documentation 
purposes. Whereas thirty-one (22 per cent) disagreed with the statement, fifty-four (39 per cent) 
were undecided about the statement. Whilst seventeen [12per cent] per cent of the respondents 
strongly agreed with the statement, sixteen [11per cent] per cent agreed with the statement that 
African migrants do tender fraudulent papers. 
 
Conclusively, since thirty-nine (39) per cent of the respondents, which is the majority, were 
undecided as against sixteen (16) per cent of the respondents who strongly disagreed and twelve 
(12) per cent of the respondents who strongly agreed with the statement, are in the minority, it 
is plausible to say that what the study can draw from this is that each African migrant is of the 
opinion that they can only answer for themselves, meaning that they could not accuse their 
fellow migrants  of submitting fake papers for documentation purposes because they do not 
have concrete evidence to support their claims or assumptions. 
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In your opinion, do you agree that officials of the Department of Home Affairs do 
assume/associate black African immigrants with the tendency of tendering fake/fraudulent 
documents?  
Figure 5. 2. 19: Participants Response that Officials of the Department of Home Affairs Do Associate African 
Migrants with Fraudulent Documents. 
 
 
 
The figure above indicates that twenty-two (16 per cent) of the sampled African migrants 
agreed with the statement that officials of the Department of Home Affairs do associate African 
migrants with fraudulent/fake documents. Whilst forty-one (29 per cent) strongly agreed with 
the statement, twenty (14 per cent) of the respondents were undecided about the statement. 
Whereas twenty-eight (20 per cent) disagreed with the statement, twenty-nine (21 per cent) of 
the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement. 
 
Since twenty-nine (29) per cent of the respondents, which is the majority, strongly agreed with 
the statement, as opposed to twenty-one (21) per cent, which is the minority, who strongly 
disagreed with the statement, it is plausible to conclude that African migrants have the 
perception that officials of the Department of Home Affairs do associate them with submitting 
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fraudulent papers for documentation purpose just to demonise them because they don’t project 
anything that will go in the African migrants’ favour. 
 
Do you agree that the quality of services rendered to African immigrants is as a result of 
discriminatory practices of officials of the Department of Home Affairs? 
Figure 5. 2. 20: Participants Response that the Quality of Services Rendered to African Migrants Is as A Result 
of the Discriminatory Practices of Officials of Department of Home Affairs. 
 
 
The figure above depicts that forty-one (29 per cent) of the sampled African migrants agreed 
with the statement that the quality of services rendered to African migrants is as a result of 
discriminatory practices of the officials of the Department of Home Affairs towards them. 
Whereas fifty-two (37 per cent) of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement, twenty 
(14 per cent) were undecided with the statement. Whilst eight (6 per cent) of the respondents 
disagreed with the statement that the quality of services rendered to African migrants is as a 
result of the discriminatory practices of officials of the Department of Home Affairs, nineteen 
(14 per cent) strongly disagreed with the statement. 
 
However, since thirty-seven (37) per cent of the respondents, which is the majority, strongly 
agreed with the statement as opposed to fourteen (14) per cent of the respondents, which is the 
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minority, strongly disagreed, the study concludes that the quality of services rendered to 
African migrants at the Department of Home Affairs is directly proportionate to discriminatory 
practices of its officials which might seems not different from how other governmental 
agencies treat black African migrants in South Africa as opined by most black African 
immigrants. 
 
Do you agree that officials of the Department of Home Affairs at the frontline desk do speak 
an indigenous language to African immigrants without first getting to know whether they 
understood the language? 
Figure 5. 2. 21: Participants Response that Officials of the Department of Home Affairs Speak to African 
Migrants in Isi-Zulu Language Without Asking First if they Do Understand. 
 
 
The figure above shows that twenty-five (18 per cent) of the sampled African migrants strongly 
disagreed with the statement that officials of the Department of Home Affairs do communicate 
to them in Isi-Zulu without first asking if they understand the language. Whilst fifteen (11 per 
cent) of the respondents disagreed with the statement, thirty-seven (25 per cent) were 
undecided. Whereas thirty (21 per cent) of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement, 
thirty-three (24 per cent) agreed with the statement. 
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Conclusively, since twenty-six (26) per cent of the respondents, which is the majority were 
undecided as opposed to eighteen (18) per cent of those who strongly disagreed and twenty-
one (21) per cent of those who strongly agreed with the statement, it is plausible to state that 
the practice of officials of the Department of Home Affairs speaking to African migrants in the 
Isi-Zulu language without first asking if they understand the language might no longer be taking 
place. Hence kudos to officials of the Department of Home Affairs for this improvement. 
 
Are you okay with how officials of the Department of Home Affairs perceive (think) of you 
before taking a decision affecting your application? 
Figure 5. 2. 22: Participants Response that they Are Comfortable with How They Are Perceived by Officials 
of the Department of Home Affairs. 
 
 
The figure above indicates that none of the sampled African migrants agreed with the statement 
that African migrants are comfortable with how they are perceived by the officials of the 
Department of Home Affairs.  Whilst none of the respondents strongly agreed with the 
statement, fifty-one (36 per cent) were undecided. Whereas fifty-six (40 per cent) disagreed 
with the statement that African migrants are comfortable with how they are perceived by 
officials of the Department of Home Affairs, thirty-three (24 per cent) strongly disagreed with 
the statement. 
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Forty (40) per cent of respondents, which is the majority disagreed with the statement and 
thirty-six (36) per cent were undecided about the statement as opposed to twenty-four (24) per 
cent of the respondents, which is the minority. It is plausible to state that African migrants are 
not comfortable with how officials of the Department of Home Affairs perceive them in relation 
to their applications at the office. 
 
Do you agree that the quality of services rendered to black African immigrants could be 
improved if the officials of the Department of Home Affairs could change the way they see 
them by treating them professionally with a spirit of Ubuntu (brotherhood) and are well-trained 
to make informed decisions? 
Figure 5. 2. 23: Participants Response that Service Delivery at the Department of Home Affairs Could Be 
Improved Should Officials Change their Perception of African Migrants. 
 
 
The figure above shows that none of the African migrants sampled strongly disagreed with the 
statement that service delivery in the Department of Home Affairs could be improved should 
the officials change their perception about African migrants. Whilst fifteen (28 per cent) were 
undecided about the statement, (38 per cent) of the respondents strongly agreed with the 
statement. Whereas (34 per cent) of them agreed with the statement, none of the respondents 
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disagreed with the statement that service delivery in home affairs could be improved should 
the officials change the perception they have about African migrants. 
 
Conclusively, since thirty-eight (38) per cent of the sampled African migrants, which is the 
majority strongly agreed and thirty-four (34) per cent agreed with the statement as against 
twenty-eight (28) per cent of respondents, which is the minority, it is plausible to conclude with 
the statement that service delivery in the Department of Home Affairs could be improved 
should the officials change the perception they have about African migrants. 
 
Do you think that you can achieve the dreams you had before coming to South Africa if treated 
fairly, as well as a positive improvement at the Department of Home Affairs? 
Figure 5. 2. 24: Participants Response that they Can Still Achieve the Dreams and Aspirations they Had Prior 
Arrival to South Africa. 
 
 
 
The figure above indicates that forty-seven (34 per cent) of the sampled African migrants 
agreed with the statement that they can still achieve the dreams and aspirations they had before 
coming to South Africa. Whilst fifty-four (39 per cent) strongly agreed with the statement, and 
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thirty-nine (28 per cent) were undecided about the statement. Whereas none of the respondents 
disagreed with the statement nor strongly disagreed with the statement. 
 
However, since thirty-nine (39) per cent of the respondents, which is the majority, strongly 
agreed with the statement and thirty-four (34) per cent agreed with the statement, as opposed 
to none of the respondents strongly disagreeing, it is quite significant to conclude that African 
migrants believed that they can achieve the goals and aspirations they had in mind before 
venturing into South Africa, which proves the assertion that a lot of African migrants residing 
in South Africa have the perception that the lack of proper channels or hurdles in  
documentation with the Department of Home Affairs is limiting their potentials. 
 
Would you agree that there is a strong relationship between being seen as a black African first 
(Afrophobia) and the quality of service delivery to African immigrants at the Department of 
Home Affairs? 
 
Figure 5. 2. 25: Participants Response that there Is a Strong Relationship Between Afrophobia and Quality of 
Service Delivery to African Migrants at the Department of Home Affairs. 
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The figure above indicates that ninety-seven (69 per cent) of the sampled African migrants 
agreed with the statement that there is a strong relationship between Afrophobia and the quality 
of services delivered to African migrants in the Department of Home Affairs. Whilst none of 
the respondents strongly agreed with the statement, thirty (21 per cent) were undecided. 
Whereas thirteen (9 per cent) disagreed with the statement, none of the respondents strongly 
disagreed with the statement that there is a strong relationship between Afrophobia and the 
quality of service delivered to African migrants in the Department of Home Affairs. 
 
Conclusively, since sixty-nine (69) per cent of the respondents, which is the majority, agreed 
with the statement as opposed to nine (9) per cent of the respondents, which is the minority 
disagreeing with the statement, it is plausible and significant to conclude that there is a strong 
relationship between Afrophobia and the quality of services delivered to African migrants at 
the Department of Home Affairs. In as much as there is evidence of Afrophobic attacks and 
negative attitudes towards African migrants within the South African society, one cannot rule 
out that there are bound to be traces of such Afrophobic tendencies experienced by African 
migrants among officials of the Department of Home Affairs as well. 
 
5.3 TEST OF HYPOTHESIS 
 
5.3.1.1 Chi-Square Test of Independence and Homogeneity [FIRST HYPOTHESIS] 
 
In application of this statistical technique one starts by stating the null hypothesis that there is 
no relationship between the two variables, that is, the two variables are independent of each 
other thus this study states: 
Research Question : If you strongly disagree with the above, would you then agree that a lack 
of good customer service is often linked to the negative attitude of officials of the Department 
of Home Affairs? 
 
H0: The lack of good customer service experienced at the Department of Home Affairs 
has no link with the negative attitudes of its officials. 
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H1: The lack of good customer service experienced at the Department of Home Affairs is 
linked to the negative attitudes of its officials. 
 
In application of the equation  𝐸𝑖𝑗 =
(𝑛𝑖 𝑥 𝑛𝑗)
𝑛
, the study computed the expected cell frequencies 
for all the cells as follows (n = 140) 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐸 =
82 𝑋 69
140
  = 40.41                  
82 X 71
140
   = 41.58 
𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐼𝐷𝐸𝐷 =
20 X 69
140
 = 9.85           
20 X 71
140
   = 10.14 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐸 =
38 X 69
140
 = 18.72               
38 X 71
140
   = 19.27 
 
 
Expected Frequencies are therefore given as: 
82
20
38
140
52
17
0
69
30
20
21
71
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
AGREE
UNDECIDED
DISAGREE
GRAND TOTAL
A
L
T
E
R
N
A
T
E
 R
E
S
P
O
N
S
E
S
AGREE UNDECIDED DISAGREE
GRAND
TOTAL
RESIDENT IN S.A BELOW TEN YEARS 30 20 21 71
RESIDENT IN S.A ABOVE TEN YEARS 52 17 0 69
R. TOTAL 82 20 38 140
RESIDENT IN S.A BELOW TEN YEARS RESIDENT IN S.A ABOVE TEN YEARS R. TOTAL
170 
 
Responses                          Respondents 
 Resident in SA 
above Ten years 
Resident in SA 
Below Ten years 
Agree 40.41 41.58 
Undecided 9.85 10.14 
Disagree 18.72 19.27 
 
The following formula is then applied in computing the chi-square value for the data: 
 
𝒙𝟐 = ∑
𝒏𝒓
𝒊=𝟏
= ∑
𝒏𝒄
𝒋=𝟏
(𝑶𝒊𝒋 − 𝑬𝒊𝒋)  𝟐
𝑬𝒊𝒋
 
Where Oij = Observed frequency 
Eij = Expected frequency 
Values for  
(𝑂𝑖𝐽 −  𝐸𝑖𝐽) 2
𝐸𝑖𝑗
 
For (𝑛11 − 𝑛12) = (
52 − 40.41
40.41
)
2
   +  (
30 − 41.58
40.58
)
2
 
For (𝑛21 − 𝑛22) = (
0 − 9.85
9.85
)
2
   +  (
20 − 10.14
10.14
)
2
 
For(𝑛31 − 𝑛32) = (
17 − 18.72
18.72
)
2
 + (
21 − 19.27
19.27
)
2
 
The summation ∑𝒏𝒓𝒊=𝟏 ∑
𝒏𝒄
𝒋=𝟏
(𝑶𝒊𝒋−𝑬𝒊𝒋)  𝟐
𝑬𝒊𝒋
  then gives us: 
3.33 + 2.23 
9.85 + 9.59 
0.16 + 0.16 
= 26.32 
𝑋2 = 26.32 
Decision Rule 
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The study rejected the null hypothesis of independence at 𝛼 = 0.05,as the computed 
value of the test statistic, 𝑋2, exceeded the critical (tabulated) value of 𝑋2 0.95 for (r-
1) (c-1) degree of freedom and accepted the alternate hypothesis. 
But, before the study took a decision, the study computed (r-1) (c-1) degrees of 
freedom, where: 
R = number of rows 
C = number of columns, thus; 
(r-1)(c-1) = (3-1) (2-1) 
= (2) (1) 
     =    (2) two degrees of freedom. 
Decision: 
Since the chi-square calculated (𝑿𝟐 = 26.32) is greater than the chi-square critical/tabulated 
(𝑿𝟐 0.95 = 5.991) and therefore falls into the critical region, the study rejected the null 
hypothesis of no association.  This is done because it is known that the computed value of 26.32 
of no association will occur by chance (<5 per cent of the time) at the 0.05 level of 
significance. 
However, the study therefore concluded (drew inference) that the two variables (customer 
service and attitudes) are not statistically independent (based on the above Chi-Square Test of 
Independence and Homogeneity). Accordingly, the research hypothesis (H1) which states that 
lack of good customer service experienced at the Department of Home Affairs by black 
African migrants is linked to the negative attitudes of its officials, is hereby supported. 
Hence, the study drew inference from this by validating the first hypothesis of this 
research study. 
 
Research Question : Most times, if not always, officials of the Department of Home Affairs 
are in doubt of the documents you present for your applications? 
 
H0: Most often, officials of the Department of Home Affairs are not in doubt of 
the documents African immigrants present to them for their application. 
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H1: Most often, officials of the Department of Home Affairs are in doubt of the 
documents African immigrants present to them for their application. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3.1.2 Chi-Square Test of Independence and Homogeneity [SECOND HYPOTHESIS] 
 
In application of the equation =
(𝑛𝑖 𝑥 𝑛𝑗)
𝑛
, the study computed the expected cell frequencies for 
all the cells as follows (n = 140) 
 
 
 
𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐸 =
59 𝑋 67
140
= 28.23
59 𝑋 73
140
= 30.76 
𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐼𝐷𝐸𝐷 =
43 𝑋 67
140
= 18.19    
43 𝑋 73
140
= 22.42 
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𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐸 =
38𝑋 67
140
=   18.19     
38 𝑋 73
140
= 19.81 
Expected Frequencies are therefore given as: 
Responses Respondents 
 Resident in SA Ten 
years Above 
Resident in SA 
Below Ten years 
Agree 28.23 30.76 
Undecided 20.58 22.42 
Disagree 18.19 19.81 
 
The following formula is then applied in computing the chi-square value for the data: 
 
𝒙𝟐 = ∑
𝒏𝒓
𝒊=𝟏
= ∑
𝒏𝒄
𝒋=𝟏
(𝑶𝒊𝒋 − 𝑬𝒊𝒋)  𝟐
𝑬𝒊𝒋
 
Where Oij = Observed frequency 
Eij = Expected frequency 
 For (𝑛11 − 𝑛12) = (
30 − 28.23
28.23
)
2
  + (
29 − 30.76
30.76
)
2
 
 For(𝑛21 − 𝑛22) = (
20 − 20.58
20.58
)
2
  +  (
23−22.42
22.42
)
2
 
 For (𝑛31 − 𝑛32) = (
17 − 18.19
18.19
)
2
   +  (
21 − 19.81
19.81
)
2
 
The summation  𝒙𝟐 = ∑𝒏𝒓𝒊=𝟏 = ∑
𝒏𝒄
𝒋=𝟏
(𝑶𝒊𝒋−𝑬𝒊𝒋)  𝟐
𝑬𝒊𝒋
  then gives 
0.11 + 0.10 
0.01 + 0.01 
16.22 + 0.07 
=16.52 
𝑿𝟐 = 16.52 
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Decision Rule: 
The study rejected the null hypothesis of independence at 𝛼 = 0.05,as the computed 
value of the test statistic, 𝑋2, exceeded the critical (tabulated) value of 𝑋2 0.95 for (r-
1) (c-1) degree of freedom and accepted the alternate hypothesis. 
But, before the decision is taken, one must compute (r-1) (c-1) degrees of freedom, 
where: 
R = number of rows 
C = number of columns, thus; 
(r-1) (c-1) = (3-1) (2-1) 
     = (2) (1) 
     = (2) two degrees of freedom. 
 
Decision: 
Since the chi-square calculated (𝑿𝟐 =16.52) is greater than the chi-square critical/tabulated 
(𝑿𝟐 0.95 = 5.991) and therefore falls into the critical region, the study rejects the null 
hypothesis of no association. This is done because it is known that the computed value of 16.52 
of no association will occur by chance (< 5 per cent of the time) at the 0.05 level of significance. 
However, it can therefore be concluded (the variables are not statistically independent) and 
inference drawn (based on the above Chi-Square Test of independence and Homogeneity). 
Accordingly, the research hypothesis (H1) which states that most often, officials of the 
Department of Home Affairs are in doubt about the documents that black African 
migrants present to them for their application, is hereby supported. Hence, the study 
drew inference from this that the first hypothesis of this research study has been 
validated. 
 
Research Question : Would you agree that there is a strong relationship between Afrophobia 
and the quality of service delivery to African immigrants? 
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H0: There is no strong relationship between Afrophobia and the quality of service 
delivered to African immigrants at the Department of Home Affairs. 
H1: There is a strong relationship between Afrophobia and the quality of service 
delivered to black African immigrants at the Department of Home Affairs. 
 
5.3.1.3 Chi-Square Test of Independence and Homogeneity [THIRD HYPOTHESIS] 
 
In application of the equation…………., the study computed the expected cell frequencies for 
all the cells as follows (n = 140) 
 
 
𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐸 =
97 𝑋 80
140
= 55.23
97 𝑋 60
140
= 41.57 
𝑈𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐶𝐼𝐷𝐸𝐷 =
30 𝑋 80
140
= 17.14
30 𝑋 60
140
= 12.85 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐸 =
 13 𝑋 80
140
= 7.42
13 𝑋 60
140
= 5.57 
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Responses                        Respondents 
 Male Female 
Agree 55.23 41.57 
Undecided 17.14 12.85 
Disagree 7.42 5.57 
 
The following formula is then applied in computing the chi-square value for the data: 
𝒙𝟐 = ∑
𝒏𝒓
𝒊=𝟏
= ∑
𝒏𝒄
𝒋=𝟏
(𝑶𝒊𝒋 − 𝑬𝒊𝒋)  𝟐
𝑬𝒊𝒋
 
 
Where Oij = Observed frequency 
Eij = Expected frequency 
 
𝐹𝑜𝑟 (𝑛11 − 𝑛12) = (
64 − 55.23
55.23
)
2
    +     (
33 − 41.57
41.57
)
2
 
𝐹𝑜𝑟 (𝑛21 − 𝑛22) = (
11 − 17.14
17.14
)
2
    +      (
19 − 12.85
12.85
)
2
 
𝐹𝑜𝑟 (𝑛31 − 𝑛32) = (
5 − 7.42
7.42
)
2
      +       (
8 − 5.57
5.57
)
2
 
The summation  𝒙𝟐 = ∑𝒏𝒓𝒊=𝟏 = ∑
𝒏𝒄
𝒋=𝟏
(𝑶𝒊𝒋−𝑬𝒊𝒋)  𝟐
𝑬𝒊𝒋
  then gives 
1.40 + -0.60 
0.35 + 2.69 
0.32 + 0.64 
= 2.65 
𝑿𝟐 = 6 
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Decision Rule: 
Thus, the study rejects the null hypothesis of independence at 𝛼 = 0.05, as the 
computed value of the test statistic, 𝑋2, exceeds the critical (tabulated) value of 𝑋2 0.95 
for (r-1) (c-1) degree of freedom and accepted the alternate hypothesis. 
But, before taking the decision, it must compute (r-1) (c-1) degrees of freedom, where: 
R = number of rows 
C = number of columns, thus; 
(r-1) (c-1) = (3-1) (2-1) 
 = (2) (1) 
                 = (2) two degrees of freedom 
 
Decision: 
Since the chi-square calculated (𝑿𝟐 = 6) is greater than the chi-square critical/tabulated (𝑿𝟐 
0.95 = 5.991) and therefore falls into the critical region, the study rejects the null hypothesis 
of no association. This is done because it is known that the computed value of six (6) of no 
association will occur by chance (< 5 per cent of the time) at the 0.05 level of significance. 
 
However, it can therefore be concluded (the variables are not statistically independence) and 
inference drawn (based on the above Chi-Square Test of independence and Homogeneity). 
Accordingly, the research hypothesis (H1) which states that there is a strong relationship 
between Afrophobia and the quality of service delivered to black African immigrants at 
the Department of Home Affairs is hereby supported. Hence, the study drew inference 
from this that the last hypothesis of this research study has been validated. 
 
 
5.3.1.4 Correlation of Demography to Indicate Variation of Severity of Perception of 
Discrimination and Negative Experiences with Frequency of Visit to the DHA 
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Figure 5. 3. 1. 4. 1: Demography of Response that there is a Linkage Between Bad Quality of Service and 
Negative Attitude of Department of Home Affairs Officials. 
 
 
 
The figure above depicts that 65 per cent of the entire Congo DRC nationals sampled agreed 
that the lack of good quality of service delivery at the DHA is linked to the negative attitude of 
its officials, whilst 35 per cent of them disagreed. Whereas 86 per cent of the entire Ghanaians 
sampled agreed to that assertion, 14 per cent disagreed. 
 
Whilst 74 per cent of all Ethiopians sampled agreed with the statement, 26 per cent of them 
disagreed. Whereas 67 per cent of the Malawians sampled agreed with the statement, 33 per 
cent of them disagreed with the statement. 
 
Also indicated and shown above, 85 per cent of Nigerians equally agreed with the perception, 
whereas 15 per cent disagreed. Whilst 58 per cent of all Tanzanians surveyed also agreed, 42 
per cent disagreed with the statement. And finally, whereas 58 per cent of the Zimbabweans 
agreed with the statement, 42 per cent of them disagreed. 
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Figure 5. 3. 1. 4. 2: Demography of Response that Officials of the Department of Home Affairs Are in Doubt 
of Documents Tendered by African Migrants. 
 
 
The figure above indicates that 67 per cent of the entire Congo DRC agreed that officials of the 
DHA are always in doubt of the documents they tendered for documentation purposes, whereas 
33 per cent of them disagreed. Whilst 67 per cent of Ghanaians agreed with the statement, 33 
per cent equally disagreed. 
 
Whereas 63 per cent of the entire Ethiopians sampled agreed with the statement, 37 per cent of 
them disagreed. Whilst 58 per cent of the Malawians polled agreed with the statement, 42 per 
cent disagreed. 
 
Whilst 60 per cent of all Nigerians surveyed agreed with the statement, 40 per cent of them 
disagreed with the statement. Whereas 56 per cent of the Tanzanians sampled agreed with the 
statement, 44 per cent of them disagreed. And finally, whilst 57 per cent of all the Zimbabweans 
sampled agreed with the statement, 43 per cent of them disagreed. 
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Figure 5. 3. 1. 4. 3: Demography of Respondents’ Strong Relation of Afrophobia and Quality of Service 
Delivered to Black African Migrants. 
 
 
As the figure above indicates 93 per cent of the entire Congo DRC sampled agreed with the 
statement that there is strong relationship between Afrophobia and the quality of service 
delivered to black African immigrants by the DHA, seven per cent of them disagreed. Whereas 
83 per cent of the Ghanaians agreed with the statement, 17 per cent of them disagreed. 
 
As also indicated, 93 per cent of the entire Ethiopians sampled agreed with the statement, whilst 
seven per cent of them disagreed. Whereas 88 per cent of the Malawians polled agreed with 
the statement, 12 per cent of them disagreed.  
 
Whereas 85 per cent of the Nigerians sampled agreed with the statement, 15 per cent disagreed. 
Whilst 85 per cent of all Tanzanians surveyed agreed with the statement, 15 per cent of them 
disagreed. And finally, whereas 90 per cent of the Zimbabweans sampled agreed with the 
statement, ten per cent of them disagreed. 
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Figure 5. 3. 1. 4. 4: Correlation of Extremely Negative Experiences with Frequency of Visits to the 
Department of Home Affairs. 
 
 
As depicted by the figure above, out of the entire number of those who visited only once a year 
and had negative experiences at the DHA, 50 per cent reported their experience to be fair 
whereas 50 per cent also reported their experiences to be poor, and none (zero per cent) reported 
their experiences to be very poor. 
In the same breath, among those who visited twice a year, whilst 69 per cent reported their 
experience to be fair, 15 per cent reported their experiences to be poor, and 15 per cent also 
reported their experiences to be very poor. 
Whereas out of those who visited the DHA more than five times a year 16 per cent reported 
their experiences to be fair, a whopping 74 per cent reported their experiences to be poor and 
10 per cent reported their experiences to be very poor. 
Whilst out of those who visited the DHA more than ten times in a year, 20 per cent reported 
their experiences to be fair, 47 per cent reported theirs to be poor and 33 per cent reported theirs 
to be very poor. 
Finally, whereas out of those who couldn’t account for how many times they visited DHA none 
(zero per cent) reported their experiences to be fair, 52 per cent reported their experiences to 
be poor and 48 per cent reported theirs to be very poor. 
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Conclusively, it seems that those who frequent the DHA for documentation purposes more than 
others are presumably those that are not be attended to successfully, effectively or efficiently. 
Hence, this study can authoritatively deduce from the above that extremely negative 
experiences correlate with frequency of visits to the DHA. 
 
5.3.2 Thematic/Conceptual Presentation and Analysis 
 
In this section, data analysis commenced with a process of organising data into key themes and 
sub-themes. The themes were developed according to the objectives of the study. Although 
new themes later emerged during the course of the study, they were later incorporated into 
earlier themes. 
 
The themes covered: frustration, unlawful detention, delays and lack of commitment to service 
delivery (ineffectiveness/inefficiency), rampant corruption and extortions, ignorance and lack 
of adequate education, discrepancy in perception of immigrants (Afrophobic tendency). 
 
FRUSTRATION 
Commencing with an extract from one of the study participants; 
I moved here in 2003. I applied for a work permit, and then permanent residency, but 
it was all drawn out and frustrating, with a lot of back-and-forth and waiting. The 
overall experience was really unpleasant. The counter staff were rude, unhelpful and 
uncaring (Participant A). 
Participant 2 from the Democratic Republic of Congo: 
…meanwhile, I have been trying to get my relative permit for more than four years. The 
department mishandled my application more than once and I have had to resubmit my 
paperwork more than three times now and [it] is still not out now. Right now, I’m still 
waiting for my visa to be sorted out. I call them fortnightly. I have not been able to do 
anything almost for four years now. Luckily, I am involved with Herbalife and that is 
how I make my money because there is no requirement of a visa for it (Participant 2) 
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Participant 3’s application took 45 days to get to Pretoria. Because the help line was not specific 
about the status of his application at each stage, he began to panic. The application returned to 
Durban after 85 days, but he was told that he couldn’t collect it until he received an SMS. 
I never actually received an SMS, but the online tracker finally indicated it was ready 
for collection. 120 days after submission, I had my visa outcome in hand. If Home 
Affairs don’t even know where applications are in their building, how do they know 
where immigrants who may be in breach of immigration rules are? (Participant 3). 
 
Participant 12 also narrated how his older brother John applied for a work permit straight after 
his marriage in January 2010 so that he would be able to apply for permanent residency as soon 
as possible. His brother received his work permit seven months later, after many hassles with 
Home Affairs officials who, he said, implied several times that a bribe would speed up the 
process. When he eventually received it, he was surprised to find that it came in the form of a 
handwritten sticker. 
Our immediate reaction was that it looked fake. The validity was one year and 11 
months, versus the three or five years we heard are standard, and coincidentally just 
short of the two years he needed before he could apply for permanent residency 
(Participant 12). 
 
Further complications arose when he tried to apply for permanent residency, without which he 
could not secure loans in order to buy a home or a car. Frustrated with the process, he and his 
wife opted instead to move to the USA, where they were soon approved as permanent residents 
through an immigration process that was “comparably easier” according to Francis. For some 
though, the situation is so bad that they believe a bribe is the only way to resolve matters. 
 
Another participant emphasised that he is in a state of confusion right now because he is not 
aware of how to sort out his permit. He says: 
I came here in 2005 with a work permit to teach computer and math’s literacy. Luckily 
for me I got a job in a high school. The problem now is that when I went to apply for 
permanent residency, I was told to get a letter from the school principal indicating that 
I am a permanent staff of the school and when I came back to the principal demanding 
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such [a] letter, he literally told me that it’s not possible unless I want him to lose his 
job (Participant 3). 
 
Participant 7, a Somali who has a temporary residence permit while his application for asylum 
is considered, said he has been beaten and refused legal representation at a police station. He 
has been waiting for a permanent decision on his application for more than two years. 
You worry each time you leave your house that the police will stop you. Sometimes they 
ignore your permit and you have to pay or be arrested. Police stations and Lindela are 
not good places. Bad people there. You don't know if you will come out alive. 
(Participant 7). 
 
UNLAWFUL DETENTION/DEHUMANISATION 
 
Another participant, a Nigerian who was part of the focus group this study interviewed 
complained he was illegally arrested - a case he took to court, to which the court eventually 
found that law enforcement officials had broken the law. He said he subsequently faced more 
intimidation and physical attacks. Police and their immigration colleagues raided the Nigerian's 
home in the middle of the night and took him to the police station where he was kept for 36 
days. 
A month into my detention an immigration officer revoked my visa, saying it had been 
illegally obtained (Participant 4). 
With his visa revoked, he became an illegal immigrant. The immigration authority sent him to 
Lindela, the detention centre in Johannesburg. There he spent the next six months (court 
documents show), well beyond the maximum declared by law. The judge ruled that the police 
and the government had "dismally failed to comply with the applicable requirements of the 
Immigration Act" and he had been unlawfully detained. 
 
One should applaud the joint efforts of the South African Police Services and the Department 
of Home Affairs immigration unit to rid the country of undocumented and illegal foreigners. 
Whilst it is clearly understood and respected that the doors of the Republic are open to those 
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who enter the country legally, there is concern that the manner in which some of the raids have 
been conducted has left a lot to be desired. For example, one cannot expect, in an open and 
democratic society, to be woken up at 2am in the morning by immigration officials. As one of 
the participants in this study complained, the officials arbitrarily broke into their house at night 
in the name of trying to check their immigration status in a bid to arrest illegals. Claudine [not 
real name] has this to say: 
They [officials] always barge into our house in the middle of the night without 
permission. Where is the privacy…where is the human right or just because we are 
foreigners means nothing, that’s why they can do as they please neh? It is not good at 
all; it is very bad. And when they discover that we are not illegal, they don’t even 
apologise or show sign of mistake. We therefore plead with these units to be mindful of 
the rights to both liberty and privacy of the documented all those who are in the 
Republic. The raids can continue to be carried out, but in a manner that promotes the 
spirit and purport of the human rights as enshrined in the bill of rights (Participant 1) 
 
DELAYS AND LACK OF COMMITMENT (INEFFICIENCY) 
 
Need something from Home Affairs? Prepare to wait unless you get the right network. 
That was a statement from an unknown individual parading himself as a Home Affairs agent. 
One would expect that the recent outsourcing to VFS would necessitate a turnaround strategy 
in the handling of visa applications but with this kind of admission by an alleged agent, one 
stands to wonder what is really going on in the Department of Home Affairs in Durban. As a 
lack of budget was among the reasons for outsourcing, the cost shifted to the applicants as the 
exorbitant fee of VFS has not translated to maximum effectiveness and efficiency. 
 
While some clients might have experienced good service at VFS lately, most of their clients 
can hardly tell the difference between the Department of Home Affairs and Visa Facilitations 
Services. Participant 4 from Malawi has this to say: 
 I agree it is way simpler now to know how to apply and it really guides, the waiting 
times are so poor, and the prices are not just worth it for the services they rendered. 
On my previous experience, already a month, I am yet to receive any kind of update on 
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my application. I spent the whole day at Visa Facilitation Service in Musgrave Durban 
and had to return the next day to complete my application (Participant 4). 
 
Another immigrant who had made an application through the Visa Facilitation Service and has 
been living in Durban since 2002 had this to say: 
I submitted an appeal visa application with Visa Facilitation Service Durban branch 
since 11th December 2014 till today being 28th April 2016 I have not gotten the outcome 
(Participant 15). 
 
It is alluded that some immigrants definitely do sometimes become the exception to the rule. 
Participant 13, a Cameroonian wife to a South African who renewed her Temporary Resident 
Permit had no difficulties when working through the Department of Home Affairs. According 
to her, though the lines were sometimes long, processing time took two months and stated that 
she has been living in South Africa for eight years. When she went for a standard renewal at 
VFS for the first time and after waiting (in nicer offices, but still a 3-hour wait) got a denial 
due to her not including her bank statements and a lack of a Police Clearance for her 15-year-
old daughter [as she stated]. However, bank statements are clearly stated as not needed for 
spouses on the DHA website and Police Clearances are not required for under 18. According 
to her: 
Within the required ten days I paid all our fees again (only benefiting VFS) and gave 
them bank statements. To this day I've been waiting seven months for a response and 
unlike before where you could speak to the DHA directly you now are completely 
blocked from speaking with anyone involved. VFS is very polite and says it's not up to 
them only the DHA, and the DHA says they don't know the tracking number so can't 
look into anything handled by VFS (Participant 13). 
 
She sounds ironic with her statement by highlighting the importance of sitting in a “nicer 
office” in the Visa Facilitation Service unlike the Home Affair’s office while her application is 
not making any headway. Thus, she continues: 
I'm unable to travel till this is sorted and the latest news is that appeals (which have 
been an overwhelming number due to situations like mine with one paper missing or 
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Police Clearances that weren't issued due to strikes) are now taking up to a year to 
process. It's a horrible system trapping many residents and costing a fortune to sit in a 
nicer office. (Participant 13). 
Participant 8 confessed that she always thought the Department of Home Affairs was the worst, 
but that it’s not, the so-called Visa Facilitation Service is the bigger culprit since she faced so 
many problems by all the complicated cold electronic systems. 
I decided to go relaxed through the renewal of my visa this year. But this is a joke for 
the Visa Facilitation Service. Every step went[was] difficult. Constantly hiccups. 
Questions. Worries. And the application day was a nightmare (Participant 8). 
 
A distinction was made between what it normally cost for submission and the collection process 
during the period it was handled by the Department of Home Affairs and what it costs currently 
through VFS. While it used to cost an average applicant around four hundred (400) to five 
(500) hundred Rand, its’ cost is now approximately one thousand, three hundred and fifty 
(1350) Rand.  This is a cost that African immigrants are complaining about saying that it is too 
expensive for them. This is what participant 1 has to say: 
What they are charging us is too high, even the price for appeal is not helping matters 
more especially when the fault or mistake is not from us. And yet no improvement in 
their services…it’s horrible[experience]. That is to show you that this people…[VFS] 
are just out to milk us dry which is not good (Participant 1). 
 
Another participant has this allegation to make when he stated emphatically: 
I got information that these Gupta family owns VFS and they had a deal with President 
Zuma and that is why they are robbing us because no one will talk for us or question 
them…after all we are AmakwereKwere [exclusion tendency] (Participant 14). 
 
Though the study cannot verify the authenticity of this allegation, this goes to show how far 
black African migrants can go to arrive at a uniform judgement or conclusion regarding issues 
affecting them in South Africa. 
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RAMPANT CORRUPTION AND EXTORTION 
 
A Ghanaian, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said he found a simple solution to his 
immigration problems. 
I approached a Home Affairs branch, and someone offered to organise a South African 
passport for me for R10000. Within a year of coming to South Africa, I am now a South 
African citizen (Participant 8). 
 
Sometimes it seems that the inefficiency and ineffectiveness witnessed at the Department of 
Home Affairs is a systemic arrangement, and this has fostered extortion. More than 12 refugees 
or migrants interviewed by this study said they had suffered corruption and worse at the hands 
of police and immigration officers. A clear example is the opinion of participant 15 from 
Zimbabwe: 
 All they want is to collect bribes from us, even though they know that most of us have 
not got jobs [being able to secure any reasonable employment] because of our 
condition [as a result of immigration status] (Participant 15). 
 
A 2015 report by Lawyers for Human Rights and the African Centre for Migration and Society, 
two South African NGOs, found that one-third of immigrants’ experience corruption at South 
African Home Affairs offices. Another report, published last November by the NGO 
Corruption Watch, found that more than 300 foreigners complained of extortion, threats and 
solicitation from government officials. Almost all the black African immigrants the study 
interviewed affirmed that corruption and extortion were part of their daily lives. A group of 
Tanzanians living in Point Road, a Durban street popular with black African migrants, 
described a well-organised system established by the police in conjunction with immigration 
officials. 
When they raid our area whether your paper is right or not, you must sort them out 
otherwise they will take you to their cell in the police station until immigration officials 
come to verify your papers. And most times they deliberately don’t come. And if you 
have something you are doing you must make a plan to pay big money this time around 
(Participant 5). 
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Officers in their area always come to collect money each week, the migrants narrated. Those 
who didn't pay were arrested, they stated, and they might eventually send you to a Johannesburg 
migrant detention centre, Lindela, where thousands of people are still awaiting a decision on 
their immigration applications. 
"If you pay, you're fine. If you don't have money then you're arrested or beaten up until 
you can pay," said 28-year-old taxi driver (Participant 6, from Congo DRC). 
 
According to participant 11, a Democratic Republic of Congo national who admits he has been 
paying bribes to extend his stay in South Africa for three years. 
No one really cares about your immigration status if you have money to sort yourself 
[bribe]. It doesn't really benefit anyone to change things. Immigration officers and 
police got money and we don't got deported. We work with the system we've got 
(Participant 11). 
 
A Somalian said police shot him because he refused to pay them bribes. This indicates that all 
the officials cared about is the money they will make from them. There are many other similar 
claims of official corruption echoed by hundreds of African immigrants in South Africa. Some 
are resigned to paying out, so that they can stay in the country. 
 
 
IGNORANCE AND LACK OF PROPER EDUCATION 
 
The experiences of the informants had contributed to them having strong stereotypes of the 
Department of Home Affairs and South Africans. This stereotype had various features. Besides 
the feeling that South Africans are prejudiced and parochial, a prominent perception was that 
Department of Home Affairs, especially their officials look down on them: 
At Home Affairs, they are very, I mean, they give you attitude. Not even sign of friendly 
look. As if we are cursed, they talk any-how to you. I blame our government, if things 
were better back home, what will I be doing here? (Participant 6). 
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Another informant said: 
Home Affairs is not a good place to go, if not that we don’t have option. Because they 
will make you look and feel bad about yourself. Even our struggle to survive here (South 
Africa) don’t bother them at all…. (Participant 9). 
 
The Department of Home Affairs was portrayed as the official institution used by the South 
African government to frustrate black African migrants living in South Africa, so as to force 
them to go back to their country: 
What they do there (Home Affairs) is to make you suffer and life becomes hell for you. 
So that you will decide to go back home on your own. But they will fail. (Participant 2). 
 
A common view was that officials of the Department of Home Affairs were poorly educated 
and ignorant. A Zimbabwean informant felt that the level of education of some of the officials 
is very poor: 
They know nothing, sometimes the kind of foolish questions they ask you, will force you 
to laugh at them, but when you remember your situation, you will be forced to swallow 
your laughter. Most of them are dumb. In a normal situation in some countries, most of 
them can only be employed as office cleaners (Participant 2). 
 
Another informant narrated her own ordeal: 
Some of the manners of the officials are unbearable. They make you feel uncomfortable 
by reminding you that you are not in your country, that you are a foreigner. If you don’t 
like it here (Department of Home Affairs) you better go back home. (Participant 13). 
 
Participant 5 from Nigeria has this to say: 
South Africa is a nice country, but most people there (Department of Home Affairs) 
aren’t nice at all. There is no difference between them and their brother/sisters on the 
street, concerning how they make us black foreigners feel (Participant 5). 
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Ignorance and lack of education are linked to holistic and mental themes of closure of South 
Africa and officials of the Department of Home Affairs as a result of the legacy of the Apartheid 
policy prior to 1994. Hence, one can go down memory lane to articulate the reason, as some 
black South Africans have not been exposed to the international environment and are therefore 
limited in their thinking. Participant 13 from Ghana observed: 
 It’s true, they did not give them the opportunity to open up to the outside world. They 
cannot stand foreigners. We are like intruders in their country. They don’t even know 
where Ghana is (Participant 13). 
 
But if the theme of closure applies in a general manner to the country and its inhabitants, it 
refers to the black population, in as much as they were the principle victims of apartheid 
particularly in the realm of education. Informants felt that the lack of an adequate, formal 
education has resulted in many South Africans being anxious and insecure in the company of 
black Africans from other countries: 
They are not too educated because of the previous system. When they see other black 
people who know their rights, are open, who challenge them when they feel that they 
are being deprived of their rights, who have degrees, who are able to say, “I have 
travelled around the world”, this could lead to jealousy and an inferiority complex 
(Participant 14- a Doctoral candidate in UKZN). 
 
Most of the informants were convinced that they were much better educated than them 
(officials of the Department of Home Affairs) and thus better equipped to defend themselves 
when they felt that their rights are trampled upon: 
They only learn the geography and the history of South Africa. We learn about the 
world, which gives us an opening (Participant 8 from Malawi).  
 
African migrants are appalled at the official of the Department of Home Affairs lack of 
knowledge of Africa: 
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Even among the intellectuals, you know you have history teachers, geography teachers 
who cannot situate any country of Africa other than (those in) Southern Africa 
(Participant 14) 
 
They feel that the lack of proper education is limiting the capacity of officials of the Department 
of Home Affairs in handling their documentation processes. They felt disappointed by the 
dysfunctional education system as evidenced by the disposition of the officials.  
 
Some of the African migrants feel that they are the new victims at the Department of Home 
Affairs, that they are deliberate targets of ‘hostility’ rather than mere differences. This hostility 
is driven by xenophobia manifesting itself in the form of Afrophobia. Those whose economic 
and legal situation makes them particularly vulnerable resent the Afrophobia experienced so 
intensely that, like participant 1 from Ghana, they argue that old-style apartheid has been 
replaced: 
By an apartheid against African migrants. This is what we feel. We are the target now 
(Participant 1 – Ghana). 
Participant 2 concurred: 
In a way it looks like intense hatred (Participant 2). 
 
 
DISCREPANCY IN PERCEPTION (DIFFERENT STROKES FOR DIFFERENT 
FOLKS) 
 
Many of the informants commented on the differences in the perception that officials of the 
Department of Home Affairs have about them which is quite the opposite to how their white 
counterparts (white migrants) are perceived. They felt that African migrants are treated with 
disdain while the reverse is the case with white migrants. African migrants’ perception is that 
the Department of Home Affairs officials are more pre-disposed to welcome white migrants 
unlike their counterparts (African). The general held narrative that white migrants are here 
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(South Africa) to create jobs, whilst African migrants are here (South Africa) to take or compete 
with South Africans with scarce jobs seems palpable. Participant 7 has this to say; 
That is a fact. It is known by all, not only in theory but in practice. What do they say? 
They say: “you left your country, maybe you committed crimes there and now you have 
come here.” I don’t want to generalise. I don’t say that all officials behave like that, 
but with the experience we have, we have noticed that those people [officials of the 
Department of Home Affairs] don’t want any African. They are Afrophobic, it is in 
them, you can see it (Participant 7). 
 
Participant 15 interjected immediately with the statement below: 
Those of them that are working in Home Affairs, they are more educated than those in 
the township. At least they are supposed to be more reasonable, but you should see how 
they address us…how they behave here [officials of the Department of Home Affairs]! 
What would you say about that? Black South Africans are xenophobic [Afrophobic]. 
They don’t want any black foreigners (Participant 15). 
 
Participant 10 had a similar view: 
There is an abrupt break between us and them [officials of the Department of Home 
Affairs] which prevents us from settling into the country, even to clarify something to 
you, she just looks at you, like that. This person sees you as a foreigner, a 
makwerekwere! I am well aware of the fact that those who live in Europe experience 
the same thing, but it is obviously difficult to live through this as a black person, 
especially when you have the feeling of being neglected because you are black and the 
worst of it all, is that it is from a fellow black person like you. Participant 10). 
 
Participant 4 became a bit irritated: 
Officials [black South Africans] do not behave like that to white migrants. Why? There 
are quite significant number of White migrants in this country, and when you see how 
they [officials] attend to them when they ask for something there [office], just because 
they don’t have black skins like us (Participant 4). 
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Another participant from Tanzania concurred: 
The first question they [officials of the Department of Home Affairs] ask a white 
migrant is if they like his/her country, whilst the first question they ask black Africans 
is, “when are you leaving? (Participant 9). 
 
Participant 4 from Ethiopia felt that ironically many South Africans are more hospitable and 
welcoming to white migrants than black foreigners. 
Hence, there is a clear discrepancy in the way that officials of the Department of Home Affairs 
perceive black African immigrants as compared to white immigrants. And this goes to enforce 
the narrative that there appears to be different strokes for different folks, depending on the 
colour of their skin. 
 
CULPABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT 
 
Such are the themes which dominate black African migrants’ descriptions of their plight at the 
Department of Home Affairs. Based on direct experiences, and an observed pattern of 
negligence of governmental actions or inactions, rumours and stories, the accumulations of 
such narratives arguably make the South African government culpable. Common assertions by 
migrants who participated in this study are: 
They [government] know what they are doing. They [officials] are just acting out the 
script written for them by their employer [government]. Have you seen any of them 
[officials] sacked or lost job because of how they treat black Africans other than unless 
a South African citizen is affected. They are like that. They [government] have it 
[xenophobia] in their blood just like their people on the street (Participant 9). 
 
These perceptions about the South African government were often presented in an essentialist 
fashion – ‘what do you expect….’; ‘that’s their plan…..’; they know what they are doing…..’, 
they just don’t want us…..’, etc. There is this outcry that if people who are in positions of 
government/authority and those at the helm of policy-making are making some unguided 
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utterances and remarks which are directed at black African migrants, how much more could 
African migrants be exposed or subjected to at the hands of the Department of Home Affairs 
officials? This could also be argued as a clear indication of the unwritten policy of the 
government, just like the Mayor of Johannesburg, Herman Mashaba, who has been accused by 
the South African Human Rights Commissions of stoking xenophobic tension with his remarks 
about African migrants: 
I will do everything possible to provide accommodation, but the City of Johannesburg 
will only provide accommodation to South Africans. Foreigners, whether legal or 
illegal, are not the responsibility of the city. I run the municipality (Mashaba, 2017). 
 
And Deputy Police Minister, Bongani Mkongis’ comment: 
How can a city in South Africa be 80 per cent foreign nationals? That is dangerous. 
South Africans have surrendered their own city to the foreigners (Mkongis, 2017). 
 
How can these remarks from the Mayor and the Deputy Police Ministers’ questions be 
discussed in-view of the aforementioned perceptions that African migrants have about the 
government? Otherwise it could create an avenue for the plausible validation of the perception 
of black African migrants. 
 
 
IN CONTEMPT OF COURT ORDER 
 
Immigration lawyers have also accused the Department of Home Affairs of being in contempt 
of a High Court order (Evans, 2015). This comes after the Department withdrew an instruction 
allowing asylum seekers and refugees to apply for permanent residence without giving up their 
asylum or refugee status. The Department also withdrew an instruction allowing asylum 
seekers and refugees to apply for temporary residence without a valid passport. 
 
Temporary residence visas include relatives’ visas and work visas. The effect or implication of 
this is huge, as asylum seekers are struggling to get married and register the birth of their 
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children with South African spouses. Another effect is that asylum seekers who did not have 
temporary residence could not open a bank account. This made them vulnerable to crooks who 
preyed on them because they carried cash. However, there is an accusation that constantly 
emerges that the Department of Home Affairs has a pattern of just appealing matters to frustrate 
clients as justice is expensive, in the hope that the clients will run out of money. 
 
5.4 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
 
 Among all the black African immigrants sampled, none was without any form of formal 
education. 
 A relatively high proportion of black African immigrants have gone to the DHA 
consecutively five times in a year for one particular documentation purpose. And it is 
pertinent to emphasise here that the reason for repetition of their visit was because the 
office in question neglected their duty, which prompted the repetition of their visits time 
and again. 
 A relatively high proportion of them rated their experiences as very poor, giving 
credibility to their initial assumption that their visits shouldn’t have exceeded twice had 
they been attended to without any fault of theirs. 
 A relatively high proportion were of the perception that there is discrepancy in how 
they are treated from their counterparts (white). Hence, they attributed the negative 
attitude and poor quality of service they received from the DHA to their blackness. 
 A greater number of black African immigrants had expected ab initio to be 
discriminated against. 
 Majority of black African immigrants were of the opinion that officials of the DHA are 
acting on behalf of the scripted instruction of their institution/government. 
 Majority were of the opinion that there is little or no good customer service at the DHA. 
 A relatively high proportion of black Africans are not proud of their blackness as a 
result of their perception that prior to routine authentication, the officials of the DHA 
associate their blackness with the presentation of fraudulent documents for 
documentation. 
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 Most prefer contracting an agent should they have the resources required.  
 A relative proportion of black African immigrants sampled were undecided as to 
whether they collectively present fraudulent documents for documentation purposes. 
However, during the course of focus group discussions, all in unison strongly opined 
that the reason was because they could only vouch for themselves as individuals and 
not on behalf of all black Africans. Hence, this study admitted that maybe this is one of 
the limitations of the framing of the questionnaire as it should have been framed in a 
manner that addressed directly to each individual, and that would have check-mated 
this assumption. 
 Virtually all black African immigrants sampled subscribed to the notion that they are 
presumed by the DHA officials as fraudsters. 
 Many were of the view that they can still achieve the respective dreams they had prior 
to arrival in South Africa should officials of the DHA be well trained and apply the 
spirit of Uhbuntu to them. 
 A relatively high proportion relate the colour of their skin to the quality of service 
rendered to them at the DHA office. 
 Most black African immigrants are experiencing frustration at the hands of the recently 
outsourced agency (VFS) who exercise some of the responsibilities of the DHA, and 
most times, those African immigrants are caught-up in-between these two entities as to 
who takes ownership of issues that emanate. 
 Most times, officials of the DHA don’t comply with the applicable requirements of the 
Immigration Act that guides their functions. 
 Most times, there are delays and a lack of commitment to services delivered to black 
African immigrants. 
 The existence of rampant corruption and extortion among the DHA officials. 
 The manifestation of ignorance and lack of adequate education and training of officials 
of the DHA. 
 Most times the DHA are in contempt of court orders when they unlawfully arrest and 
dehumanise black African immigrants. 
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 The discrepancy of officials of the DHA in their perception of immigrants (different 
strokes for different folks). 
 Also, based on direct experiences, and observed pattern of negligence of governmental 
actions or inactions, rumours and stories, and the accumulations of such narratives, 
arguably makes the South African government culpable. 
 And finally, contracting of some of the responsibility of Department of Home Affairs 
to the VFS is inconsiderate and irrational. The nature and kind of function outsourced 
to those VFS is insensitive, because they are not civil/public servants who are subjected 
to Batho Pele precepts. 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The findings seem to have ratified the hypothesis which stated that a lack of good customer 
service as experienced by black African immigrants at the DHA is linked to the negative 
attitudes of its officials as a result of the vulnerability of black African immigrants in South 
Africa and KwaZulu-Natal to be precise. This was explored within the theoretical foundation 
of relative deprivation. Hence, this theory offered a psychological explanation of the 
perspective of black African immigrants based on their experiences that they are deprived of 
good quality service by the DHA. This psychoanalytic theory similarly offered an intrapsychic 
explanation of scapegoating as a projective and defensive process. However, the research 
implication is that until a study of this nature is conducted in the entire country, it might not be 
plausible to generalise the result to the entire country, as there is a limitation. 
 
Secondary, findings confirmed the second hypothesis which stated that most times, if not all 
times, officials of the DHA are in doubt of the documents that black African immigrant present 
to them for application purposes in South Africa. This was explored within a social comparison 
theory that humans have a drive to evaluate their opinions and ability by comparing with others. 
The implication of this is the fact that black African immigrants expected that they would be 
treated in a discriminatory way, so it is possible that their perceptions of their treatment might 
have been coloured by their expectations. 
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And finally, findings validated the third hypothesis which stated that there is strong relationship 
between Afrophobia and the nature (quality) of services rendered to black African immigrants 
at the DHA. This was explored within the Afrophobia theory which argued that the 
psychosocial syndrome is used to exclude foreigners, and mostly African foreigners in socio-
political terms. Hence, drawing from Afrophobia informs an explanation for the phenomenon 
and underpinned issues regarding why, how and whom xenophobia targets. The implication of 
this is that with regards to this study, it would have been more useful had white immigrants 
been asked about their experiences of service delivery at the DHA, to see if their perceptions 
of their treatment are more or below what black African immigrants are experiencing or have 
experienced. And this is where this study is proposing or recommending for future research.  
 
The black Africans’ experience of service delivery in the Department of Home Affairs is 
presumably discriminatory in nature from the perspective of black African immigrants sampled 
for this study, but the extent to which this perception can be ascertained is subject to unlimited 
study. Though the perception of most black African immigrants might be coloured, it seems 
their experience at the DHA might be different from the white experience, which in turn is 
different from the Chinese or Bangladesh or Pakistani experience. Indeed, we can’t even 
generalise about all blacks in South Africa, since the experience of black natives is different 
from the experience of black immigrants from the rest of Africa. However, that doesn’t mean 
the group cultural traits that show patterns of success or failure should be ignored. 
 
This study argues that even if a perfect apples-to-apples comparison cannot be made, that 
doesn’t mean one can’t make any comparisons or conclusions. Many different racial and ethnic 
minority groups have experienced various degrees of hardship in South Africa and in other 
countries all over the world. How those groups have dealt with those circumstances is 
something to study closely and draw lessons from going forward, even if the only lesson is to 
manage expectations. This is where the Afrophobic tendency in the Department of Home 
Affairs in Durban comes into play. Reflection on how the Department of Home Affairs in 
Durban functions in reality is nothing to write home about as testament of this study’s 
participants/interviewees. The Department of Home Affairs in Durban is expected to be made 
aware of these issues, and efforts made towards addressing them with VFS. VFS is a 
commercial company and the whole point of outsourcing the submission and collection process 
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was to improve efficiency. This, to date, is not happening as it should be. Commercial 
companies that do not perform are supposed to be penalised and even their contracts 
withdrawn. The study sincerely hopes for improvement in the service delivery of the 
Department of Home Affairs as well as information on what the Department is doing to manage 
an outsource which is clearly and currently not keeping up to the standards of a normal visa 
application operation. 
 
One of the clear lessons from history is that human capital has proven to be far more important 
than political capital in getting ahead, and that reality helps to explain why black African 
migrants fared the way they did, not only in the post-Apartheid era but also in the preceding 
decades. 
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6 CHAPTER SIX: TRIANGULATED FINDINGS, 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1 THEORETICAL AND HYPOTHETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
RESEARCH STUDY 
This section provides a summary of the entire research study. It summarises the hypothetical 
foundation upon which the study was underpinned. This, then goes on to draw summary 
conclusions and recommendations about the study. The conclusions and recommendations are 
based on the findings. The study investigated the experiences of black African migrants on the 
service delivery of the Department of Home Affairs and explored the perceptions they had 
about the department. 
 
There seems to be elements of plausibility that the post-apartheid state has employed similar 
techniques of the apartheid regime to alienate and isolate non-nationals and mostly black 
African immigrants. In both, there have been means of gaining a legal foothold in the city, 
largely through fraud, dissimulation, or playing to the state’s instrumental logic. Nonetheless 
there are at least three areas of political action that illustrate the state’s legal and coercive efforts 
to exclude the threatening aliens: legal status and documentation; arrest, detention, and 
deportation; and a general lack of access to constitutional protection through the court and 
political processes. On their own, none of these exclusions are unique to non-nationals; many 
of the poor are similarly marginalised and are popularly considered less than full citizens. What 
separates non-nationals is the degree to which exclusion is both bureaucratically 
institutionalised and socially legitimate. In all cases, it is not only the material acts of 
marginalisation that matter – imprisonment, denial of services, or harassment (eg. recent 
2016/2017 Operation Fiela) – but also the nationalist discourse evoked to legitimise and explain 
them. 
 
As much as it is official state policy to exclude and remove unwanted outsiders (non-nationals 
and slum-dwellers), local officials and quasi-governmental actors retain enormous discretion 
in how they fulfil such imperatives. In places, this means police and officials of the Department 
of Home Affairs can decide on how to dispense their duty, they can choose to do little about 
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the alien invasion or capitalise on opportunities to develop protection rackets that allow them 
to stay. The daily practice of migration management has also been regularly controversial and, 
in some instances, sanctioned by Government’s internal control structures. These dysfunctional 
management practices have had three obvious manifestations: inconsistencies in temporary and 
permanent residence permits leading to litigation cases; parliamentary monitoring of the 
Department of Home Affair’s budgetary mismanagement and finally, rampant corruption. 
However, the study came up with a triangulation of findings emanating from both theoretical 
and hypothetical summaries of the research which are: 
1. The lack of good customer services as experienced by black African immigrants at the 
Durban Department of Home Affairs is often linked to the negative attitudes of its 
officials.  
 
2. Most often, officials of the Durban Department of Home Affairs are in doubt of the 
documents black African immigrants present to them for application purposes. 
 
3. There is a strong relationship between Afrophobia and the nature (quality) of service 
delivery to black African immigrants at the Durban Department of Home Affairs.  
 
4. The outsourcing of responsibility of the Department of Home Affairs is irrational 
because of the sensitive nature of the duties stipulated by the legal framework that are 
instituted and subject to Batho Pele precepts, whereas VFS Global that handles this 
responsibility is a private enterprise with the sole purpose of maximising profit. 
 
5. Currently mismanagement, corruption, poor productivity and limited strategic vision 
have led to the discrediting of the new permit system being handled by VFS. The 
official immigration system fails to facilitate the importing of workers with much-
needed skills, instead generating an unofficial economic immigration process (Segatti, 
et al., 2008). Corruption remains rife throughout immigration services and ‘prices’ for 
services (from the renewal of temporary permits to asylum applications, marriage 
certificates and airport ‘passage’) are regularly updated in NGOs reports. It is against 
this backdrop of dysfunctional public-sector management that the Turnaround Strategy 
emerged.  
203 
 
 
6. Recent work in anthropology has shown that individuals who seek the support or 
services of state institutions, such as protection by the police or financial assistance, as 
well as immigration departments, do apprehend the state not as a rational-bureaucratic 
ideal but precisely as the opposite: a dangerous and inscrutable entity, guided by rules 
but staffed by officials with ulterior motives. Anthropologists have termed this 
contradictory phenomenon ‘the magic of the state’. Hoag (2010) has shown, however, 
that such ‘magic’ is relational: from the perspective of the Department of Home Affairs 
bureaucrats, it is the public and upper-level administrators that are perceived as 
dangerous and illegible, the not street-level public servants. These sorts of impressions 
no doubt complicate the delivery and reception of directives, suggesting that even sound 
plans could be met with scepticism. For example, officials do point out with irony that 
they are charged with carrying out the DHA’s Batho Pele (People First) initiative aimed 
at improving customer service, and yet when requesting information or resources from 
Head Office they are often met with delays and indifference, and in most cases, black 
African immigrants are not aware of this. Despite an emphasis on changing the 
Department of Home Affair’s institutional culture, divides between upper-management 
and street-level bureaucrats endure. 
 
7. This suspicious perspective was directed ‘upwards’ towards management and 
‘outwards’ towards the public (black African immigrants). It is alleged that often, if not 
most of the times, officials perceived members of the public (black African immigrants) 
to be dangerous and untrustworthy, always ready to cheat the system by submission of 
fraudulent papers for documentation purposes. Officials’ responsibility, they stated, 
was to protect themselves and the broader South African public against these threats. 
However, it is ironic for example, that when asked about accusations in the media that 
the Department of Home Affairs officials take bribes to marry South African women to 
non-national men who want to obtain a ‘spousal accompaniment’ permit, officials 
always roundly rejected the assertion. Instead, they said that the immigrants were 
paying South Africans to marry them and were therefore responsible. The Department 
of Home Affairs officials also stressed that weak institutional capacity in foreign states 
was undermining their own systems. This mistrust of the populace (black African 
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immigrants) was pervasive at almost all of the offices visited, where most officials 
viewed all ‘clients’ as potential suspects. 
 
The criminalisation of applicants was another way that officials contributed to building 
the perception of a ‘magical’ public. Most black African immigrants were presumed 
guilty until being proven innocent. This has a wider ramification as black African 
immigrants stated that they are never given a fair judgement when making an 
application at the Department of Home Affairs. Just as Peberdy (2008) notes, “the 
state’s restrictive and exclusionary immigration policies include all immigrants – black 
and white – in order to protect the new members of the ‘new” South Africa” (Peberdy, 
2008, p.35). Indeed, throughout its post-colonial history, South African policy has 
regularly spoken of the nation as a body that could be bolstered or, more regularly, 
contaminated by outsiders – native or foreign. Many government leaders, regardless of 
race or political affiliation, privately (and occasionally publicly) share a former 
Minister of Home Affairs’ sentiment that: 
South Africa is faced with another threat, and that is the SADC ideology of free 
movement of people, free trade and freedom to choose where you live or work. 
Free movement of persons spells disaster for our country (Buthelezi, 1997). 
 
8. It has often been alleged that officials conceive some of the public (black African 
immigrants) as a dangerous object by what might be called the pathogenisation of 
migrants. For example, one official of the Department of Home Affairs, when asked 
about the challenges of his job, declared that health issues were foremost, something 
mentioned by others as well. He said that they are not given enough vaccinations by the 
Department of Home Affairs, given their close contact with some immigrants and 
asylum seekers from all over the world. Oddly, though perhaps indicative of the 
potential irrationality of these fears, the illness he feared contracting was malaria. While 
recognising that these mechanisms of reification and demonisation of the public are 
widely shared by immigration officials worldwide and not necessarily emblematic of 
some specific South African construction of the aliens (Spire 2005).  
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The implication of these perceptions of the public as threatening and irrational are 
certainly not specific to the Department of Home Affairs and can be found in other 
sectors of public administration. However, they are certainly strongly reinforced by the 
fact that the Department of Home Affairs officials face a non-national public and 
participate in a legal culture that questions the legitimacy of foreigners’ presence in 
South Africa. The demonisation of outsiders and human mobility; ineffective, arbitrary, 
and often extra-legal efforts to ensure socio-spatial separation; and the state’s inability 
to affect a post-1994 national rebirth all appear to be strategies to achieve specific 
objectives. Nevertheless, it is these continuities and trends that have created and 
demonised the ‘aliens’ while encouraging and empowering the citizenry to alienate and 
liquidate in the name of political self-actualisation. 
 
9.  By enforcing compliance with quantitative metrics of performance, the Department of 
Home Affairs encouraged its junior officials to view civilians, and particularly foreign 
African immigrants, as problems to be solved rather than clients to be served. This 
seriously undermined the adoption of a genuine service-oriented organisational culture 
(Segatti 2012). With Batho Pele and the Turn-around Strategy, no doubt, its 
implementation has undeniably resulted in an overall improvement of services across 
the Department as well as better financial management at the top levels, resulting in the 
Department’s first clean audit since 1995. However, most empirical evidence available 
to date indicates that immigration services, particularly in the areas of corruption, work 
permit allocation, treatment of undocumented migrants and of asylum seekers and 
refugees, remains largely unchanged. 
 
Borrowing from Grindle’s (1997) analytical framework, this study has argued that if 
some intentions of the Turn-around Strategy and of previous transformation initiatives 
did address core problems (such as recruitment and performance expectations), these 
missed out on one crucial dimension, the creation of a shared sense of mission. In doing 
so, it increased most officials’ sense of institutional instability and antagonism towards 
the public (black African immigrants), two points which prevent the learning processes 
that have actually taken place from spreading beyond certain individuals and certain 
sections of the Department. This in turn raises the question of the degree to which a 
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public-oriented reform can succeed in the absence of a political will to serve a specific 
public. 
 
It is rather the failure of the political leadership to address the lack of a shared sense of 
mission and the range of unintended, counter-productive effects, elicited by the reform 
itself which explain the overall incapacity to amend perceptions and behaviours among 
civil servants. 
 
6.2 SUMMARY 
 
The arrival of international migrants in South Africa, particularly those of black African 
origin, has been met with intense intolerance. Xenophobia remains one of the negative 
and widespread features of post-apartheid South Africa. It is not only racialised, but it 
is also Africanised, with black African foreigners being disproportionally the targets of 
xenophobia (Nyamnjoh, 2006, p.49). It is within this context that some authors such as 
Matsinhe (2011, p.298), Everatt (2011, p.7) and Mngxitama (2008, p.195) use the terms 
‘negrophobia’ or ‘Afrophobia’ to refer to the racialised xenophobia directed towards 
black African migrants, which they view as a more accurate term to describe 
xenophobia in South Africa. Bekker (2010, p.136) alludes to a hierarchy of belonging 
of the different races based on a ranking of races and stereotypes of the different racial 
groups. 
 
Black African foreigners in South Africa are often referred to by the derogatory term 
amakwerekwere. The term, coined by black South Africans, is loaded with negative 
connotations and symbolises the sound of the unintelligible languages other Africans 
speak (Nyamnjoh, 2006, p.39). The amakwerekwere are regarded as a deep threat to 
personal and community security (Vale, 2002, p.10), and a danger to the South African 
nation (Nyamnjoh, 2006, p.39). Thus, the African migrant is construed as the ‘other’. 
According to Vale (2002, p.13), this ‘othering’ was “derived ironically from a sense of 
superiority and inflated by the celebration of the success of South Africa’s transition, 
but it simultaneously constructed another underclass around the same conceptual 
primitives upon which apartheid once rested”. Nyamnjoh (2006, p.51) underscores how 
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ironic it is that black Africans should be the victims of racial profiling in a new 
democratic dispensation. 
 
In practice, xenophobia in South Africa is manifested in the prejudice, discrimination, 
hostility and violence directed towards foreigners. Incidents of physical xenophobic 
attacks have been reported in the media since the mid-1990s. In 2008 South Africa was 
in the international spotlight following a wave of xenophobic violence, the worst 
violence witnessed in the country since the end of apartheid. Over a period of two 
weeks, violence spread across townships in Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg and 
left 62 dead, hundreds injured, tens of thousands displaced and a lot of property 
destroyed (Worby, Hassim and Kupe, 2008, pp.1-2). Although the attacks were targeted 
at black African migrants, some South Africans from smaller ethnic groups were also 
victims. 
 
After an initially slow reaction to the 2008 xenophobic violence, the government 
attributed it to a ‘third force’ and denied the existence of xenophobia. A year prior to 
the attacks the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) had noted the poor treatment 
of migrants by South Africans. It noted that African foreigners were being subjected to 
brutality and detention and that the rising tide of xenophobia should be stopped (African 
Union, 2007, p.286). However, in its response, the state denied the existence of 
xenophobic tendencies (African Union, 2007, p.377). Misago (2011, p.96) argues that, 
alongside the denial, the state had allowed a culture of impunity in relation to 
perpetrators of xenophobic violence to prevail. This is despite the existence of a legal 
framework guaranteeing international migrants more rights than ever before (Landau 
et al., 2010, p.222). In short, the South African state has not only downplayed the 
seriousness of xenophobia but has allegedly also been guilty of fostering it. 
 
In March 2012 the South African government was accused of being xenophobic by the 
Nigerian government after Home Affairs deported 125 Nigerians who, upon landing at 
the airport in Johannesburg, allegedly produced fake immunisation cards (Butunyi, 
2012). The Nigerian government retaliated by deporting 84 South Africans from 
Nigeria, sparking off a diplomatic spat between the two countries. The South African 
government then issued an apology to the Nigerian government, which resolved the 
208 
 
issue. But later South Africa’s Deputy Foreign Minister admitted that the yellow fever 
certificates had not been checked properly by South African immigration officials and 
the Nigerians should not have been deported (BBC, 2012). 
 
The key arguments and assumptions that the researcher makes in this dissertation can 
be summarised as follows. The author asserts that the negative perceptions of migrants 
and the concern with state sovereignty in South Africa have led to a discourse that 
construes African migrants as vectors of insecurity. He argues that in response to the 
assumed threat posed by migrants to the wellbeing of South Africans, some state 
officials use their authority to disregard their own laws with impunity in order to 
constrain and exclude migrants with serious consequences for their wellbeing in South 
Africa. 
 
6.3  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This study is advocating for revision of the role played presently by the expensive and 
apparently inefficient/ineffective private agency called VFS. 
 
1.  The Department of Home Affairs should overhaul its core business applications, 
technology infrastructure and overall operations for improved service delivery. Hence, the 
officials of the department should equally be capacitated to ensure that African immigrants 
perception of them is improved positively. 
 
2. Effort should be made by top management to ensure that officials of the Durban 
Department of Home Affairs are adequately trained to handle applications of African 
immigrants that depend on their valued and informed judgement in making decisions that affect 
their lives. They should refrain from casting aspersion on the validity of documents tendered 
before them until such documents have been subjected to routine confirmation checks. 
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3. The South African government should endeavor to nip in the bud some of the 
unwarranted perceptions of people of colour in the country. Hence, the principles of justice, 
equity and fairness should be applied across the board without any fear or favor in rendering 
services at the Department of Home Affairs.  
 
4. The Department of Home Affairs outsourcing of some of its responsibility to VFS 
Global is irrational, expensive, and still evidenced with traces of inefficiency to the black 
African immigrants. This outsourcing should be reassessed/evaluated, improvement made to 
curtail the present condition of affairs and if possible, VFS should be entirely scrapped. 
Otherwise how will this private entity be subjected to Batho Pele precepts that governs public 
institutions like the Department of Home Affairs? Currently VFS is unprofessional, 
unresponsive, insensitive and worse still not subject to Batho Pele precepts. 
 
5.  The South African government should put up all measures necessary to curtail and 
apprehend corrupt practices/officials at the Department of Home Affairs. This will go a long 
way to root out corrupt officials who bring disrepute to the image of the department from the 
genuine officials who should also be rewarded periodically for good conduct to ensure 
continuity. Hence, this will also serve as a deterrent measure for the corrupt officials. There 
should be greater awareness of the presence of service standards within the regional 
government office, so that all employees are educated on its value and relevance for public 
service delivery. This can be achieved through displays, workshops and developmental 
programmes. 
 
6.  Top management at the Head Office of the Department of Home Affairs should 
endeavour to speed up turn-around time when officials at the regional offices are requesting 
information, confirmation or resources from the Head Office. This will go a long way to 
alleviate the plight of black African immigrants, who most of the time presume that the 
Department just intentionally wants to frustrate them to go home to where they came from. 
Most of them are not privy to information regarding the status of their applications. Hence, an 
appropriate institutional policy that is effective and efficient should be adopted. The 
Department’s internal customers’ concern of redress is impossible to apply fully because some 
of the functions are centralised and they really don’t have a say, and yet those functions are the 
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ones that have many errors in processing documents and the turnaround time can therefore not 
be predicted. So de-centralisation of functions may be the solution, because the regional office 
will be able to take ownership of errors. Management teams play a pivotal role in providing 
strategic leadership and leading by example. There should be greater monitoring in terms of 
management ‘walking the talk’. This will motivate staff to follow the principles underpinning 
the ‘people first’ approach. 
 
7.  There should be a total recalibration of the mind-set and perception of officials of the 
Department of Home Affairs directed towards black African immigrants as being dangerous 
and untrustworthy. This prejudice should be condemned in the strongest terms by top-
management in the Department of Home Affairs in its entirety and political leaders inclusively. 
Officials of the Department of Home Affairs should always endeavour to officially confirm 
documents presented by black African immigrants before they are discredited. Also, political 
leaders from all political spectrums should equally refrain from making unfounded statements 
which they deliver in the public domain, as some of these statements have the capacity to 
embolden prejudices among citizenry and staff of the Department of Home Affairs in 
dispensing their official duties. When an activity is allowed to take place time and time again 
without any hindrance from the government and its departmental service agency, more 
especially when those affected are black Africans, it means that it is tacitly condoned by the 
government authorities. This becomes a norm and according to international law this can 
portend an accepted activity of such given society. 
 
8. There is an urgency in the need to change the narrative perception of demonising and 
pathogenising black African immigrants as a threat. This is irrational and is enforced by the 
fact that the public whom they are dealing with are a non-national public and is based on their 
(official) capacity of questioning the legitimacy of black African presence in South Africa. This 
point cannot be over-emphasised. This will go a long way to discontinue the continuing trends 
of the Apartheid regime. There is a need for adequate training and re-training of the Department 
of Home Affairs officials, which is important not only for career development, but also for 
motivation of staff in respect of service delivery initiatives. There is also a need to consider 
staff complaints, as this provides valuable input that can transform performance in the 
department. Since staff are also customers and are often directly involved with the public, their 
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complaints often constitute primary data which should not be ignored for any service delivery 
improvement initiatives. 
 
9.  The call is upon the South African government to put appropriate measures in place to 
ensure that quantitative metrics of performance as expected from officials of the Department 
of Home Affairs go beyond just seeing black African immigrant applicants as a problem to be 
solved, but rather as clients to be served with human dignity and respect. Hence, the need for 
a re-alignment of human rights with already existing performance criteria for officials of the 
Department of Home Affairs. The South African government should deploy, and ensure the 
sustenance of cultural diplomacy in order to make it more effective in bringing our peoples 
together. 
 
As Croucher (1998, p.64) emphasised, “immigration in South Africa and elsewhere, is a 
complex social, political and economic issue that poses numerous policy challenges for even 
the most stable democratic states”, official policy toward illegal immigrants have also 
sometimes been confusing, incoherent and contradicting because the government had “been 
caught unawares by the enormity, complexity and seeming intractability of dealing with large-
scale black immigration” (Mercury, October 26,1995). 
 
However, this study is advocating for a migration policy that is humane and consistent and 
which can foster the spirit of Ubuntu, contribute to economic development, taking cognisance 
of global realities, and which should be consistent with the constitution of the Republic, the 
Bill of Rights as well as ensuring respect for human dignity as espoused and enshrined in the 
charter of Fundamental Human Rights. 
 
6.4  CONCLUSION 
 
In as much as the country’s majority opposes further assistance or incorporation of immigrants 
into South African life, the government’s legitimacy is at stake, as is the universalism of the 
post-Apartheid constitutional order. This is well encapsulated as can already be seen in the 
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words of a police officer at Denver police station during the aftermath of the 2008 xenophobic 
attack, a space of safety for displaced migrants immediately after the attacks. As he explained, 
“We have worked for the past fourteen years to be seen as legitimate among a community that 
had good reason to distrust the police. Now if they see us protecting foreigners, all we’ve done 
will be lost” (Hornberger, 2008, p.12). Unless the South African government and its citizens 
find ways to address the ethical and practical tensions reflected in these views, and to reconcile 
the two demons within South African society the possibility of abetting some of the findings 
of this study may not soon be realised. 
  
6.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
 
The study was conducted with black African immigrants residing in KwaZulu-Natal province 
and specifically within the Durban metropolitan areas. It would be interesting to compare black 
African immigrants’ perceptions and experiences of service delivery at the Department of 
Home Affairs with the perceptions and experiences of other black African immigrants from the 
rest of the provinces in South Africa. 
 
As corruption has been equally identified as one of the hindrances to service delivery, 
determining the effectiveness of mechanisms used by the Department of Home Affairs in 
rooting out corruption since it is quite high, is worth pursuing. 
 
Centralisation of the functions to Head office has been cited by some of the 
respondents/interviewees as among the main causes of delays in processing and accessing 
enabling documents. A study on the pros and cons of de-centralisation of core functions of the 
Department of Home Affairs to provincial offices should be pursued and is worthwhile. 
 
It would also be interesting to conduct another study on white immigrants to ascertain their 
experiences and perceptions of service delivery at the Department of Home Affairs. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
 
Informed Consent Form 
 
Dear Participant, 
I am currently conducting a Doctoral study titled ‘An interrogation of Service Delivery by the 
Department of Home Affairs towards immigrants, exploring the possibility of Afro-phobia 
within Xenophobia: A case study of the Durban Department of Home Affairs’. 
You are kindly requested to consider and respond to the questions attached herewith. Details 
of the project appear below. Information provided by you will be treated with the strictest 
confidentiality and your identity will not be revealed to anyone, unless you give consent. 
Participation in this survey/interview is voluntary and you may withdraw if you should choose 
to do so, at any time. Your time and effort in participating in this project are greatly appreciated. 
 
Name of Researcher: Akachukwu Darlington Umeh. 
 
Title of Project: (An interrogation of Service Delivery by the Department of Home Affairs 
towards immigrants, exploring the possibility of Afro-phobia within Xenophobia: A case study 
of the Durban Department of Home Affairs) 
 
Investigator: Name: Akachukwu Darlington Umeh. 
                        Address: Political Science (UKZN) 
                        Tel :0846433149      
                        E-mail: 212554282@stu.ukzn.ac.za. 
 
For further information please contact: Dr. Lubna Nadvi 
                                                                     UKZN 
                                                                     Tel: 031 260 7124 / 7336 
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nadvis@ukzn.ac.za 
 
Reason for Selection as a participant: To elicit information on the above topic. 
 
 
 
I____________________________________________________(full name of participant) 
hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the 
research project and I consent to participating in the research project. 
 
I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so 
desire. 
 
 
Signature __________________________       Date ____________________________ 
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PLEASE KINDLY INDICATE, TICK OR CIRCLE THE CORRECT ANSWER 
THAT IS APPLICABLE TO YOU 
 
1) Sex and Nationality    
i. Male              
ii. Female 
 
    NATIONALITY   ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
1b) Please indicate your age bracket. 
 
i. 20----29 
ii. 30----39 
iii. 40----49 
iv. 50----59 
 
1c) Marital Status     
 
i. Single          
ii. Married 
iii. Divorced 
 
1d) Nationality of your spouse if married. 
 
i. South African 
ii. Non-South African 
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1e) Highest level of Education. 
 
i. No formal  
ii. Completed primary 
iii. Completed secondary 
iv. Completed matric 
v. Tertiary 
 
2) How long have you been in South Africa? 
 
A. Less than three years. 
B. Less than five years. 
C. Less than ten years. 
D. More than ten years. 
E. More than fifteen years. 
 
3) How often do you visit Home Affairs within a year for documentation purposes? 
 
A. Once in a while. 
B. Twice. 
C. More than five times. 
D. More than ten times. 
E. Uncountable. 
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4) From below how can you rate your experience at the Department of Home Affairs for 
example; the way you were spoken to, time spent in a queue, abuse from officials….? 
 
A. Very good. 
B. Good. 
C. Fair. 
D. Poor. 
E. Very poor. 
 
5) Did the officials at the Department of Home Affairs attend to you in a professional manner? 
 
A. Agree. 
B. Strongly Agree. 
C. Undecided. 
D. Disagree. 
E. Strongly Disagree. 
 
6) In your opinion, do you think you are treated in the same way as other immigrants (whites) 
at the Department of Home Affairs? 
 
A. Agree. 
B. Strongly Agree. 
C. Undecided. 
D. Disagree. 
E. Strongly Disagree. 
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7) Are you worried about the situation at the Department of Home Affairs office? 
 
A. Agree. 
B. Strongly Agree. 
C. Undecided. 
D. Disagree. 
E. Strongly Disagree. 
 
8) Before your visit to the Department of Home Affairs did you expect to be treated differently 
from others (whites) with regards to the quality of service delivered by the staff members? 
A. Agree. 
B. Strongly Agree. 
C. Undecided. 
D. Disagree. 
E. Strongly Disagree. 
 
9) Do you agree that officials of the Department of Home Affairs are to be blamed for the 
manner in which they attend to you?  
 
A. Agree. 
B. Strongly Disagree. 
C. Undecided. 
D. Disagree. 
E. Strongly Disagree. 
 
10) Or, do you think that they are not to be blamed? 
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A. Agree. 
B. Strongly Agree. 
C. Undecided. 
D. Disagree. 
E. Strongly Disagree. 
 
11) There is huge evidence of good customer service at the Department of Home Affairs. What 
is your position with the above statement? 
 
A. Agree. 
B. Strongly Agree. 
C. Undecided. 
D. Disagreed. 
E. Strongly Disagree. 
 
12) If you ‘Strongly Disagree’ with the above, would you agree that lack of good customer 
service is often linked to the negative attitude of officials of the Department of Home Affairs? 
 
A. Agree. 
B. Strongly Disagree. 
C. Undecided. 
D. Disagree. 
E. Strongly Disagree. 
 
13) Are you proud of your identity (as a black African immigrant) in South Africa in relation 
to how you are treated at Department of home Affairs? 
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A. Agree. 
B. Strongly Agree. 
C. Undecided. 
D. Disagree. 
E. Strongly Disagree. 
 
14) If you ‘Agreed’ or ‘Strongly Agreed’ with the statement above, is it because you are treated 
professionally by the officials of the Department of Home Affairs? 
 
A. Agree. 
B. Strongly Agree. 
C. Undecided. 
D. Disagree. 
E. Strongly Disagree. 
 
15) Do officials of the Department of Home Affairs honour the paper documents you present 
for your application with dignity? 
 
A. Agree. 
B. Strongly Agree. 
C. Undecided. 
D. Disagree. 
E. Strongly Disagree. 
 
16) Most times, if not always, officials of the Department of Home Affairs are in doubt of the 
documents you present for your application? 
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A. Agree. 
B. Strongly Agree. 
C. Undecided. 
D. Disagree. 
E. Strongly Disagree. 
 
17) Would you rather contract an agent for your application if you have the resources than 
make the application yourself? 
A. Agree. 
B. Strongly Agree. 
C. Undecided. 
D. Disagree. 
E. Strongly Disagree. 
 
18) In the course of presenting documents for application, do you agree that black African 
immigrants are treated in a similar manner as their other counterpart immigrants (whites)? 
 
A. Agree. 
B. Strongly Agree. 
C. Undecided. 
D. Disagree. 
E. Strongly Disagree. 
 
19) In your opinion which is subject to verification, if you ‘Strongly Disagree’ with the above 
statement, does it mean you think that other counterparts (white immigrants) are treated with 
dignity and less suspicion of presenting fraudulent/fake documents for application at the 
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Department of Home Affairs? 
 
A. Agree. 
B. Strongly Agree. 
C. Undecided. 
D. Disagree. 
E. Strongly Disagree. 
 
20) Do you agree that most times, if not always, that black African immigrants do 
present/submit fraudulent documents for application? 
 
A. Agree. 
B. Strongly Agree. 
C. Undecided. 
D. Disagree. 
E. Strongly Disagree. 
 
21) In your opinion, do you agree that most times, if not always, that officials of the Department 
of Home Affairs do assume/associate black African immigrants with the tendency of tendering 
fake/fraudulent documents? 
 
A. Agree. 
B. Strongly Agree. 
C. Undecided. 
D. Disagree. 
E. Strongly Disagree. 
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22) Do you agree that the quality of services rendered to black African immigrants is as a result 
of discriminatory practices of the officials of the Department of Home Affairs? 
A. Agree. 
B. Strongly Agree. 
C. Undecided. 
D. Disagree. 
E. Strongly Disagree. 
 
23) Do you agree that most times officials of the Department of Home Affairs at the frontline 
desk do speak an indigenous language to black African immigrants without first getting to 
know whether they understand the language? 
 
A. Agree. 
B. Strongly Agree. 
C. Undecided. 
D. Disagree. 
E. Strongly Disagree. 
 
24) Are you okay with how officials of the Department of Home Affairs perceive (think) of 
you before taking a decision affecting your application? 
 
A. Agree. 
B. Strongly Agree. 
C. Undecided. 
D. Disagree. 
E. Strongly Disagree. 
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25) Do you agree that the quality of services rendered to black African immigrants could be 
improved if the officials of the Department of Home Affairs can change the way they see you 
by treating you professionally with a spirit of Ubuntu (brotherhood), and are well trained to 
make informed decisions? 
A. Agree. 
B. Strongly Agree. 
C. Undecided. 
D. Disagree. 
E. Strongly Disagree. 
 
26) Do you think that you can achieve the dreams and aspirations you had before coming to 
South Africa if treated fairly, as well as a positive improvement at the Department of Home 
Affairs? 
 
A. Agree. 
B. Strongly Agree. 
C. Undecided. 
D. Disagree. 
E. Strongly Disagree. 
 
27) Would you agree that there is a strong relationship between being seen as a black African 
first (Afro-phobia) and the quality of service delivery to African immigrants at the Department 
of Home Affairs? 
A. Agree. 
B. Strongly Agree. 
C. Undecided. 
D. Disagree. 
E. Strongly Disagree 
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
1. What are the challenges you face applying for a permit as a black African 
immigrant in South Africa? 
 
2. What was your experience of the service delivery at the Department of Home 
Affairs? 
 
3. Give examples and cite cases of your experience at the Department of Home 
Affairs? 
 
4. What is your opinion of the service delivery at the Department of Home Affairs 
towards immigrants? 
 
5. What do you think will be the implication or consequence of these to the 
Department and to yourself? 
 
6. It is alleged that the Department of Home Affairs is unresponsive to the needs 
of its customers, what is your view on this? 
 
7. Does it make any difference being a black African immigrant or a white 
immigrant at the office of Department of Home Affairs? 
 
8. Do you understand any South African languages like IsZulu, IsXhosa,      
Tsonga, Sotho etc. and if not, does it make any difference at the Department of 
Home Affairs? 
 
